A Government… in Imagination
By Mohamed Wad’a
Dr. Bakri El-Jak, the official spokesperson for the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination (Taqadom), stated: “The official position of the Coordination has always been and remains that it does not seek to form an exile government or a parallel government.” He said during a meeting of the Taqadom leadership body, which concluded on December 6th of the previous year, that a proposal to form a government was raised by a group within the leadership body, but no consensus was reached on it. Therefore, the meeting decided to refer the issue of contesting legitimacy and other issues to the political mechanism, which held several meetings and issued recommendations that were referred to the Coordination’s General Secretariat and leadership body. The political mechanism, in its last meeting, agreed to sever ties between the entities and individuals who insist on proceeding with the formation of the government, and those who are committed to not forming any government either independently or with any of the warring parties. A committee was formed to reach a formula for severing these ties in a way that maximizes the agreed points between both sides, so that each party can work independently politically and organizationally from the other, with full respect for the different options based on understandable grounds for each party. However, the reality is that these options cannot coexist within one alliance that rejects war and is neutral to any of its parties. We sense the profound effect of the war in pushing everyone towards polarization and division. The Coordination of Democratic Civil Forces will remain neutral to any party in the war and does not recognize the legitimacy of the de facto authority in Port Sudan or any other authority. We reject war and violence as a means to manage political conflict in the country. We will work towards building a civil front that rejects war and believes in the unity of the country. We will also work to contribute to stopping the war through mass mobilization and diplomacy, in addition to efforts to end the war through inclusive dialogue with all active forces, based on a comprehensive project for justice, transitional justice, and a holistic vision for social recovery to mend the social fabric and confront the social and political aftermath of the war, including division and polarization.”
In a counter statement, Dr. Al-Hadi Idris, Vice President of the Democratic Civil Forces Coordination (Taqadom), confirmed, “We would like to emphasize, in light of the recent statements, that the statement circulated on behalf of the official spokesperson does not represent the official position of the Coordination of Democratic Civil Forces (Taqadom). This statement was not agreed upon by any of the Coordination’s accredited bodies, nor was it approved within the known organizational frameworks. Furthermore, we confirm that the Coordination (Taqadom) has not yet made any decision regarding the formation of a government, and this matter is still under discussion among all parties. Any hasty statements made outside the organizational context are irresponsible attempts to impose certain agendas and do not reflect the collective will of the alliance. We see in this hurried statement an attempt to create division within the Coordination, which we strongly reject. The Taqadom alliance was founded on the principles of political consensus among its founders, and only they have the right to decide its fate. No single party can decide the fate of the Coordination or issue critical decisions without the consent of all. We reject any attempts to impose a fait accompli without consulting all partners, and we will confront that with resolve and responsibility.”
To realize the extent of the damage suffered by (Taqadom) and the enormous political loss it has incurred, it is essential to identify those seeking the government. Prominent names, as indicated, include (Al-Hadi Idris, Taher Hajar, Suleiman Sandal, Al-Tayashi, and Nasr El-Din Abdel-Bari). Aside from most of them hailing from Darfur, they do not represent any significant political, tribal, or tangible legacy in the armed struggle. These names emerged during the Juba peace negotiations and were under the patronage of Hemetti. Therefore, the direction of this group was not imposed by political realities but by their blatant alignment with the militia and an attempt to create a base for it, which has failed time and again. According to statements from Suleiman Sandal, who denied it was an exile government but rather one existing within Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces revealed that they would cooperate with a newly formed government to oversee areas under their control. Although the territory controlled by the militia has been steadily shrinking since the announcement of the intention to form this government, the militia lost control of Al-Jazeera state and its capital, Madani, and dozens of towns and villages. It also lost its presence in most of Khartoum state and in many strategic urban centers. All indicators suggest that the militia has lost the war and will not find a safe place to hold a meeting for the promised government.
Perhaps this is the first time that some of the Taqadom leaders have realized the contradiction between the country’s interests and the presence of the Rapid Support Forces. From the first day in the political scene, this contradiction was clear and more obvious than being hidden behind slogans of democratic transformation, the state of 56, and fighting the remnants. Now, the dimensions of the regional conspiracy and the misguided hopes concerning Darfur are becoming apparent. They were in the wrong place and made severe mistakes against the people and the nation. In its political bureau meetings, the Umma Party presented the “National Salvation” project and sent signals to draw the curtain on Taqadom’s era. Perhaps what Dr. Hamdok, the leader of the Coordination, will say about the matter will not add anything.
