Islamists in Sudan: Their Struggles and Revival (6 of 6)

(The Post-Turabi Party)

Lady Aisha (may Allah be pleased with her) narrated that when the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ passed away, Abu Bakr entered the mosque without speaking to anyone. He proceeded to the chamber of Aisha, where the Prophet’s body was laid covered with a Yemeni cloth. Abu Bakr uncovered the Prophet’s face, kissed him, and said, “By Allah, you have tasted the death that was decreed upon you, and Allah will not combine two deaths upon you.”

Ibn Abbas (may Allah be pleased with him) reported that Abu Bakr emerged from Aisha’s chamber while Umar was addressing the people, insisting that the Prophet had not died and would return to deal with his enemies. Abu Bakr told Umar to sit down, but he refused. Abu Bakr then began reciting, “Whoever worships Muhammad, know that Muhammad has passed away. Whoever worships Allah, know that Allah is Ever-Living and does not die.” He recited the verse:
“Muhammad is no more than a Messenger; many were the Messengers that passed away before him. If he dies or is killed, will you then turn back on your heels? And he who turns back on his heels will not harm Allah in the least. And Allah will reward the grateful.” (Quran 3:144)

Hearing this verse, it was as if the people were unaware it had been revealed until Abu Bakr recited it. They began reciting it themselves, while Umar said, “When I heard Abu Bakr recite this verse, my legs could no longer carry me, and I collapsed to the ground.”

(Adapted from Sahih al-Bukhari, Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, and Ibn Kathir’s Tafsir)

The “Turabi Party” was the dominant movement in Sudan’s Islamic political scene from 1964 to 2024. Although this movement fragmented into various factions, these groups continued to draw upon Dr. Hassan al-Turabi’s ideas on renewing Islam and applying it to governance. While the movement had successes and failures, its foundation was driven by intention, and intentions are judged accordingly.

However, history shows that eras and paradigms must inevitably come to an end, making way for new chapters with fresh perspectives, generations, and challenges. This is a divine and rational necessity. The proposed new chapter, referred to here as the “Post-Turabi Party,” represents a break from past ideological and organizational traditions. Below is a modest approach outlining this shift, hoping it will be refined and enriched by others.

The new approach examines three core areas of difference between the “Turabi Party” and the envisioned “Post-Turabi Party”:

1. Goals
2. Organizational Structure
3. Intellectual Approach

The Goal

In earlier writings, I explained that Sudanese Islamists became so to achieve a particular objective: ensuring that the state adhered to the nation’s religion and societal values, as was the case before colonialism. During the era of the National Salvation Government (1989–2019), the Islamists achieved considerable success in this regard, as detailed in Part 5 of this series. They outmaneuvered secularists politically and socially, which led their opponents to boycott elections under various pretexts, fearing an Islamist victory.

After the fall of the National Salvation Government in 2019, secularists aimed to re-establish a purely secular state, reminiscent of Sudan’s early independence era. This escalated into demands that included the separation of religion from state governance. Secularists, supported by Western powers and regional actors like the UAE, sought to exclude Islamists, passing the November 2019 “Dismantling of the June 30 Regime” Act, which dissolved the National Congress Party and confiscated its assets without judicial oversight.

The international community’s envoy, Volker Perthes, explicitly supported these measures, stating in June 2022 that the UN mission in Sudan had “no intention of engaging with banned Islamist parties.” This exclusionary stance became a norm in Sudanese politics, with the phrase “except the National Congress Party” frequently invoked. The exclusion expanded to include affiliated individuals and parties, marginalizing a significant segment of Sudanese society.

Following the outbreak of war in 2023, the secularist agenda intensified. Agreements such as the “Addis Ababa Agreement” (2020) and the “Nairobi Declaration” (2024) emphasized the establishment of a secular state, enshrining these principles as “super-constitutional,” beyond amendment even by public referendum. These developments fundamentally altered the political landscape, forcing Islamists and broader nationalist groups into a united front against external imposition.

The challenges faced today are fundamentally different from those of the “Turabi era.” The goal is no longer about convincing society of Islam’s comprehensive nature; this has already been achieved over decades of Islamic governance and activism. Instead, the challenge lies in resisting attempts to impose secularism through external influence, sidelining both Islamists and the broader Sudanese public.

Organizational Structure

The fight against secularism and external impositions is no longer limited to Islamist parties. It is a collective effort involving the entire Sudanese society, as demonstrated by the widespread rejection of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their external backers. In this context, traditional Islamist organizations are insufficient to encompass the broad societal movement emerging post-war.

Dr. Hassan al-Turabi once expressed concerns about the Islamic revival turning into a “scattered popular phenomenon” if not organized. However, today, it is this very popular phenomenon—a collective national consciousness—that offers the greatest potential for societal transformation. The envisioned “Post-Turabi Party” must integrate into this societal movement rather than operate as a distinct ideological entity.

This new party would serve as a unifying platform for all Sudanese, transcending ideological and sectarian divisions. It would welcome not only Islamists but also Christians and others who suffered from the RSF’s atrocities, standing as a national party open to all.

Intellectual Approach

Dr. Turabi’s earlier intellectual contributions, characterized by a pragmatic linkage between thought and action, remain relevant today. His “old” approach—prior to the National Salvation era—was free from rigid ideological frameworks, emphasizing practical solutions over utopian visions. This stands in contrast to the more ideologically-driven strategies that emerged later.

The “Post-Turabi Party” must revive this flexible and action-oriented intellectual tradition while remaining open to new ideas and leaders capable of addressing contemporary challenges. As Imam Ali (may Allah honor him) said, “The wisest person is one who combines the wisdom of others with their own.”

In summary, the “Post-Turabi Party” represents a new chapter in Sudan’s Islamic and national movement, one that transcends old paradigms and embraces inclusivity. By aligning with the broader societal will and focusing on pragmatic solutions, it can navigate the complex realities of Sudan’s post-war landscape while resisting external impositions.