𝗡𝗼𝘁 𝗬𝗼𝘂𝗿𝘀 𝘁𝗼 𝗚𝗿𝗮𝗻𝘁: 𝗦𝘂𝗱𝗮𝗻’𝘀 𝗦𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝗯𝘂 𝗗𝗵𝗮𝗯𝗶 𝗥𝗲𝗴𝗶𝗺𝗲

𝗕𝘆 𝗦𝗮𝗯𝗮𝗵 𝗔𝗹-𝗠𝗮𝗸𝗸𝗶

𝘈𝘧𝘵𝘦𝘳 𝘚𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘯 𝘴𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘦𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘈𝘣𝘶 𝘋𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘮𝘦, 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘳𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘳𝘦𝘵𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘥𝘦𝘤𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘚𝘶𝘥𝘢𝘯’𝘴 𝘨𝘰𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘯𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘦, 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘶𝘵𝘩𝘰𝘳𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘢𝘯 𝘭𝘰𝘨𝘪𝘤 𝘣𝘦𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘥 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘶𝘧𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘥 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯.

𝖮𝗇 𝖬𝖺𝗒 𝟨, 𝟤𝟢𝟤𝟧, 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖱𝖾𝗉𝗎𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼 𝗈𝖿 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇 𝗌𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖾𝖽 𝖽𝗂𝗉𝗅𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗂𝖼 𝗍𝗂𝖾𝗌 𝗐𝗂𝗍𝗁 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖠𝖻𝗎 𝖣𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾, 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗅𝖺𝗋𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗂𝗍 𝖺 𝗁𝗈𝗌𝗍𝗂𝗅𝖾 𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗈𝗋. 𝖳𝗁𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇 𝖿𝗈𝗅𝗅𝗈𝗐𝖾𝖽 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝗉𝗎𝖻𝗅𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗈𝗇 𝗈𝖿 𝖾𝗑𝗍𝖾𝗇𝗌𝗂𝗏𝖾 𝖾𝗏𝗂𝖽𝖾𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝗅𝗂𝗇𝗄𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝖠𝖻𝗎 𝖣𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂 𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗏𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇 𝗈𝖿 𝖽𝗋𝗈𝗇𝖾𝗌, 𝗐𝖾𝖺𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌, 𝖺𝗇𝖽 𝗅𝗈𝗀𝗂𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗎𝗉𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍 𝗍𝗈 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖱𝖺𝗉𝗂𝖽 𝖲𝗎𝗉𝗉𝗈𝗋𝗍 𝖥𝗈𝗋𝖼𝖾𝗌 (𝖱𝖲𝖥) 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗂𝖻𝗅𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗋 𝗆𝖺𝗌𝗌 𝖺𝗍𝗋𝗈𝖼𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖾𝗌 𝖺𝗇𝖽 𝖺𝖼𝗍𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝗈𝗎𝗇𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗍𝗈 𝗐𝖺𝗋 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗆𝖾𝗌.

