๐ก๐ผ๐ ๐ฌ๐ผ๐๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ป๐: ๐ฆ๐๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ปโ๐ ๐ฆ๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ถ๐ด๐ป๐๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐น๐ถ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฏ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ถ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ด๐ถ๐บ๐ฒ

๐๐ ๐ฆ๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ต ๐๐น-๐ ๐ฎ๐ธ๐ธ๐ถ
๐๐ง๐ต๐ฆ๐ณ ๐๐ถ๐ฅ๐ข๐ฏ ๐ด๐ฆ๐ท๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฅ ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ญ๐ข๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ๐ด ๐ธ๐ช๐ต๐ฉ ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ ๐๐ฃ๐ถ ๐๐ฉ๐ข๐ฃ๐ช ๐ณ๐ฆ๐จ๐ช๐ฎ๐ฆ, ๐ช๐ต๐ด ๐ณ๐ถ๐ญ๐ฆ๐ณ๐ด ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ต๐ข๐ญ๐ช๐ข๐ต๐ฆ๐ฅ ๐ฃ๐บ ๐ฅ๐ฆ๐ค๐ญ๐ข๐ณ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐๐ถ๐ฅ๐ข๐ฏโ๐ด ๐จ๐ฐ๐ท๐ฆ๐ณ๐ฏ๐ฎ๐ฆ๐ฏ๐ต ๐ช๐ญ๐ญ๐ฆ๐จ๐ช๐ต๐ช๐ฎ๐ข๐ต๐ฆ, ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ท๐ฆ๐ข๐ญ๐ช๐ฏ๐จ ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฆ ๐ข๐ถ๐ต๐ฉ๐ฐ๐ณ๐ช๐ต๐ข๐ณ๐ช๐ข๐ฏ ๐ญ๐ฐ๐จ๐ช๐ค ๐ฃ๐ฆ๐ฉ๐ช๐ฏ๐ฅ ๐ฎ๐ข๐ฏ๐ถ๐ง๐ข๐ค๐ต๐ถ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ฅ ๐ณ๐ฆ๐ค๐ฐ๐จ๐ฏ๐ช๐ต๐ช๐ฐ๐ฏ.
๐ฎ๐ ๐ฌ๐บ๐ ๐จ, ๐ค๐ข๐ค๐ง, ๐๐๐พ ๐ฑ๐พ๐๐๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐ฟ ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐ ๐๐พ๐๐พ๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐ฝ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐บ๐๐๐ผ ๐๐๐พ๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐พ ๐ ๐ป๐ ๐ฃ๐๐บ๐ป๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐พ, ๐ฝ๐พ๐ผ๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐บ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐พ ๐บ๐ผ๐๐๐. ๐ณ๐๐พ ๐ฝ๐พ๐ผ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฟ๐๐ ๐ ๐๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐๐๐พ ๐๐๐ป๐ ๐๐ผ๐บ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฟ ๐พ๐๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐พ ๐พ๐๐๐ฝ๐พ๐๐ผ๐พ ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ ๐ป๐ ๐ฃ๐๐บ๐ป๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐พ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ฟ ๐ฝ๐๐๐๐พ๐, ๐๐พ๐บ๐๐๐๐, ๐บ๐๐ฝ ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐๐พ ๐ฑ๐บ๐๐๐ฝ ๐ฒ๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฅ๐๐๐ผ๐พ๐ (๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฅ) ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐บ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ป๐ ๐พ ๐ฟ๐๐ ๐๐บ๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐ผ๐๐๐๐พ๐ ๐บ๐๐ฝ ๐บ๐ผ๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐ผ๐๐๐๐พ๐.
