Khartoum: The Dazzling Glow

By Abdullah Ali Ibrahim

Summary

(By continuing the war until the liberation of Khartoum, disregarding the international community, perhaps Burhan found inspiration in his call for “national ownership of solutions” from a verse in the poem “Sah Ya Kanar” by Mahmud Abu Bakr:
“If your people’s unity is shattered, bring them together,
And if they refuse, strike with unwavering resolve.”)

Reverend Desmond Tutu, upon voting for the first time at the age of 70 in South Africa’s 1994 elections following the end of apartheid, said, “It feels like falling in love again.”

The liberation of Khartoum was akin to many Sudanese falling in love again. It was a moment that poet Mohammed Al-Makki Ibrahim might describe as galloping towards “the dazzling glow.”

Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had once emphasized what he termed “national ownership of solutions” for Sudan’s war. The liberation of Khartoum—symbolized by reclaiming the Republican Palace—was a literal embodiment of this principle. The international community and influential Sudanese circles had continuously proposed scenarios for resolving the conflict, but all failed to determine who, in the “war of the two generals,” stood on the side of a just cause. The primary reason for this indecision was the crushing defeats suffered by the Sudanese Armed Forces for over a year and a half. These losses weakened the army to the point that politicians like Bakri Al-Jak, leading the “Coordination of Progressive, Democratic, and Civil Forces,” suggested that it accept its defeats, just as Japan did after World War II. Many others urged the army to negotiate, considering its insistence on war reckless and oblivious to its devastating toll on the country and its people. Some even equated compassion for the army with pushing it towards any available negotiation table, arguing that otherwise, it would be completely lost. Their “national solution” was for the army to enter negotiations unconditionally if it wished to secure a future.

Since the international community could not agree on which side held legitimacy in the ongoing war, it equated the violence of both parties. This neutrality rendered it incapable of enforcing decisions aimed at de-escalating the conflict and protecting civilians. De-escalation was the least that could be done to contain the war’s escalation. However, when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) ignored international calls to cease hostilities in El Fasher, the UN Security Council failed to take even the smallest action to implement its Resolution 2736 (June 13, 2024), which called on the RSF to lift its siege on the city, de-escalate, and withdraw all forces threatening civilian safety. The UK representative at the council warned that an attack on El Fasher would be catastrophic for the 1.5 million displaced people who had sought refuge there. The Swiss representative stated that the resolution sent an unequivocal message to the RSF to end its siege. The U.S. was the first to warn against an attack on El Fasher, with its UN ambassador, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, appealing to Hemetti, the army, and its allies to avoid escalating the war. On April 24, 2024, she expressed deep concern over reports of an imminent RSF assault on El Fasher, warning that the group had two choices: continue its aggression and risk the disintegration of the state, or halt the attack. She called for a ceasefire in El Fasher, where the RSF had been attacking since April 2024, for the sake of millions of innocent civilians. She described El Fasher as being on the brink of a massacre, urging the RSF to lift its siege or face severe consequences. Yet, despite this persistent international pressure, the RSF remained immune to any real punishment, aside from the U.S. placing some of its commanders near El Fasher on a blacklist.

“National Ownership of Solutions”

What validated the “national ownership of solutions” approach was that neither the international community, as we have seen, nor Sudanese groups advocating for an end to the war had achieved anything tangible in two years of conflict. The Coordination of Progressive Forces (“Taqadum”) split two months ago, driven by those dissatisfied with its neutral stance on the war—something many already doubted—who then openly allied with the RSF during a conference in Nairobi last February. Meanwhile, Abdullah Hamdok, leader of the remaining faction that retained the name “Smod,” called for an end to the war during Ramadan. He proposed a joint meeting of the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, attended by the leaders of the army, RSF, and both civilian and armed groups, to agree on an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. He saw this as a first step toward constitutional arrangements based on broad consensus, restoring Sudan’s democratic transition. However, his appeal felt more like a plea for help than a solid political initiative with real leverage.

Taqadum remains as weak as when it was founded, having failed to strengthen itself institutionally to carry weight in the political arena. The humanitarian task force it promised to establish in April 2024—to visit Sudanese refugee camps and coordinate relief efforts with international organizations—never materialized beyond a single visit to a refugee camp in Ethiopia, which felt more like a fleeting gesture than a structured mission. The group had also pledged to work with international educational organizations to address the war-induced loss of schooling but failed to deliver on this promise. Despite its lack of achievements, Taqadum criticized the Port Sudan government for holding secondary school exams in February, accusing it of deepening the country’s division by organizing the exams only in areas under its control while students in RSF-held territories were left out. While their objection was understandable, their own failure to take meaningful action in education before the country reached the brink of collapse undermined their position.

Weakness and Defiance

With no alternative solutions emerging from either Sudanese or international actors, the army stood its ground, committed to fighting until the war ended on its terms. This stance resembled Rwanda’s path, where the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) saw no option but to pursue “a solution through war” in the face of an indifferent world and a Hutu-dominated government intent on exterminating them. The armed conflict between Rwanda’s government and the RPF began in 1990 and formally ended with the Arusha Accords in 1993, brokered by the international community and supported by a UN peacekeeping mission, mainly comprising Belgian troops. However, tensions persisted, and in 1994, the UN mission received a clear warning that the government was planning genocide against the Tutsi. The mission relayed this information to the UN, only to be told, “You are peacekeepers, not warriors,” meaning their role was to maintain peace, not engage in combat.

The well-known genocide against the Tutsi then unfolded over three months while the world stood by. The U.S., still reeling from its disastrous intervention in Somalia, was reluctant to intervene in another African crisis, especially after repeated UN peacekeeping failures in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti. Meanwhile, France, which had armed the Rwandan government, sympathized with it, fearing that the English-speaking Tutsi exiles in Uganda would dominate Rwanda. The UN mission was powerless, focusing only on evacuating international staff after Belgium withdrew its troops. Left with no outside help, the RPF took matters into its own hands, capturing the capital, Kigali, on July 15, 1994, and ending the genocide. The international community seemed almost relieved that the problem had resolved itself, and a sense of guilt over inaction became a long-term diplomatic advantage for Rwanda.

“Whoever relies on the international community is exposed”

The liberation of Khartoum confirmed a modified Sudanese saying: “Whoever relies on the international community is left exposed.” African nations—and similar developing countries—often find themselves devoid of solutions for their crises, whether political, economic, or health-related, as seen when President Donald Trump dismantled USAID, leading to worsening health conditions in many countries. The Rwandan scenario suggests that the world may even be content to see such crises resolve themselves, freeing it from the burden of involvement. One wonders, for instance, why migration is primarily a European and American concern rather than an African one.

By continuing the war until the liberation of Khartoum, disregarding the international community, perhaps Burhan, in his call for “national ownership of solutions,” found wisdom in Mahmud Abu Bakr’s poem:
“If your people’s unity is shattered, bring them together,
And if they refuse, strike with unwavering resolve.”