Sudan War… How Did the Army Turn the Tide?

By Othman Mirghani

Now that the balance of power in the Sudanese war has significantly shifted in favor of the army, it may be appropriate to reflect on the strategies it employed to regain control. This serves as a practical response to those who doubted its capabilities at the beginning of the war or underestimated it to the extent that some questioned how a longstanding army could collapse before a militia. Others went even further, calling on its leaders to negotiate surrender.

Regardless of the debate over who initiated the war and fired the first shot, there is no dispute that the army was ambushed and unprepared for war when the first shot was fired. In fact, the army’s commander was at his residence when a large force from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked, aiming to either arrest or kill him. At the same time, many senior officers were on their way to their offices as usual in the morning, only to find themselves confronted by fully prepared RSF forces, who then detained them.

In those early stages, when the army’s headquarters were under siege and the RSF had seized key positions in the capital, the army’s primary goal was to contain the initial shock and prevent the fall of key military bases—such as the Armored Corps headquarters—or strategic targets, like the General Command, into RSF hands. It also aimed to repel any attack on the main Wadi Sayyidna Air Base after the RSF had stormed the Merowe Air Base and neutralized other airports. One of the most crucial early successes was thwarting the attempt to kill or capture General Burhan—a goal later confirmed by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo and his brother Abdul Rahim—since what happened was essentially a coup attempt that was foiled by the army’s resistance, which prevented the RSF from achieving its objectives.

According to several military sources, despite the apparent chaos in those early days, the army’s leadership quickly formulated plans and defined strategies to address the situation at various stages. After absorbing the initial shock, the next phase involved withstanding successive attacks and systematically exhausting the RSF. This included tactical withdrawals from some isolated military positions—a move that drew significant criticism at the time but was necessary to preserve troops and lives.

That phase was the most difficult and was accompanied by a strategy described by Burhan as “digging with a needle”—focused on wearing down the opponent while simultaneously rebuilding the army’s strength through rearmament, recruitment, and the mobilization of forces from other military units across the states.

A significant turning point came with the popular mobilization, which faced harsh criticism and attempts to undermine it but ultimately succeeded when large numbers of volunteers flocked to training camps. This was driven by the harsh treatment they had suffered at the hands of the RSF, which included killing, destruction, rape, displacement, and various forms of torture and humiliation.

The fact that the majority of the population stood by the army and rejected the RSF and its practices was a key factor in shaping the course of events. No army can win a complex war like this without popular support and without the people’s endurance of the hardships imposed by the conflict.

The army’s shift from a defensive to an offensive strategy took about 17 months. During this period, it had to overcome issues such as manpower shortages, secure weapon supplies, keep state institutions and essential services running under extreme conditions, and simultaneously counter an intense psychological and media war aimed at weakening it and driving a wedge between it and the public. In late September last year, the army announced the start of its counteroffensive and launched its largest and most comprehensive operations based on carefully crafted plans to address the challenges of urban warfare—described by military experts as one of the most complex and dangerous types of warfare.

As the army’s strategies began to succeed, the balance of power started to shift rapidly in its favor in what appeared to be a deliberate and calculated move to prevent the RSF from regaining its footing or reorganizing its ranks. Within five months, the situation had completely changed—the army was on the verge of fully liberating Khartoum, while RSF control had shrunk to Darfur and a few scattered pockets.

Is the war nearing its end?
Now that the army holds the initiative, along with allied forces, it seems determined not to lose momentum. It has already begun moving battles into Kordofan and liberating key towns there while simultaneously deploying more troops and equipment to Darfur.

It is always difficult to predict when wars will end, but from the signs on the ground, it is possible to say that this war has entered a decisive phase.