Sudan’s War Is a UAE-Backed Invasion — Not a Civil War

By Sabah Al-Makki

The Dangerous Misframing of Sudan’s War
The war tearing Sudan apart is often described as a “power struggle between rival factions” or “a clash between two generals.” This narrative has dominated international media coverage and diplomatic discourse since the conflict began on April 15, 2023.
But this framing is dangerously wrong.
Sudan’s war is not a civil dispute between two equal sides. It is a foreign-sponsored invasion, executed through mercenary forces and sustained by external support.
Mischaracterizing this war as an internal conflict has not only distorted global understanding but has also allowed the true aggressors to avoid scrutiny, delayed meaningful international action, and prolonged the violence. Any serious effort toward peace and accountability must begin by naming the war for what it is.

Why This Is Not a Civil War: The Legal and Scholarly Consensus
Across international law, political science, and academic research, Sudan’s conflict fails to meet the standard definitions of civil war. Mischaracterizing it as such is not merely a semantic mistake — it is a failure of both analysis and responsibility.
The Legal Framework: Geneva Conventions and the ICTY Tadić Ruling
The Geneva Conventions (1949), through Common Article 3, define civil war — or “non-international armed conflict” — as hostilities between state forces and armed groups of internal origin. The 1995 Tadić ruling by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) further clarified that conflicts shaped by substantial foreign involvement do not qualify as civil wars.
Sudan’s conflict does not meet these legal standards. The RSF militia’s dependence on foreign arms, logistics, and mercenaries violates the internal-origin requirement.
The Political Science Standard: Fearon and Laitin’s Definition
In their influential 2003 study “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”, James Fearon and David Laitin define civil war as sustained armed conflict between domestically organized groups, driven by internal grievances and contesting control over government, territory, or policy.
The RSF militia does not meet these criteria. It is not a political movement with grassroots support or a national agenda, but a closed, family-based force drawn from a narrow ethnic group. Its military strength depends on foreign mercenaries and external sponsorship, not local mobilization or internal insurgency.
Academic Consensus: Encyclopaedia Britannica Definition
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines civil war as armed conflict between organized groups within the same state, typically over government control, independence, or significant policy change, and characterized by the absence of decisive foreign involvement.
The RSF militia neither represents a political movement nor operates independently. Its capacity to wage war is sustained by external funding and foreign-supplied weaponry — a reality confirmed by multiple international investigations.

A Foreign-Sponsored Invasion — and Its Human Cost
Sudan’s war is not a civil war. It is a foreign-sponsored invasion — a UAE proxy war.
The evidence linking the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the heart of Sudan’s conflict is extensive and consistent. Multiple investigations, official reports, and legal proceedings confirm that the RSF militia’s military campaign is not self-sustained but powered by foreign arms, funding, and mercenaries — with the UAE at its center.
In June 2024, the Sudanese government filed a formal complaint at the United Nations Security Council, accusing the UAE of fueling the conflict by supplying weapons, financing, and mercenary fighters to the RSF militia in violation of international law. This was followed by Sudan’s legal case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in April 2025, charging the UAE with unlawful aggression through proxy warfare and complicity in genocide and war crimes.
Independent investigations reinforce these charges. A UN Panel of Experts report, leaked to The Guardian on April 15, 2025, confirmed systematic arms transfers and logistical support from the UAE to RSF militia-controlled zones via Amdjarass airport in eastern Chad, in breach of the international arms embargo on Darfur. A concurrent investigation by France24 Observers (“European Weapons in Sudan,” April 2025) exposed how the UAE diverted European-manufactured weapons to the RSF militia and recruited mercenaries, including ex-combatants from Colombia, to fight in Darfur.
The human cost of this foreign-backed war has been devastating. The UN Human Rights Office (June 2025), along with Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), has documented mass killings, ethnic cleansing, systematic sexual violence, and the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid. Hospitals have been occupied, civilians targeted, and relief efforts blocked — actions not of a local insurgency but of an external proxy force waging war against a civilian population.

The Cost of Misframing — and the Path Forward
The continued portrayal of Sudan’s war as an internal conflict between “two rival sides” is not simply a mistake of language — it is a political failure that enables impunity. This misframing protects foreign sponsors from scrutiny and shields them from accountability.
By dressing up a foreign-sponsored invasion as a civil war, the international community avoids confronting those who sustain the violence. It allows the UAE — and any other external backers — to operate behind the mask of neutrality. At the same time, the Sudanese people bear the consequences.
This misframing does not merely distort media narratives and diplomatic language — it also undermines the effectiveness of international mechanisms themselves. From United Nations Security Council resolutions to sanctions enforcement and ceasefire frameworks, presenting this conflict as an internal dispute allows global institutions to evade the obligations of decisive action. Aid strategies and policy responses are then shaped by a false reading of the power dynamics and responsibility on the ground.
This pattern of distortion is not unique to Sudan. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, proxy wars have been repackaged as internal disputes, delaying justice and paralyzing international response. In each of these conflicts, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a common denominator — funding militias, fueling fragmentation, and undermining sovereignty across the region.
As documented by the Jamestown Foundation (“The United Arab Emirates’ Long-Term Goals in Syria: Managing Militant Proxies and Geopolitical Adversaries,” 2023), the UAE has systematically pursued influence through the management of militant proxies and mercenary networks. Whether in Syria, Yemen, Libya, or now Sudan, its strategy has been consistent: to destabilize, divide, and dominate through indirect warfare while avoiding direct accountability.
Sudan risks becoming the next addition to this list of “forgotten wars,” not because the evidence is unclear but because the framing remains deliberately wrong.
There can be no peace without naming the aggressors. There can be no accountability without identifying the sponsors.
Ending the war in Sudan requires more than hollow calls for dialogue between “both sides.” It demands the political will to confront the foreign powers driving the conflict. This means enforcing arms embargoes, applying targeted sanctions on the RSF militia’s backers, and dismantling the supply chains that keep the militia operational.
The RSF militia cannot fight without its foreign sponsors. Cut off the weapons, the funding, and the mercenaries — and the war will collapse.
Naming this war for what it is — a foreign-sponsored invasion, a UAE proxy war — is not simply a question of rhetorical accuracy. It is the foundation for justice, accountability, and the possibility of peace