𝖳𝗁𝗂𝗌 𝗐𝖺𝗌 𝗇𝗈𝗍 𝖺 𝗋𝗁𝖾𝗍𝗈𝗋𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝗀𝖾𝗌𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖾, 𝗇𝗈𝗋 𝖺 𝗌𝗒𝗆𝖻𝗈𝗅𝗂𝖼 𝗉𝗋𝗈𝗍𝖾𝗌𝗍. 𝖨𝗍 𝗐𝖺𝗌 𝖺 𝗅𝖺𝗐𝖿𝗎𝗅 𝖺𝖼𝗍 𝗈𝖿 𝗇𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝖾𝗅𝖿-𝖽𝖾𝖿𝖾𝗇𝗌𝖾 𝗀𝗋𝗈𝗎𝗇𝖽𝖾𝖽 𝗂𝗇 𝖠𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗅𝖾 𝟧𝟣 𝗈𝖿 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖴𝖭 𝖢𝗁𝖺𝗋𝗍𝖾𝗋. 𝖴𝗇𝖽𝖾𝗋 𝗍𝗁𝗂𝗌 𝖺𝗋𝗍𝗂𝖼𝗅𝖾, 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇 𝗐𝖺𝗌 𝗃𝗎𝗌𝗍𝗂𝖿𝗂𝖾𝖽 𝗂𝗇 𝗂𝗍𝗌 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝖾 𝗍𝗈 𝖺 𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗀𝗇-𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝗌𝗈𝗋𝖾𝖽 𝖺𝗋𝗆𝖾𝖽 𝖼𝖺𝗆𝗉𝖺𝗂𝗀𝗇 𝗍𝗁𝖺𝗍 𝗁𝖺𝗌 𝗄𝗂𝗅𝗅𝖾𝖽 𝗍𝗁𝗈𝗎𝗌𝖺𝗇𝖽𝗌 𝗈𝖿 𝖼𝗂𝗏𝗂𝗅𝗂𝖺𝗇𝗌, 𝖽𝗂𝗌𝗉𝗅𝖺𝖼𝖾𝖽 𝗆𝗂𝗅𝗅𝗂𝗈𝗇𝗌, 𝖺𝗇𝖽 𝗍𝖺𝗋𝗀𝖾𝗍𝖾𝖽 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇’𝗌 𝖼𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝗂𝗇𝖿𝗋𝖺𝗌𝗍𝗋𝗎𝖼𝗍𝗎𝗋𝖾.

𝖳𝗁𝖾 𝖿𝗈𝗅𝗅𝗈𝗐𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝖽𝖺𝗒, 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖠𝖻𝗎 𝖣𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗆𝖾 𝗋𝖾𝗌𝗉𝗈𝗇𝖽𝖾𝖽 𝖻𝗒 𝗌𝗍𝖺𝗍𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗍𝗁𝖺𝗍 𝗂𝗍 𝖽𝗂𝖽 𝗇𝗈𝗍 𝗋𝖾𝖼𝗈𝗀𝗇𝗂𝗓𝖾 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇’𝗌 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍 𝖺𝗇𝖽, 𝗍𝗁𝖾𝗋𝖾𝖿𝗈𝗋𝖾, 𝖽𝗂𝖽 𝗇𝗈𝗍 𝖺𝖼𝖼𝖾𝗉𝗍 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝖽𝖾𝖼𝗂𝗌𝗂𝗈𝗇 𝗍𝗈 𝗌𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝖽𝗂𝗉𝗅𝗈𝗆𝖺𝗍𝗂𝖼 𝗍𝗂𝖾𝗌. 𝖳𝗁𝗂𝗌 𝗐𝖺𝗌 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖾 𝗍𝗁𝖺𝗇 𝖺 𝗋𝖾𝗃𝖾𝖼𝗍𝗂𝗈𝗇—𝖺𝗇 𝖺𝗍𝗍𝖾𝗆𝗉𝗍 𝗍𝗈 𝖽𝖾𝗅𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗆𝗂𝗓𝖾 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇’𝗌 𝗌𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗀𝗇 𝖺𝖼𝗍 𝖻𝗒 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗒𝗂𝗇𝗀 𝗍𝗁𝖾 𝗀𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝗇𝗆𝖾𝗇𝗍’𝗌 𝖺𝗎𝗍𝗁𝗈𝗋𝗂𝗍𝗒 𝗍𝗈 𝗆𝖺𝗄𝖾 𝗂𝗍. 𝖳𝗁𝖾 𝗆𝗈𝗏𝖾 𝗌𝖺𝗂𝖽 𝗅𝖾𝗌𝗌 𝖺𝖻𝗈𝗎𝗍 𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇’𝗌 𝗂𝗇𝗍𝖾𝗋𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗒 𝗍𝗁𝖺𝗇 𝖠𝖻𝗎 𝖣𝗁𝖺𝖻𝗂’𝗌 𝖺𝗆𝖻𝗂𝗍𝗂𝗈𝗇 𝗍𝗈 𝖺𝗌𝗌𝖾𝗋𝗍 𝖽𝗈𝗆𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝖾 𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋 𝗋𝖾𝗀𝗂𝗈𝗇𝖺𝗅 𝗌𝗈𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖾𝗂𝗀𝗇𝗍𝗒 𝗍𝗁𝗋𝗈𝗎𝗀𝗁 𝖿𝗂𝗇𝖺𝗇𝖼𝗂𝖺𝗅 𝗅𝖾𝗏𝖾𝗋𝖺𝗀𝖾 𝖺𝗇𝖽 𝗉𝗈𝗅𝗂𝗍𝗂𝖼𝖺𝗅 𝖽𝖾𝗇𝗂𝖺𝗅.

