Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue: An Alternative Perspective

By Ali Askouri

For quite some time, the idea of a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue has been circulating among political forces, becoming the preferred motto for all. Some see it as mere deception (in the language of Western pragmatists), a lifeline (as the Arabs prefer to call it), or the last bullet and the last soldier (in military terms).

I have often asked myself and posed this question to several political leaders: What is the alternative if the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue fails? Or, in American terms, what is Plan B? I say this not out of pessimism but based on the historical record of previous failed Sudanese dialogue attempts.

Starting with the 1965 Round Table Conference and passing through numerous peace agreements, the Asmara Conference on Crucial Issues, and finally the “Wathba Dialogue” organized by the National Congress regime—all of these efforts led to no tangible results. This raises the question: What is the source of optimism among political forces this time?

In this series of articles, I will attempt to present an alternative vision for organizing the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, ensuring it does not remain an elitist discussion disconnected from the grassroots and does not suffer the fate of past conferences.

Returning to History

There is a genuine need to return to the history of our country to draw lessons from it. If we fail to do so, we will inevitably repeat the same mistakes. As the saying goes, “He who forgets his past is lost,” and indeed, we have forgotten our past and thus lost our way.

We have repeatedly stated that the current Sudanese state is essentially the same one created by the Turks to exploit resources. The British later improved its governance, introducing some stability, providing services, and implementing modern administrative systems unfamiliar to Sudanese society at the time.

If we set aside the ancient Nubian states—fully sovereign national entities that thrived independently and expanded externally—the state that succeeded them was the Sennar Sultanate (1505–1821), which ruled for about 316 years. Regardless of one’s opinion about the Sennar Sultanate, the indisputable fact is that it was a national state that emerged purely from internal Sudanese dynamics.

One of the most significant achievements of the groups that founded Sennar was their preference for dialogue over war. The mediation led by Sheikh Idris Wad Al-Arbab (may God sanctify his soul) successfully brokered peace and resulted in a power-sharing agreement—without the involvement of the African Union or the United Nations, which were still centuries away from existence!

This was the wisdom of our ancestors. They compromised to prevent bloodshed and establish their state. Why, then, are we lost today, forgetting our own history?

The Historical Context of Darfur and Its Integration into Sudan

Notably, when the Sennar Sultanate was established, its territorial influence did not include Kordofan or Darfur. While the Funj later subdued parts of Kordofan, Darfur remained outside Sennar’s jurisdiction until it was annexed by Zubair Pasha.

The Turks showed little interest in subjugating Darfur and integrating it into Sudan, possibly due to its remoteness, lack of strategic value, or administrative challenges. They could have done so but refrained.

It was only in 1874 that Zubair Pasha Rahma conquered Darfur, defeating the Rizeigat tribe after they violated their agreement regarding the security of trade caravans carrying ivory and ostrich feathers from South Sudan. The Rizeigat engaged in looting, prompting Zubair Pasha to launch a military campaign, ultimately entering El Fasher.

Later, after the British overthrew the Mahdist regime in 1898, Darfur remained independent for 18 years before being re-annexed in 1916 with the killing of Sultan Ali Dinar.

Thus, Darfur’s exit from the Sudanese state is not a new phenomenon—history provides clear precedents for such shifts.

The Strategic Mistakes of Zubair Pasha

Zubair Pasha made two historical strategic errors that continue to impact Sudan’s trajectory:

1. Forcing Darfur into Sudan, despite its distinct historical identity.

2. Sparing the life of the Mahdist leader, Khalifa Abdullah, whom he had initially arrested as a sorcerer who wrote amulets for women and gullible followers.

These historical events are highly relevant when discussing the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue, particularly given that some of the same groups Zubair Pasha defeated over a century ago are now behind the current invasion of Sudan.

The successful mediation by Sheikh Idris Wad Al-Arbab between the Funj and the Abdallab tribes led to a peaceful resolution and a federal power-sharing arrangement—a rare occurrence at the time when monarchs usually wielded absolute authority.

The two factions did not divide the land into separate states, despite having the power to do so. Instead, they agreed on shared governance, ensuring the continuity of the Sudanese state.

This historical precedent challenges those who claim that Sudan’s unity only began in 1956. Sudan existed as a unified, independent state for over three centuries, while European colonial powers were still expanding and pillaging resources.

While Europe was suffering from famine and hardship—such as the Great Famine of 1695–1697, which devastated Estonia, Scotland, Sweden, and Northern France—Sudan was an independent state raising its flag high.

Unfortunately, we have forgotten this legacy and now beg for solutions from Europe, which was once plagued by hunger, and from some African leaders whose ancestors sold their own people into slavery.

Reimagining the Sudanese-Sudanese Dialogue

Given this historical background, I propose a two-tier structure for the dialogue:

1. The “Sennari Bloc”, consisting of regions with shared historical, cultural, and governance traditions. These include Kordofan, White Nile, Gezira, Blue Nile, Eastern Sudan, Northern Sudan, and the Khartoum area. This group has a long history of coexistence and peaceful conflict resolution.

2. The Darfur Bloc, which should first resolve its internal conflicts before engaging in national dialogue. The region has suffered from fragmentation, with over 100 armed movements, many based on tribal divisions. If these groups cannot unite among themselves, how can they be expected to unite with the rest of Sudan?

The Juba Peace Agreement granted Darfur enormous power and resources at the expense of other regions, yet violence persists. Worse still, some Darfurian groups turned their aggression against other communities, engaging in mass killings, displacement, and destruction.

Sudan cannot continue paying the price for Darfur’s internal conflicts. It is unacceptable to expect the Sennari Bloc to bear the burden of ensuring security for groups that do not seek peace among themselves.

The resources spent on military defense against militias come directly at the expense of development in the Sennari regions. The only solution is to correct Zubair Pasha’s historical mistake and ensure such tragedies never occur again.

This Land is Ours