๐ณ๐๐๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐บ ๐๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐พ, ๐๐๐ ๐บ ๐๐๐๐ป๐๐ ๐๐ผ ๐๐๐๐๐พ๐๐. ๐จ๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐บ ๐ ๐บ๐๐ฟ๐๐ ๐บ๐ผ๐ ๐๐ฟ ๐๐บ๐๐๐๐๐บ๐ ๐๐พ๐ ๐ฟ-๐ฝ๐พ๐ฟ๐พ๐๐๐พ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ฝ๐พ๐ฝ ๐๐ ๐ ๐๐๐๐ผ๐ ๐พ ๐ง๐ฃ ๐๐ฟ ๐๐๐พ ๐ด๐ญ ๐ข๐๐บ๐๐๐พ๐. ๐ด๐๐ฝ๐พ๐ ๐๐๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐ผ๐ ๐พ, ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐ฟ๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐๐พ ๐๐ ๐บ ๐ฟ๐๐๐พ๐๐๐-๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐บ๐๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐ผ๐บ๐๐๐บ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐บ๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐ ๐พ๐ฝ ๐๐๐๐๐๐บ๐๐ฝ๐ ๐๐ฟ ๐ผ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐บ๐๐, ๐ฝ๐๐๐๐ ๐บ๐ผ๐พ๐ฝ ๐๐๐ ๐ ๐๐๐๐, ๐บ๐๐ฝ ๐๐บ๐๐๐พ๐๐พ๐ฝ ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐โ๐ ๐ผ๐๐๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ ๐๐๐ฟ๐๐บ๐๐๐๐๐ผ๐๐๐๐พ.
๐ณ๐๐พ ๐ฟ๐๐ ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฝ๐บ๐, ๐๐๐พ ๐ ๐ป๐ ๐ฃ๐๐บ๐ป๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐พ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐ฝ๐พ๐ฝ ๐ป๐ ๐๐๐บ๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐บ๐ ๐๐ ๐ฝ๐๐ฝ ๐๐๐ ๐๐พ๐ผ๐๐๐๐๐๐พ ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐โ๐ ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐ ๐บ๐๐ฝ, ๐๐๐พ๐๐พ๐ฟ๐๐๐พ, ๐ฝ๐๐ฝ ๐๐๐ ๐บ๐ผ๐ผ๐พ๐๐ ๐๐๐พ ๐ฝ๐พ๐ผ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐พ๐๐พ๐ ๐ฝ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐บ๐๐๐ผ ๐๐๐พ๐. ๐ณ๐๐๐ ๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐๐พ ๐๐๐บ๐ ๐บ ๐๐พ๐๐พ๐ผ๐๐๐๐โ๐บ๐ ๐บ๐๐๐พ๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐ฝ๐พ๐ ๐พ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐พ ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐โ๐ ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐พ๐๐๐ ๐บ๐ผ๐ ๐ป๐ ๐ฝ๐พ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐พ ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐โ๐ ๐บ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐๐บ๐๐พ ๐๐. ๐ณ๐๐พ ๐๐๐๐พ ๐๐บ๐๐ฝ ๐ ๐พ๐๐ ๐บ๐ป๐๐๐ ๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐โ๐ ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ ๐๐พ๐บ๐ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐บ๐ ๐ ๐ป๐ ๐ฃ๐๐บ๐ป๐โ๐ ๐บ๐๐ป๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐ ๐บ๐๐๐พ๐๐ ๐ฝ๐๐๐๐๐บ๐๐ผ๐พ ๐๐๐พ๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐บ๐ ๐๐๐๐พ๐๐พ๐๐๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐๐๐๐ ๐ฟ๐๐๐บ๐๐ผ๐๐บ๐ ๐ ๐พ๐๐พ๐๐บ๐๐พ ๐บ๐๐ฝ ๐๐๐ ๐๐๐๐ผ๐บ๐ ๐ฝ๐พ๐๐๐บ๐ .
๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐ผ๐ด๐ป๐ถ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป ๐ฎ๐ ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ท๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป: ๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฃ๐ผ๐น๐ถ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐๐ฒ๐น๐ฒ๐ด๐ถ๐๐ถ๐บ๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป
In international relations, recognition is a function of legal status, not a discretionary token extended by regimes that have never practiced democratic governance. The Abu Dhabi regime, ruled through dynastic fiat, lacks elections, independent parties, and public accountability. Its claim to assess another stateโs legitimacy is not rooted in international norms but in geopolitical self-interest.
Despite the immense strain, Sudanโs transitional government has emerged from within, shaped by resistance, internal consensus, and national sacrifice. Its authority derives not from foreign endorsement but from the resilience and determination of the Sudanese people, a testament to the power of collective action in the face of adversity.
The Abu Dhabi regimeโs dismissal of such a government is not diplomatic dissent. It is an act of narrative control masquerading as diplomacy.
