Sudan Sues the UAE at the International Court of Justice: Why the World Should Care

By Amjad Farid Al-Tayeb

On March 6, 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) announced that the Republic of Sudan had filed a lawsuit against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), accusing it of complicity in genocide under Article 36(1) of the ICJ Statute and Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Sudan’s case is based on accusations that the UAE has provided ongoing support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a military militia engaged in a brutal power struggle since the outbreak of the Sudanese war on April 15, 2023. The case rests on documented violations committed by the RSF, including the massacre between May and June 2023, which resulted in the deaths of more than 15,000 Masalit civilians in Darfur and the displacement of nearly 500,000 people into Chad—echoing the horrors of the early 2000s Darfur conflict when the Janjaweed militias, the RSF’s predecessor, committed similar ethnically driven atrocities under Omar al-Bashir’s Islamist regime.

Sudan accuses the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention by enabling the RSF to carry out genocidal acts, particularly the Masalit massacre. The case relies on documented forensic evidence, including a 2024 report by the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights and another by Human Rights Watch titled “The Masalit Will Not Return to Their Homes.” Both reports document patterns of systematic killings, sexual violence, and large-scale village burnings in West Darfur, all directed against the Masalit community—consistent with the definition of genocide in Article II of the Genocide Convention. Satellite images analyzed by the Yale University Humanitarian Research Lab show large-scale destruction of civilian settlements, while a United Nations report on mass graves discovered after RSF attacks further supports the credibility of this evidence. Survivor testimonies describe how RSF fighters specifically targeted the Masalit based on their ethnic background, using racial slurs while killing civilians, including children—indicating a clear intent to commit genocide. In January 2025, the U.S. State Department formally classified RSF’s actions as genocide—a delayed but significant acknowledgment from the Biden administration that aligns with the available evidence.

The UAE’s role in this case is not disputed but is well-documented. A January 2024 report by the United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts, established under Resolution 1591 (2005), found “credible evidence” that the UAE supplied arms to the RSF through a base in Amjarass, Chad. Flight tracking data and satellite imagery analyzed by the Conflict Observatory—a U.S. State Department-funded research group—showed a “high degree of certainty” that the UAE had transferred weapons to the RSF. Reuters reported 86 flights between the UAE and Amjarass from April 2023 to mid-2024, with three-quarters operated by airlines previously linked to arms smuggling networks. A separate investigative report by The New York Times revealed a secret UAE-run drone base at Amjarass airport near the Sudanese border, supporting the RSF with Chinese-made Wing Loong drones launched from an airstrip developed under the cover of a UAE Red Crescent hospital project. Data from conflict analysis firms show that militias equipped with drones cause significantly higher civilian casualties in urban warfare.

In 2024, U.S. lawmakers Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs attempted to block a $1.2 billion arms deal with the UAE due to its support for the RSF. In January 2025, both confirmed—based on classified briefings from the Biden administration—that the UAE had failed to stop its support for the RSF, contributing to an estimated 10,000 deaths per month.

Amid the erosion of international justice mechanisms—highlighted by U.S. sanctions on the International Criminal Court—this case tests whether global courts can hold powerful states accountable or will succumb to political pressure and procedural roadblocks.

In December 2023, South Africa filed a genocide case against Israel at the ICJ over Gaza, under the same convention. South Africa’s case gained strong backing from several Global South nations, including Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Ireland, Jordan, the Maldives, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Slovenia, Spain, and Venezuela, through legal briefs or diplomatic support. This demonstrated unprecedented Global South solidarity. South Africa grounded its case in its moral legacy of opposing apartheid and colonialism. While Sudan lacks such symbolic capital, its current crisis reflects deeper postcolonial challenges: eroded sovereignty, elite collusion with foreign powers, and escalating foreign interference. Sudan’s conflict—marked by massive human suffering, ethnic violence, state collapse, and mass displacement—represents one of the world’s gravest political and humanitarian crises. It is not merely a domestic conflict but a consequence of global neglect, regional manipulation, and Africa’s continued marginalization in the global order. Failing to support Sudan’s case not only undermines a legal challenge but also perpetuates global justice imbalances, reinforcing a system where power shields perpetrators from accountability while victims are ignored.

Supporting Sudan’s pursuit of justice does not mean siding with the Sudanese government or its military against the RSF; it means recognizing the substance of the case. The UAE’s extensive transnational influence, backed by its oil wealth and strategic alliances with Western and non-Western powers, makes its actions particularly dangerous. If left unpunished, the UAE will continue exploiting regional conflicts—from Sudan to Libya, Yemen to Syria—undermining the sovereignty of Global South nations in its pursuit of resources and geopolitical dominance. Failure by the Global South to take a stand on Sudan will create a vacuum that external actors will exploit for military bases, resource extraction, and strategic leverage. In such a scenario, silence becomes complicity—a tool to further weaken Africa’s agency in global affairs at a time when justice, reparations, and sovereignty are returning to the forefront of global debate.

Despite the strength of Sudan’s case, it faces complications. The Sudanese government and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have their own troubling human rights record. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), the SAF was responsible for 200 incidents involving civilian casualties in 2024, compared to 1,300 by the RSF during the same period. While the SAF’s operations are often framed as responses to rebellion, this does not justify civilian harm or exempt the military from its legal and moral obligation to minimize harm.

Sudan’s bureaucratic obstacles to humanitarian aid access further exacerbate the crisis. While international humanitarian organizations bear some responsibility for failing to adapt their field strategies, Sudan’s restrictions weaken its moral position and tarnish its international image.

An additional procedural hurdle lies in the UAE’s reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which grants the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes related to the convention’s interpretation or application. This reservation has sparked legal debate, with some experts arguing that such reservations undermine the convention’s purpose and provide unjustified immunity.

Former ICJ judge Abdul Koroma (1994–2012) stated that such reservations contradict the convention’s goals, calling them “political maneuvers with no legal merit.” Legal scholar Payam Akhavan (McGill University) similarly argued that reservations to Article IX weaken the convention’s enforceability. In a 1951 advisory opinion, the ICJ affirmed that reservations to multilateral treaties are only valid if they do not contradict the treaty’s core purpose—preventing and punishing genocide.

Precedents, however, are mixed. In the 2006 “Armed Activities” case between Congo and Rwanda, the ICJ upheld Rwanda’s reservation, ruling that it lacked jurisdiction. Similar rulings were made in the 1999 “Legality of Use of Force” cases brought by Yugoslavia against NATO states.

What may strengthen Sudan’s case is the unprecedented scale of evidence—from drone analysis to direct links between UAE aid and RSF atrocities. Sudan could argue that the UAE’s actions contradict the Genocide Convention’s core goal, making its reservation legally void. However, the UAE’s economic and diplomatic clout, with a $500 billion economy compared to Sudan’s $34 billion, makes this an uphill battle.

The UAE’s record of fueling regional instability—from Syria to Yemen to Libya—where it armed groups responsible for over 300,000 deaths, underscores the urgency of this case.

What is at stake is not just Sudan’s future but the credibility of international justice. A successful case would mark the first legal reckoning for the UAE’s destabilizing foreign policy. Failure, however, would reinforce global impunity, leaving Sudan’s victims as forgotten casualties in a geopolitical game that values wealth and power over justice and human dignity.