What is (Sumoud)’s position on the (RSF submarine) within (Taqaddum)?

By Adel Ibrahim Hamid

The initially announced step was to form a parallel government to challenge the legitimacy of the (Port Sudan government). At that time, the larger bloc within (Taqaddum) opposed this move—a rejection that signaled an imminent split within the organization. And indeed, that’s what happened. (Taqaddum) diplomatically described it as a civilized example of how to manage disagreements.

However, the matter didn’t stop at the parallel government. The splinter group allied itself with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whose hands are stained with the blood of innocent civilians—a dangerous escalation that demands (Sumoud) to take a clear stance. This is especially critical since the allied group was, until recently, an integral part of (Taqaddum) and falsely claimed to be neutral. This strengthens existing accusations against the other faction unless they actively work to dispel the suspicions surrounding them after the (RSF submarine) revealed its true nature.

But (Sumoud) has not acted.

By ignoring the serious implications of this development, (Sumoud) risks being accused of falsely claiming that (Taqaddum) as a whole was neutral. The faction allied with the RSF may have simply grown tired of pretending and found it exhausting to maintain the charade of neutrality—controlling their tone, pace, and appearance. They may have decided to shed the mask and reveal their true face. Meanwhile, the other faction within (Taqaddum)—(Sumoud)—continues to bear the burden of acting neutral and maintaining the costly illusion.

What (Sumoud) fails to realize is that turning a blind eye to the consequences of this new alliance will only deepen doubts about (Taqaddum)’s previous positions. It will undermine claims of neutrality by raising questions about why one would remain neutral between security and fear. Security is associated with regions under army control—Gadaref, Kassala, the Red Sea, the Nile River state, and the Northern state—where displaced citizens from Khartoum, Gezira, and Sennar have sought refuge after being driven from their homes, their properties looted, and their infrastructure destroyed by the RSF.

Doubts have long surrounded (Taqaddum)’s position, which equates an army protecting civilians with militias led by Abdul Rahman Juma, Jelha, and Omar Sharon. These doubts have been reinforced by (Taqaddum)’s weak stance on the new alliance and by the statement of principles signed between (Taqaddum)’s leader and the RSF commander in Addis Ababa—just days after the fall of Madani—when (Taqaddum)’s leader reassured Madani’s displaced residents and the villages of Gezira (where men were whipped, boys killed, and food stores looted) that the RSF commander had agreed with (Taqaddum) on state federalism!

Doubts have also grown over (Taqaddum)’s call to ban airstrikes—a measure that gives the army a tactical advantage over the RSF. This call amounts to a plea to protect the RSF from a certain defeat if the army’s air superiority persists. When this demand is combined with a general call to stop the war—while Khartoum, much of central Sudan, and parts of Kordofan and four Darfur states remain under RSF control—it becomes clear that this is a veiled call for the army’s surrender and submission to RSF terms, despite (Taqaddum)’s claim of equal distance between the army and the RSF.

(Taqaddum)’s positions have become increasingly questionable, and its political miscalculation lies in framing the entire conflict through the lens of the October 25 coup. Consequently, it has become acceptable for (Taqaddum) to side with any enemy of the (coup army), even if that enemy is a militia that:

Massacres thousands of Masalit in El Geneina

Kills hundreds in Wad Al-Noura and among farmers in Al-Jabalain

Terrorizes and humiliates civilians in Al-Harqa, Tamboul, Umm Adham, Umm Maliha, and Al-Sareeha

Kills teachers in Wad Al-Jatra, medical staff in Al-Hasahisa, Madani Arab, and Al-Dinder

Murders an obstetrician in Sennar with an RSF machete

Destroys factories in Bahri, the Giad industrial complex, the Genid sugar plant, and Sennar sugar refinery

Bombs Al-Naw Hospital, the Saudi Hospital in El-Fasher, Sabreen Market, and Umm Dabakir station

None of this seems to matter as long as the militia opposes the (coup army)!

(Sumoud) has little credibility left.