Tough Choices Await the Rapid Support Forces

By: Rikabi Hassan Yaqoub

With the dramatic collapse of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which can be dated to the morning of last Friday, March 21, 2025, when the Sudanese army and its allied forces managed to reclaim the presidential palace and establish full control over it and its surroundings, the RSF suffered a significant blow. This was followed by a large-scale retreat of the remaining RSF forces from the southwest of the capital, Khartoum, toward Kordofan and then to Darfur. This collapse has largely paved the way for the Sudanese army to complete its victory over the RSF rebellion.

The RSF has now lost all the territory it had controlled since the beginning of the war, except for the cities of Al-Geneina in West Darfur, Nyala in South Darfur, and small parts of North Darfur, especially around the city of El Fasher, which the RSF has been trying to capture for months without success.

The RSF has been betting on seizing El Fasher to establish complete control over the Darfur region, with the aim of declaring a parallel government there, potentially setting the stage for the region’s secession—or at the very least, enhancing its offensive capabilities in the region to resume hostilities against the army and the central government.

The collapse of the RSF and the rapid pace of this breakdown following the Sudanese army’s takeover of the palace suggest that the RSF’s central stronghold was primarily concentrated around the presidential palace. The palace served as the core of the RSF’s strategic positioning in Khartoum.

With the fall of this stronghold, the rest of the RSF forces positioned around the palace’s perimeter crumbled under intense and close-range fire from the Sudanese army and its allied forces. This resulted in large numbers of casualties, injuries, and prisoners, as well as a mass flight of RSF fighters toward the southwestern outskirts of the capital.

This hypothesis is supported by the Sudanese army’s discovery of stockpiles of advanced and heavy weapons, as well as sophisticated jamming devices, in various locations around the presidential palace. Military experts have stated that these weapons were capable of enabling the RSF to repel any attack, no matter its size, and maintain their position in the palace for a longer period.

However, that did not happen. The collapse came quickly and unexpectedly, especially considering RSF commander Hemetti’s recent assertions, just days before the palace’s fall, that his forces would not withdraw from the presidential palace and that the army would not prevail in the palace battle. He had even promised a “surprise” prepared by his forces for the Sudanese army.

This raises questions about the reason behind the sudden collapse: Was it due to the RSF forces’ inability or lack of skill in handling the advanced weapons at their disposal? Or was it the result of the siege imposed by the Sudanese army weeks before the assault, which cut off food and supply lines? Or was it a combination of all these factors, with Hemetti’s threats merely serving to boost his forces’ morale as they prepared to defend the palace?

Whatever the case, the reality on the ground is that the RSF has suffered a crushing defeat and lost a critical position that gave it a strategic presence at the heart of Sudan. The U.S. State Department described the Sudanese army’s recapture of the presidential palace as a significant turning point in the Sudan conflict.

Thus, a major chapter of the two-year-long war has now closed, leaving only the final chapter to unfold in the Darfur region.

Analyzing the current military landscape, unless new developments emerge to shift the balance of power between the RSF on one side and the Sudanese army and its allies on the other, the Sudanese army is likely to continue inflicting heavy losses on the RSF and securing further victories for several reasons:

First: The RSF lost many fighters and a significant portion of its military equipment in the Battle of Khartoum. It also lost key strategic positions it had used as launching pads for artillery and drone attacks on army positions and vital civilian targets in the capital and other states.
In contrast, the Sudanese army has captured large amounts of military equipment and weapons, including advanced jamming systems once held by the RSF. The army’s morale has also risen significantly, strengthening its resolve to continue fighting and eliminate the RSF’s remaining strongholds.

Second: The RSF has lost effective air defense systems, which will give the Sudanese army’s air force a decisive advantage in the upcoming battle in Darfur. The RSF forces will be exposed and vulnerable to air strikes by the Sudanese army.

With the end of the Battle of Khartoum, the urban warfare phase—where the RSF had a tactical edge due to its “hit and run” strategy, quick mobility, use of civilian infrastructure for cover, and reliance on human shields—has concluded. This type of combat had posed significant challenges for the Sudanese army, which is trained for conventional warfare between states involving full-scale military engagement. With the conflict now shifting outside the capital, the RSF has lost this advantage entirely.

Third: The armed movements in Darfur, now known as the “Joint Forces,” which are fighting alongside the Sudanese army, have extensive experience in desert warfare. Their expertise, gained over more than two decades of conflict, makes them a formidable opponent for the RSF in Darfur.
These forces, backed by the Sudanese army, are well-versed in the RSF’s combat tactics and are intimately familiar with Darfur’s terrain and geography.

Senior RSF leaders have previously tried to sway these forces to their side or at least neutralize them with offers of political and economic rewards, but these attempts have failed.

For the Sudanese army, the most difficult phase is over following its victory in Khartoum. What remains will be easier. Conversely, for the RSF, the easiest phase has ended with defeat, and the remaining phase will be the most difficult. That is the current equation.

Now, as the RSF prepares for the final battles, all its options are difficult: It can either fight under its current weakened condition, which would likely result in defeat, surrender, or attempt to flee westward beyond Sudan’s borders.

All these options point to one outcome: Defeat.

Source: Al Jazeera Net