The Militia Government They Want to Push Through the Leadership Body of Taqadum

At the outset, the leadership body of Taqadum was formed with a composition of 70% from civil society forces and 30% from political forces. This structure allowed the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia to infiltrate the leadership of Taqadum’s coordination body. The RSF decided to pass its government through Taqadum’s structures and rallied support for this purpose. Although the proposal was formally presented by the Revolutionary Front, it created a strong faction within the leadership body, led by figures such as Mohamed Hassan Al-Ta’ishi, Nasr Al-Din Abdel Bari, Alaa Al-Din Naqd, Taha Osman, and many others who entered the leadership body through the civil society quota, which represents 70%.

When this issue is portrayed as solely concerning the Revolutionary Front, it is a deliberate misrepresentation aimed at absolving the legislative leadership of Taqadum from any allegations of collusion with the RSF militia. In reality, the proposal garnered the support of 70 out of 140 members of the leadership body.

This division within the legislative leadership rendered the crucial meeting incapable of resolving any pivotal issues. Instead, the meeting devolved into an event characterized by mere “positive rhetoric and pleasantries.” When the political party bloc, representing 30% of the leadership body, rejected the proposal for an RSF militia government—deeming it a breach of the rules and principles of Taqadum itself—the opposing faction, aligned with the militia, disrupted the Roundtable Conference initiative proposed by the party bloc as a compromise. This resulted in both the militia government proposal and the Roundtable Conference being referred to the political mechanism for resolution, along with the organizational file.

A small group aligned with Yasir Arman supported the RSF-aligned faction in stalling the Roundtable Conference initiative. Arman himself chose to sit outside the meeting hall, directing his group like university students through tactics of sensationalism. However, to his credit, he opposed the proposed RSF militia government being pushed through the leadership body.

In conclusion, all critical issues—such as the government proposal, the Roundtable Conference, and the organizational file—were deferred to the political mechanism due to the deep divisions within the leadership. These divisions go beyond the narrative that the Revolutionary Front alone proposed the so-called “Exile Government,” which some leaders of Taqadum refer to it as. Its proponents, however, call it the “Government Within Sudan.”

The bottom line is that framing this issue as exclusively related to the Revolutionary Front, while ignoring the fact that the proposal received support from 70 members of the leadership body, does not reflect the true state of affairs within Taqadum. The reality is that the organization has effectively split into two factions.