Five Mistakes Made by the Sudanese Opposition that Cost Them the Support of the Public and the Nation
Dr. Yasser Mahjoub Al-Hussein
In theory, the civilian opposition in any country plays a pivotal role in consolidating the foundations of good governance and addressing national crises. It represents the voice of the people and their aspirations for a better future.
In Sudan, great hopes were pinned on what became known as the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) following the popular protests that led to the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. Sudanese citizens expected these forces to lead the country towards building a modern, democratic, civilian state.
However, the journey of these forces was marred by numerous disappointments and failures, particularly evident in their handling of the current crisis gripping the country.
This reality raises a fundamental question: why did the Sudanese civilian opposition—especially the Forces of Freedom and Change – Central Council, whose prominent figure is former Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok—fail to play an effective role in confronting the current crisis and offering practical solutions?
1. Ambiguous Stance on the War
From this main question emerge several others: why did the opposition take an ambiguous, and in many cases supportive, stance towards the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, avoiding clear condemnation of its crimes? How did its political positions weaken domestic initiatives and tie the fate of the civilian movement to foreign agendas that do not necessarily serve Sudanese interests? How did the absence of charismatic and unified leadership affect its ability to mobilize the public and influence events? How did the reliance on external solutions reduce the opposition to mere reactive forces rather than active players? And how did dependence on foreign powers and internal divisions cause the opposition to lose genuine representation among the local population?
The opposition’s failure to explicitly condemn the RSF militia and its crimes against humanity, coupled with its reliance on waiting for external solutions instead of building a unified internal force with a clear national vision, made it part of the problem rather than the solution.
Engagement with the international and regional communities—though sometimes necessary—should be grounded in broad internal consensus and based on a purely national vision that reflects the interests of the Sudanese people. Reclaiming its independent sovereign decision-making is the first step for the opposition to reintegrate into the national movement and effectively contribute to good governance and crisis management.
The passive stance of the Sudanese civilian opposition, led by Abdullah Hamdok and the FFC (Central Council)—which, due to internal splits, later rebranded itself under names such as “Taqaddum” and “Sumood”—was, at best, described as ambiguous regarding the war that erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the RSF militia.
This war was not merely a power struggle, as it was often portrayed, but rather a clear rebellion against the state and its institutions. This ambiguous position attracted much criticism and opened the door to direct accusations of the opposition politically supporting the militia, or at least providing it with soft cover for its criminal activities.
2. Rapprochement with the RSF Militia
One of the most notable criticisms of the FFC is its failure to explicitly condemn the RSF militia, despite its role in sparking the war and committing widespread atrocities against civilians. Its statements often adopted a neutral tone, blaming both sides equally, as if both parties were comparable in legitimacy and conduct.
Moreover, the FFC signed an agreement with the militia leader under foreign sponsorship in Ethiopia. It also clung to the controversial “Framework Agreement” prior to the war, which many saw as an attempt to dismantle the army and restructure the military institution to serve the interests of a narrow elite.
This agreement was brokered with the support of the head of the UN mission, whom Hamdok had invited during his premiership without the army’s knowledge. After hostilities broke out, some opposition leaders continued to advocate for the Framework Agreement, ignoring the catastrophic realities imposed by the militia’s actions.
One of the most controversial positions was describing the crisis as a “conflict between two generals,” equating a lawful national institution with an outlawed armed militia.
3. Dependency on Foreign Powers and Favoring International Initiatives
The opposition appeared, in many of its stances, to adopt an external approach to the crisis, focusing on international and regional initiatives tied to foreign interests, without presenting an independent national vision or serious efforts to heal internal rifts.
The opposition participated in dubious external initiatives that did not prioritize holding the RSF accountable for its violations, treating the militia instead as a political party rather than an armed insurgent group.
Another major criticism is that the opposition persistently called for the “reform” and restructuring of the army while failing to show similar seriousness in demanding the disarmament of the RSF or holding it accountable for its grave crimes.
The accusations against the civilian opposition were bolstered by evidence, including continued direct or indirect communication with the RSF leadership after the war erupted, as revealed in both leaked and public reports. The close ties of some opposition leaders with countries accused of supporting the RSF further fueled suspicions about their agendas.
Statements from some leaders revealed double standards; while publicly calling for an end to the war, they privately suggested that a military victory by the army could lead to the return of the old regime, implicitly justifying the continued presence of the RSF as a balancing factor.
This stance cost the opposition much of its popular political capital and gave the impression that they were more concerned with regaining power than safeguarding the nation, even if that meant an implicit alliance with a militia that had committed atrocities against the people.
4. Internal Divisions and the Absence of Unified Leadership
Deep divisions within the opposition encouraged external actors to engage selectively with different factions, reinforcing its dependency and preventing the formation of a strong, unified national stance.
This fragmentation weakened the opposition’s representative legitimacy among the domestic populace, especially after the RSF rebellion, as many saw the opposition as disconnected from the people, relying instead on foreign legitimacy.
In addition to foreign dependency, the Sudanese civilian opposition suffered from chronic organizational weaknesses, sharp divisions, and the lack of unified leadership. These challenges worsened after it assumed executive power following al-Bashir’s fall.
The structural fragility—evidenced by multiple factions with diverse political and ideological orientations—hindered the adoption of unified, effective positions in the face of various challenges.
Political and ideological divisions—ranging from traditional parties to so-called modern revolutionary forces and independent activists—created constant conflicts over visions, priorities, and tactics, hampering the development of a cohesive national framework.
The absence of charismatic and unified leadership, particularly after the fragmentation of the FFC coalition, led to a dilution of authority and personal rivalries over leadership, weakening internal cohesion and the ability to mobilize the public and influence events.
This institutional weakness, with some groups depending on individual leadership and fragile structures, increased their vulnerability to splits and limited their ability for strategic planning and effective execution.
The continued state of external dependency and internal weakness raises serious doubts about the opposition’s ability to play an influential and effective role in Sudan’s future.
Historically, moments of weakened central authority have increased the opposition’s chances of impact, as seen after popular uprisings like those of October 1964, April 1985, and December 2018. Yet, this momentum often fades if not translated into stable political structures capable of absorbing changes and leading transformations.
The apparent unity within the opposition during those moments was exceptional but quickly dissipated due to ideological, regional, and tribal differences, leading to fragmentation and undermining the opposition’s ability to enact meaningful political change.
The most prominent example of this dynamic is the FFC, which began as a strong, unified body but soon splintered due to leadership disputes and conflicting visions for the transitional period.
5. Losing Touch with the Public and Preoccupation with Elites
Over time, the opposition lost its connection with the masses, becoming absorbed in internal conflicts and negotiating for political gains rather than expressing the aspirations of the street.
This disconnect continues to deepen as the opposition limits itself to elite meetings and press conferences instead of organizing on the ground, mobilizing the public, and presenting clear political discourse addressing daily concerns.
Will the Sudanese opposition learn that excessive reliance on foreign support, without building internal mechanisms for change, severely diminishes its credibility? Waiting endlessly for a green light from international capitals only portrays it as incapable of independent decision-making, weakening public trust.
Furthermore, revolutionary rhetoric unsupported by clear, practical plans no longer convinces a public that has become more conscious and demanding.
Thus, it becomes essential for opposition forces to reassess their strategies, seriously work towards building an inclusive national project grounded in internal will and unity, instead of awaiting foreign solutions or promises, which often come burdened with agendas not necessarily aligned with the interests of Sudan and its people.
