The Future of Arab Tribes After the Defeat of the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan
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Al-Sadiq Al-Razeeqi
After the decisive victories of the Sudanese Army over the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in various states of Sudan and battle areas in recent days, and after the apparent collapse of the rebellion and failure of its political and military project, while the war teeters on the edge, a state of anxiety, fear, and concern about the war’s repercussions and its impact on the Arab tribes scattered across the vast geographical stretch of western Sudan from the Nile River in the east to the Atlantic coast of West Africa is now unfolding.
This geographic region, known through centuries of European geographic exploration and earlier by Arab travelers, was historically referred to as Western and Central Sudan, which currently includes the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, particularly the countries of the Niger and Senegal river basins, Lake Chad, and surrounding areas, now known as the Sahel countries.
There is no disagreement that the war in Sudan was further complicated by external parties stoking the fire in an already intricately connected social environment shared by nine countries in the region. These external parties did not foresee the scale of political and social disarray they would cause, nor the storm of chaos that this war would unleash across sub-Saharan African nations.
For centuries, the Arab tribes in this vast part of the African continent have lived on the margins of political life, far from the centers of power, like many other desert tribes, carrying the burden of their historical struggles. This was compounded by the rise of the RSF in Sudan, with some of the Arab tribes in this vast region seeing it as a way to seize power in Sudan and then spread westward. However, some wise members recognized that the RSF was an ill-fated political and military project with no lasting power.
Nevertheless, certain voices from intellectuals and tribal leaders supported the RSF, driven by history and geography, hoping that the course of history would change, unaware that such aspirations did not align with the natural course of historical movements.
Some of the more enlightened members of the Arab tribes in western Sudan, as well as in Sudan’s western and central regions, understood that the RSF’s project had no direct connection with the aspirations of the tribes post-independence, yet it stirred emotions and ignited passions depending on the specific circumstances of each country in the region.
Over time, these diverse groups of intellectuals, politicians, and leaders of Arab origin worked diligently to express a political role that harmonized with the evolving political contexts of their countries, aiming to participate meaningfully in their national development and contribute to transforming their pastoral societies into stable and secure ones. They had been part of liberation movements, independence efforts, and key players in the civil and military struggles across their respective countries for six decades.
In light of social and political developments and the impact of social development rates, the dream of the Arab tribes in this vast region grew. However, they did not plan a political project or seek armed conflict for power, whether united, cooperative, or independently, except in the case of armed movements in Chad since 1965, when the people rose against the rule of President François Tombalbaye, leading to the formation of the FROLINAD movement. Arab Chadians played a central role in this, and Arab tribes immediately allied with other tribes to form armed political organizations, ensuring the movement was not exclusively an ethnic project.
The RSF’s rise, particularly following its involvement in the Yemen war in 2017, marked the first secret meeting with Israeli Mossad, which outlined a plan reflecting Israeli interests and addressed the ambitions of the RSF leadership.
At the same time, groups of Arabs from Chad, southern Libya, and other parts of Central West Africa were recruited for the RSF, and by 2019, their numbers had reached around 11,000 recruits. The number increased by over 400% after the fall of President Omar al-Bashir’s regime, enabling the RSF to build a large parallel army to the Sudanese military and create an African-Arab version of the Russian Wagner Group.
By the onset of the war, the RSF had over 120,000 soldiers, with 45% being foreign mercenaries from Chad, Niger, Mali, South Libya, Central Africa, eastern Nigeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, southern Algeria, and other countries, with Arabs making up 70% of the foreign presence within the RSF.
Given the shared tribal connections between Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Mali, Libya, southern Algeria, Senegal, and Mauritania, groups from these areas joined their Sudanese Arab cousins, including tribes such as the Rizeigat, Messiria, Hawazma, Tiyaisha, Himad, Bani Helba, Habbania, Salamat, Awlad Rashid, Khazam, Barariish, Awlad Suleiman, Mahamid, Hassaniya, and Jafari. Other non-Arab tribes in the region, like the Tuareg, Fulani, Tebu, Goran, Zaghawa, and Bidayat, also joined the fight under similar political and social conditions.
The recruitment of young Arab tribesmen from western Sudan and neighboring African regions for the RSF took place among youth aged 14-45, while older individuals participated in propaganda tasks and recruitment efforts. Tribal leaders and activists played key roles in this, utilizing black propaganda to rally support for the RSF.
While some Arab tribes in western Sudan and the Sahel region were drawn into the conflict by the RSF’s promises and coercive methods, many expressed concerns about the negative repercussions this involvement could have. Former Nigerien president Mohamed Bazoum, former Chadian Foreign Minister Mohamed Saleh Nezif, and several regional leaders voiced reservations about the RSF’s project.
The strategic consequences of the war in Sudan are still being analyzed by Western intelligence circles and officials in the Sahel region, especially in countries like Chad, Niger, and Libya, all of which are closely linked to Sudan. If the RSF’s actions deplete the Arab tribes’ resources and reduce their effectiveness, it may have achieved its intended purpose.
In Sudan alone, the Rizeigat tribe, from which the RSF leaders hail, has lost tens of thousands of young men, possibly up to 45,000 in Darfur’s five states. Similarly, the Messiria and Hawazma tribes lost nearly 20,000 young men, while tribes such as Bani Helba, Tiyaisha, Habbania, Fulani, Salamat, and Ziyada lost several thousand in battles across Khartoum, Al-Jazeera, and central Sudan.
Opposition groups from Chad, mostly Arab, reported that many of their leaders and youth were killed in the Sudanese war after rushing to join the RSF, as were Arab tribes from Niger, southern Libya, and Central Africa.
It is important to note that the tribes themselves should not be blamed for the actions of the RSF. However, these tribes now face severe accusations related to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the RSF, including looting and theft of Sudanese property, which has found its way to markets in western Sudan and across neighboring regions.
The most significant impact, however, is the growing animosity and tribal divisions within Sudan, with increasing calls for revenge and distrust in various sectors of society. Sahelian countries, too, fear the Arab tribes, particularly if they possess weapons, money, and combat training, and may seek to seize power in their own countries.
After the war ends, or even before, the Arab tribes in western Sudan must begin deep reconciliation dialogues with other Sudanese tribes to mitigate the pent-up anger and resentment. They must rebuild trust and distance themselves from the crimes committed in their name, rejecting the messages of hate, barbarism, and radicalism promoted by the RSF, which targeted specific tribes and aimed to destroy Sudan’s social, political, and economic fabric.
Based on the trajectory of the war, it seems likely that the RSF will be defeated, its leadership removed, and its supporters pursued. In this context, it is critical that a national reconciliation process is initiated, assuming political and social maturity is achieved by all parties involved, as the consequences of the war will be costly and must be addressed collectively by all Sudanese.