How Did the Rapid Support Forces Use Drones to Change the Course of the War?

By Dr. Yasser Mahjoub Al-Hussein

The Sudanese army is no longer facing a limited internal rebellion; it is now engaged in a complex battle against a regional and international project.
As the Sudanese war enters its second year, a profound shift in the tools and methods of conflict between the Sudanese army and the rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is becoming increasingly evident.

The war has moved beyond its traditional realm—characterized by ground offensives and direct clashes—and entered a new phase that could be described as a “shadow war,” where drones have become the most influential players on the battlefield.

At the onset of the conflict, the numerical advantage was clearly in favor of the militia, which deployed heavily across the capital, Khartoum, with an estimated force of around 100,000 fighters, compared to approximately 40,000 personnel in the Sudanese Armed Forces. The army also suffered from a structural imbalance, with a disproportionately high number of officers relative to soldiers.

Despite this imbalance, the Sudanese army managed to overcome the shock of the sudden rebellion, absorbed the initial blow that targeted its critical infrastructure, and quickly began reorganizing its ranks and regaining the initiative.

One of the most decisive turning points in the confrontation was the introduction of air power, particularly drones—a qualitative weapon that changed the rules of the game.

Drones enabled the army to carry out precise strikes targeting enemy supply lines, command centers, weapons depots, and militia strongholds embedded within urban areas.

This intelligent use of modern technology helped paralyze the enemy’s ability to maneuver, turning its numerical advantage into a liability. The RSF’s large force was effectively rendered “foam on the surface of a flood.”

Over time, the army transitioned from a defensive stance to launching offensives, reclaiming territory from the militia in various regions, dismantling its solid structure, and pushing it toward fragmentation. The remnants of the RSF have now devolved into scattered gangs engaged in looting and terrorizing civilians in remote areas, lacking the capacity to wage conventional battles.

Beyond the Framework of a Just War

However, the most significant—and perhaps most dangerous—development in the course of this war has been the militia’s recent success in acquiring and using drones, not only against military targets but also against vital civilian infrastructure.

In recent weeks, they launched attacks on water and electricity stations in government-controlled areas, reflecting a shift in the nature of the conflict—from a battlefield confrontation to a scorched-earth strategy aimed at disrupting daily life, preventing the return of displaced people and refugees, and hindering reconstruction, stability, and the tangible outcomes of military victories.

In a troubling escalation, the Al-Shouk power station—located 381 kilometers southeast of Khartoum—was hit by a drone strike on January 18, 2025, cutting electricity to three states: Gedaref, Kassala, and Sennar.

Just days later, Dongola power station—530 kilometers north of Khartoum—was also bombed, plunging the Northern State into total darkness. The attacks extended to key facilities such as the Merowe Dam—350 kilometers north of Khartoum—causing partial power production disruptions.

The water sector was also targeted: Al-Manara station in Omdurman was hit, cutting off water to three localities. Gedaref’s main water station was also struck, forcing residents to rely on the Nile and wells for water amid acute shortages and rising prices.

These attacks have had a direct impact on civilian life—hospitals, bakeries, and food production facilities were disrupted, while farmers in the Northern State expressed concern about losing crops that depend on electric-powered irrigation.

This wave of drone strikes reveals a calculated intent to prolong civilian suffering by turning essential services into tools of pressure, placing ordinary people in the line of fire and increasing the daily cost of the war.

This alarming transformation raises legitimate questions: Where did the militia acquire these drones? How are they conducting such complex operations without the necessary technical infrastructure or qualified personnel?

The logical answer is that the militia is no longer fighting with its own capabilities alone—it has become a proxy for foreign actors with intertwined interests in Sudan, who view the war as an opportunity to settle regional and international scores at minimal cost.

The conflict is thus more complex than it appears. The Sudanese army is not merely facing a limited domestic rebellion, but rather a multi-layered battle against a regional and international project using the RSF as a combat proxy, while the true player remains hidden behind the curtain, orchestrating this “shadow war” from afar.

A Strategic Dilemma: Did the Army Reveal Its Capabilities Too Soon?

Strategically, a critical question emerges: Was it wise for the army to reveal its technological edge so early?

Undoubtedly, this move aimed to boost troop morale and intimidate the enemy by showcasing superior capabilities. However, this early disclosure may have given adversaries time to study and understand these technologies, paving the way for external support that could replicate or counter them.

Moreover, broadcasting such capabilities in the media can be a double-edged sword: while it instills confidence domestically, it may provoke external foes and invite interference—especially if they sense the balance of power is shifting away from their proxies.

Even if the army has succeeded in establishing a drone deterrence equilibrium, a crucial question remains: How long can it maintain this edge?

Technology evolves rapidly and spreads easily; what is considered a qualitative advantage today may become standard tomorrow.

Sudan’s conflict has clearly moved beyond the bounds of a just war to suppress an armed rebellion—it has become an open battleground for a multidimensional struggle. A war fought directly at times and by proxy most of the time, using unconventional tools—from drones and disinformation campaigns to mercenaries and diplomatic escalation via international organizations.

The gravest threat facing Sudan is not merely the continuation of the war, but the lack of readiness to engage with its complex nature. Thus, achieving peace and stability solely by defeating the militia internally—without dismantling the web of foreign interference—is shortsighted and incompatible with any serious nation-building agenda.

Awareness of the nature of this “shadow war” is a prerequisite for any successful peace strategy, for one cannot confront an invisible enemy with undefined borders without knowing who is behind the curtain, orchestrating events in the dark.

Military and Political Paths Forward

Drones have changed the face of war—once a tool of technical superiority in the army’s hands, they are now a dual threat that creeps across the horizon, strikes without warning, and targets civilians and the pillars of national stability.

It is no longer sufficient to respond to this phenomenon with reactive or ad-hoc measures. The Sudanese army must reshape its combat doctrine and defense strategies to align with the new nature of warfare.

Militarily, the army should accelerate the development of short-range air defense systems, expand its use of jamming and electronic surveillance technologies, and establish specialized cyberwarfare units capable of disabling those iron birds before they deliver destruction.

Continual updates to battlefield tactics and specialized training for troops will be the most reliable guarantees for maintaining the initiative against an enemy that does not hesitate to target water tanks or power transformers.

On the political front, the battle is no longer confined to trenches—it also unfolds in international forums and on media screens. Documenting war crimes committed with drones and exposing the sources of external support is no longer a luxury, but a national necessity that justifies the war and establishes its legitimacy.

This must be accompanied by a smart diplomatic message that redefines the army as a responsible force fighting transnational terrorism, guided by a strategy of salvation rather than revenge.

Amid all this complexity, there is a pressing need for strategic awareness that understands victory is not measured by the number of successful airstrikes, but by the state’s ability to restore unity, shield civilians from the conflict, and eliminate foreign interference.

While drones may fly pilotless, those who operate them often care little for the fate of this nation or the cries of its children. Herein lies the critical role of the army’s awareness and strategic intelligence in managing this “shadow war”—as the only bridge toward a light that glimmers at the end of a long, dark tunnel.