𝗥𝗲𝗰𝗼𝗴𝗻𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻 𝗮𝘀 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝗷𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻: 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗣𝗼𝗹𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗰𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗗𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗶𝘇𝗮𝘁𝗶𝗼𝗻

In international relations, recognition is a function of legal status, not a discretionary token extended by regimes that have never practiced democratic governance. The Abu Dhabi regime, ruled through dynastic fiat, lacks elections, independent parties, and public accountability. Its claim to assess another state’s legitimacy is not rooted in international norms but in geopolitical self-interest.

Despite the immense strain, Sudan’s transitional government has emerged from within, shaped by resistance, internal consensus, and national sacrifice. Its authority derives not from foreign endorsement but from the resilience and determination of the Sudanese people, a testament to the power of collective action in the face of adversity.

The Abu Dhabi regime’s dismissal of such a government is not diplomatic dissent. It is an act of narrative control masquerading as diplomacy.

𝗕𝗿𝗼𝗸𝗲𝗿 𝗮𝗻𝗱 𝗕𝗲𝗹𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗻𝘁: 𝗔𝗯𝘂 𝗗𝗵𝗮𝗯𝗶’𝘀 𝗗𝗼𝘂𝗯𝗹𝗲 𝗚𝗮𝗺𝗲 𝗶𝗻 𝗦𝘂𝗱𝗮𝗻

The Abu Dhabi regime has perfected a dual-track strategy: funding armed factions while presenting as a neutral interlocutor. Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in Sudan. While branding itself as a stabilizing force, it has armed and supplied the RSF militia, an entity officially designated by Sudan’s authorities as a terrorist organization.

Investigations—including a five-part exposé by France 24 Observers and UN expert reports—have traced weapons and drone systems from Abu Dhabi to RSF militia operations via Chad. Despite such documentation, the regime continues positioning itself at the center of diplomatic tracks it sabotages.

What may seem like a contradiction in the Abu Dhabi regime’s actions is, in fact, a carefully orchestrated deception. It is not a contradiction, but a choreographed performance designed to deceive.

𝗖𝗶𝘃𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗥𝘂𝗹𝗲 𝗪𝗶𝘁𝗵𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗮 𝗕𝗮𝗹𝗹𝗼𝘁: 𝗔 𝗠𝗮𝗻𝘂𝗳𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗡𝗮𝗿𝗿𝗮𝘁𝗶𝘃𝗲

The Abu Dhabi regime’s rhetoric about “civilian rule” in Sudan reveals a profound contradiction. It champions electoral transition in a country it seeks to influence, while having never held elections. Its political model does not allow multi-party competition, legislative debate, or public scrutiny.

That such a regime seeks to define what civilian governance should look like elsewhere does not demonstrate regional leadership—it is the outsourcing of political design. Under this model, civilian rule is less about ballots than branding.

The figures it promotes are often selected not for who they represent, but for whom they align. Their credibility is shaped by international appearances, not by national constituencies.
Civilian leadership in Sudan is crucial. However, it must not be assembled offshore by a regime unacquainted with voting booths. It must emerge from Sudanese political development, a process that demands our respect and support.

