Rapid Support Militia and Forces of Freedom and Change: Time for Separation

By: Somaya Said

The relationship between military militias and political parties worldwide is complex and dynamic, influenced by a variety of internal and external factors. Often, this relationship forms the cornerstone of the political landscape, with militias supporting parties and protecting their interests in exchange for material and political backing. However, these relationships can undergo significant shifts, leading militias to sever ties with political parties.

This analysis explores some of the reasons behind the Rapid Support Militia’s decision to part ways with the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) and other aligned civilian forces. It also highlights the potential consequences for these political parties.

The sweeping victories of the Sudanese Armed Forces across various fronts have altered the strategic objectives of the militia, prompting it to reassess its alliances with political parties that oppose the military. Initially, the militia aimed to control the entire country. However, it scaled back its ambitions to dominate specific regions it called “controlled areas” in Khartoum, Madani, and Darfur. After nearly two years, it became clear that establishing an independent state was unachievable, as reliance on external support and weak internal political allies led to significant losses. This realization marked not only the failure of their strategic goals but also the end of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the downfall of its leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), who went from being Sudan’s vice president to one of the most infamous war criminals in history.

Before the conflict, internal disputes arose within the Dagalo family over power and resources, creating rival factions, particularly with Gony, who controls RSF investments abroad. However, the war that erupted on April 15, 2023, temporarily united them around the greater goal of taking control of Sudan, backed by financial support from the UAE and profits from smuggling Sudanese gold.

It seems that Hemedti has lost faith in the FFC parties, which supported him before and during the war. Previously hidden, significant disagreements have now surfaced, potentially signaling the end of a dubious relationship between the two sides.

To this day, the FFC parties maintain a cautious connection with the RSF, refraining from condemning its internationally documented atrocities, including killings, displacement, and destruction of civilian infrastructure such as hospitals in Khartoum, Madani, and El Fasher. They have also avoided celebrating the Sudanese Armed Forces’ victories or acknowledging the return of displaced civilians and the cessation of violence. This silence, likely intended to preserve their alliance with the RSF, has not shielded them from criticism. RSF media outlets have launched fierce attacks on FFC leaders, revealing damaging information about their connections with the militia. These ties appear to be rooted in mutual exploitation rather than genuine aspirations for a civilian state or democratic transition.

The RSF’s shift in strategy stems from its perception of the FFC’s failure to deliver on promises and its policies, which conflict with the militia’s interests in seizing power. The RSF feels it is fighting on the battlefield while its ally awaits military success to claim political power effortlessly.

Many RSF fighters and media affiliates have expressed dissatisfaction with the FFC, accusing it of silence and failing to defend Hemedti and his forces against external pressures from major countries and international organizations demanding accountability for war crimes and atrocities.

Typically, militias in some countries seek greater economic gains through illegal activities such as arms and drug trafficking, viewing political alliances as obstacles. In the case of the RSF, however, its wealth from illicit activities like gold smuggling enticed the FFC to align with it, using the militia as a military lever to gain power in Sudan.

Currently, the political and civilian forces allied with the rebellion are in their weakest position, facing the dual challenge of RSF battlefield defeats and fierce media attacks from RSF advisors and affiliates.

Will the Forces of Freedom and Change and the Coordination of Civil Forces (Taqaddum) sever their ties with the RSF following its collapse? Do they have the courage to apologize to the Sudanese people for siding with the wrong camp?