Plan (T): Encirclement (2)

As I See
Adel El-Baz
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In the first part of this article, we explained why the UAE resorted to the encirclement plan. We stated that the reason was the failure of the plans to seize the Sudanese state on the eve of April 15, 2023. Afterward, confusion ensued, leading to a transition from one failed plan to another, until they arrived at the comprehensive encirclement plan. What is this plan? What did the UAE do with the surrounding states? And how were they recruited?
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The encirclement plan involves surrounding Sudan with hostile states that facilitate the recruitment of mercenaries or enable their movement through these countries — as happened in Libya, where Colombian fighters entered Sudan from Haftar-controlled Libya. The role of these surrounding states is to serve as a corridor for the transfer of weapons to the militia inside Sudan and to supply the forces with everything they need. These countries also act as a rear base for evacuating the wounded, with some of them hosting hospitals (Um Jaras and Aweil) and establishing training camps and drone launch bases. Long-range drones are now being launched from inside Chad, specifically from Um Jaras.
All of this is being done to support the militia’s war effort. To tighten the encirclement of Sudan, the UAE rushed to strengthen its already existing relationships with neighboring countries (Haftar’s Libya and Abiy Ahmed’s Ethiopia) and quickly established new relations with border states or those close to Sudan, such as Chad, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Kenya, and Uganda. Let us examine what the UAE has done and is doing with these surrounding states.
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Ethiopia:
UAE-Ethiopian relations began years ago as commercial ties. Ethiopia is one of the key countries where the UAE invests, with total Emirati investments in Ethiopia reaching $2.9 billion by the end of 2022. A total of 113 Emirati investment projects have been established in Ethiopia in various fields.
During the rule of Abiy Ahmed, Abu Dhabi sought to turn Ethiopia into a political platform for its influence in the Horn of Africa. After brokering the peace agreement between Addis Ababa and Asmara, the UAE pledged $3 billion for investment and aid, including $1 billion deposited in Ethiopia’s central bank. The UAE also initiated several strategic projects, such as the construction of an oil pipeline linking the Eritrean port of Assab to Ethiopia.
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The Ethiopian-Emirati alliance took a strategic turn after the war broke out between the Ethiopian government and the Tigray Front. The UAE’s intervention was decisive, as the war was won in favor of the Ethiopian government thanks to Turkish Bayraktar drones funded by the UAE, in addition to Chinese drones. A report published on the Military Africa website, based on satellite images taken in August 2018, confirmed the presence of a Chinese Wing Loong 2 drone at the base. The report added that Abu Dhabi had purchased an unspecified number of this model from the Chinese manufacturer in 2022.
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The UAE is now attempting to supply the militia with long-range Bayraktar drones by purchasing them from Turkey and delivering them to the militia, where they are operated from Chad. In addition, the UAE possesses Chinese Wing Loong 2 drones. These drones were used to bomb the “Sarkab” camp in Omdurman three months ago. In other words, the same weapons that contributed to the defeat of the Tigray are now being used in the hope of saving the militia — even though the UAE knows that the militia’s victory over the Sudanese army is impossible, no matter how many weapons are amassed. If weapons alone could secure victory, Israel would have already won, given its access to open American and Western arms stockpiles — and Gaza is only 365 kilometers away!
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The commercial and military support expanded the UAE’s influence in Ethiopia. Consequently, since the outbreak of the war in Sudan, Ethiopia has adopted the UAE’s pro-militia stance, declared the government illegitimate, and called for an end to the war and a halt to airstrikes. Ethiopia also opened its territory to all political opponents of the Sudanese government to support the militia and hosted militia conferences and other Sudanese opposition figures.
Moreover, Ethiopia began responding to the UAE’s request to establish a military base on Ethiopian territory at the beginning of the war. This was only halted after a stern warning from Sudan, especially since Khartoum had previously turned a blind eye to arms shipments that crossed from Ethiopia to South Sudan, where they were delivered to the militia in the early months of the war.
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Thus, Ethiopia’s position was aligned in favor of the militia, making Ethiopia the cornerstone of the first ring in the encirclement plan around Sudan. This ring has begun to function effectively to implement the comprehensive encirclement plan, and the building of this ring continues, as we shall see.
To be continued…