𝗔𝘂𝘁𝗵𝗼𝗿𝗶𝘁𝗮𝗿𝗶𝗮𝗻 𝗜𝗻𝗳𝗹𝘂𝗲𝗻𝗰𝗲 𝗪𝗶𝘁𝗵𝗼𝘂𝘁 𝗕𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗲𝗿𝘀

The Abu Dhabi regime operates a model of statecraft that blends economic leverage, military outsourcing, and image management. It is not traditional authoritarianism—it is transactional power disguised as stability.

Across fragile states, it deploys this model: invest in infrastructure, arm local actors, and mediate the crises it helped inflame. Its public diplomacy is polished, but its strategy remains clear: displace political agency through external dependency.
In Sudan, this model has fueled violence, obstructed institutional recovery, and stalled national coherence.

𝗪𝗵𝘆 𝗜𝘁 𝗠𝗮𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝘀: 𝗧𝗵𝗲 𝗥𝗶𝘀𝗸𝘀 𝗼𝗳 𝗥𝗲𝘄𝗮𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝗔𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗶𝘀𝘁

Despite mounting evidence, some Western governments continue to treat the Abu Dhabi regime as a source of regional stability. This framing is increasingly out of step with on-the-ground realities. In Sudan, the regime has not mitigated conflict—it has enabled it.
Rewarding such behavior undermines the principle of non-intervention and the credibility of international norms. It also signals that regimes can act as fire-starters and still be applauded as firemen.

Western tolerance of such dual-track behavior—arming conflict while preaching diplomacy—undermines the credibility of the rules-based order these powers claim to defend.
Sudan is not merely facing a domestic crisis. It is resisting the normalization of externally orchestrated fragmentation.

𝗖𝗼𝗻𝗰𝗹𝘂𝘀𝗶𝗼𝗻: 𝗥𝗲𝗰𝗹𝗮𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗦𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗶𝗻 𝗮 𝗣𝗿𝗼𝘅𝘆 𝗔𝗴𝗲

No regime holds proprietary rights over recognition, not least those that reject representative governance themselves. Sovereignty is not something to be leased or conferred. It is exercised, defended, and, when necessary, reclaimed.

The Abu Dhabi regime may continue to present itself as a diplomatic actor. But Sudan has clarified its position: its sovereignty is not subject to foreign brokerage. Its political trajectory will not be scripted in the lobbies of regional powers.

This position aligns with Sudan’s formal submission to the International Court of Justice and its prior efforts to address Abu Dhabi’s involvement through multilateral diplomatic channels.
If the world is serious about sovereignty, it must begin by acknowledging not just the weapons used against Sudan but the frameworks of legitimacy being manipulated to dismantle it.

𝗦𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗶𝗴𝗻𝘁𝘆 𝗜𝘀 𝗡𝗼𝘁 𝗣𝗲𝗿𝗳𝗼𝗿𝗺𝗲𝗱 — 𝗜𝘁 𝗜𝘀 𝗣𝗿𝗮𝗰𝘁𝗶𝗰𝗲𝗱

𝖲𝗎𝖽𝖺𝗇 𝖽𝗂𝖽 𝗇𝗈𝗍 𝗋𝖾𝗍𝗋𝖾𝖺𝗍. 𝖨𝗍 𝗌𝗍𝗈𝗈𝖽 𝖿𝗂𝗋𝗆—𝗅𝖾𝗀𝖺𝗅𝗅𝗒, 𝗆𝗈𝗋𝖺𝗅𝗅𝗒, and diplomatically. It severed ties with an aggressor, upheld international law, and protected its citizens, even on hostile soil. It did so without granting political legitimacy or recognition to the Abu Dhabi regime.

The regime, in contrast, deployed disinformation, recycled dismissed envoys, and relied on media theatrics. It sought to craft an illusion in place of law.
But Sudan did not blink. It chose discipline over reaction, law over optics, and responsibility over political theatre. That is what true sovereignty looks like.