Al-Burhan’s Visit to Egypt: What’s New?

As I See

By Adel Al-Baz

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It seems that many Arab countries are now rapidly shifting their positions regarding what is happening in Sudan. After maintaining neutrality for a long time since the outbreak of the war, steps are now accelerating in several directions; some countries are repositioning themselves closer to the stance of the Sudanese state, while others are openly supporting it.
The positions of three countries—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—are now remarkably aligned regarding Sudan. What united these countries is the extreme approach of the UAE, which neither cares for nor respects the interests and national security of others, focusing only on implementing its imperial project without regard for any other party.

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What are the indicators of this shift in stance?
Let’s begin with Saudi Arabia:
Saudi Arabia exercised patience with the UAE’s attempts to monopolize the Sudanese file and mold it to its own interests, even to the extent that the UAE sought to place the “Janjaweed rifle” on Saudi Arabia’s head and shores. Recently, either due to realization or reaching its limit, Saudi Arabia responded to UAE actions—especially after the UAE unilaterally demarcated its maritime borders, escalating a dispute with Riyadh. Saudi Arabia rejected the move, viewing it as a violation of prior agreements.

Now Saudi Arabia is taking decisive steps in the Sudan file, including:
a/ In mid-February, it refused to participate in a UAE-sponsored conference in Addis Ababa titled “High-Level Humanitarian Aid.”
b/ After the militia conference in Nairobi in February, Saudi Arabia issued a statement on February 27 rejecting “any illegitimate steps or actions taken outside the framework of Sudan’s official institutions, which may harm its unity and do not reflect the will of its people, including calls to form a parallel government.”
c/ On April 15, Saudi Arabia refused to sign the final statement of the failed London conference, which collapsed due to the refusal of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar to sign it—because they insisted on the legitimacy of Sudanese state institutions and pointed out the external support being provided by the UAE.
d/ Saudi Arabia quickly formed a high-level committee that visited Sudan to assess all reconstruction, humanitarian, and even military needs.
e/ Saudi Arabia also dispatched a delegation to Sudan’s neighboring countries, the same ones visited earlier by Shakhbout to incite them against Sudan. While little information leaked about these meetings, it is evident that Saudi Arabia has moved beyond neutrality and mediation to play a direct and welcomed role.

Saudi Arabia has even begun restoring its embassy in Khartoum, with its military attaché being the first to arrive and paying a visit to the General Command—a clear signal given the current developments.

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Egypt’s stance has also evolved dramatically and publicly. Egypt had declared its position from day one, after the militia destroyed its aircraft and detained several of its forces at Merowe Airport. Dozens were captured. Egypt had previously warned the militia against reckless actions in Sudan, but the UAE-backed militia ignored these warnings, believing that its ties with the UAE would shield it from Egyptian retaliation.
What it didn’t understand is that Egypt is an ancient, great nation whose national security is neither for sale nor subject to bargaining, and certainly not up for grabs in the stolen markets of Dagalo in the UAE.

Egypt took the right stance from the beginning but preferred to act quietly to protect its national interests amid the militia’s aggression and savagery. Now, however, Egypt is more openly asserting its position—from the Geneva Conference, to refusing participation in Addis Ababa, to rejecting the London statement, and insisting on condemning those supporting the militias (now widely known), while affirming the sovereignty of Sudan and its official institutions.

Before the London conference, Egypt led a wave of diplomatic activity, especially after President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Doha on April 14, 2025, during which a direct investment package worth $7.5 billion was agreed with Qatar, to be implemented soon.
This is a significant signal at a time when Egypt is going through well-known economic hardships—pressures exploited by some to impose agendas that strike at Egypt’s core national interests. This is a losing bargain, and Egypt has refused it.

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Al-Burhan’s visit to Egypt yesterday comes in the wake of the above developments and also just ahead of Donald Trump’s official visit to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, scheduled for May 13–16, 2025.
The Sudan file is expected to surface, especially given repeated statements from members of the Republican Party about the UAE’s support and funding of the Rapid Support Forces.
However, given the bribes the UAE is offering Trump, who is notoriously greedy for money and deals, it’s unlikely he will pressure the UAE—especially since the UAE has pledged to invest $1.4 trillion in the U.S. over 10 years.
More importantly, Trump will hear a different narrative on the Sudan war from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Saudi Arabia is also expected to announce $100 billion in U.S. investments. As for Sudan—it remains off Trump’s priority list, thankfully.

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What matters here is the rapid shift in Egyptian and Saudi positions, a development that puts Sudan in a more comfortable and less politically isolated situation.
Even if these countries don’t provide direct financial or military support, simply derailing UAE-led conferences and exposing its destructive actions puts a major obstacle in the UAE’s path.
It is hoped that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia will eventually provide full support—not just for Sudan’s sake, but for their own national security.

Perhaps the most important line in the joint statement issued after yesterday’s meeting between President al-Burhan and President el-Sisi was:

> “The two countries’ visions are aligned due to the deep interconnection of their national security, and they agreed to continue coordination and joint action to safeguard the water security of both nations.”
This is the most important part of the statement, especially in light of suspicious efforts to involve foreign actors in the conflict—a topic we will address in detail later, God willing.