๐๐ฟ๐ผ๐ธ๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐๐ฒ๐น๐น๐ถ๐ด๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ป๐: ๐๐ฏ๐ ๐๐ต๐ฎ๐ฏ๐ถโ๐ ๐๐ผ๐๐ฏ๐น๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐บ๐ฒ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ฆ๐๐ฑ๐ฎ๐ป
The Abu Dhabi regime has perfected a dual-track strategy: funding armed factions while presenting as a neutral interlocutor. Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in Sudan. While branding itself as a stabilizing force, it has armed and supplied the RSF militia, an entity officially designated by Sudanโs authorities as a terrorist organization.
Investigationsโincluding a five-part exposรฉ by France 24 Observers and UN expert reportsโhave traced weapons and drone systems from Abu Dhabi to RSF militia operations via Chad. Despite such documentation, the regime continues positioning itself at the center of diplomatic tracks it sabotages.
What may seem like a contradiction in the Abu Dhabi regimeโs actions is, in fact, a carefully orchestrated deception. It is not a contradiction, but a choreographed performance designed to deceive.
๐๐ถ๐๐ถ๐น๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฅ๐๐น๐ฒ ๐ช๐ถ๐๐ต๐ผ๐๐ ๐ฎ ๐๐ฎ๐น๐น๐ผ๐: ๐ ๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐๐ณ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐๐๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐ก๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐๐ฒ
The Abu Dhabi regimeโs rhetoric about โcivilian ruleโ in Sudan reveals a profound contradiction. It champions electoral transition in a country it seeks to influence, while having never held elections. Its political model does not allow multi-party competition, legislative debate, or public scrutiny.
That such a regime seeks to define what civilian governance should look like elsewhere does not demonstrate regional leadershipโit is the outsourcing of political design. Under this model, civilian rule is less about ballots than branding.
The figures it promotes are often selected not for who they represent, but for whom they align. Their credibility is shaped by international appearances, not by national constituencies.
Civilian leadership in Sudan is crucial. However, it must not be assembled offshore by a regime unacquainted with voting booths. It must emerge from Sudanese political development, a process that demands our respect and support.
๐๐๐๐ต๐ผ๐ฟ๐ถ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐๐ป๐ณ๐น๐๐ฒ๐ป๐ฐ๐ฒ ๐ช๐ถ๐๐ต๐ผ๐๐ ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐
The Abu Dhabi regime operates a model of statecraft that blends economic leverage, military outsourcing, and image management. It is not traditional authoritarianismโit is transactional power disguised as stability.
Across fragile states, it deploys this model: invest in infrastructure, arm local actors, and mediate the crises it helped inflame. Its public diplomacy is polished, but its strategy remains clear: displace political agency through external dependency.
In Sudan, this model has fueled violence, obstructed institutional recovery, and stalled national coherence.
๐ช๐ต๐ ๐๐ ๐ ๐ฎ๐๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐: ๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐ถ๐๐ธ๐ ๐ผ๐ณ ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฑ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐๐ต๐ฒ ๐๐ฟ๐๐ผ๐ป๐ถ๐๐
Despite mounting evidence, some Western governments continue to treat the Abu Dhabi regime as a source of regional stability. This framing is increasingly out of step with on-the-ground realities. In Sudan, the regime has not mitigated conflictโit has enabled it.
Rewarding such behavior undermines the principle of non-intervention and the credibility of international norms. It also signals that regimes can act as fire-starters and still be applauded as firemen.
Western tolerance of such dual-track behaviorโarming conflict while preaching diplomacyโundermines the credibility of the rules-based order these powers claim to defend.
Sudan is not merely facing a domestic crisis. It is resisting the normalization of externally orchestrated fragmentation.
๐๐ผ๐ป๐ฐ๐น๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป: ๐ฅ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐น๐ฎ๐ถ๐บ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฆ๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ถ๐ด๐ป๐๐ ๐ถ๐ป ๐ฎ ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ผ๐ ๐ ๐๐ด๐ฒ
No regime holds proprietary rights over recognition, not least those that reject representative governance themselves. Sovereignty is not something to be leased or conferred. It is exercised, defended, and, when necessary, reclaimed.
The Abu Dhabi regime may continue to present itself as a diplomatic actor. But Sudan has clarified its position: its sovereignty is not subject to foreign brokerage. Its political trajectory will not be scripted in the lobbies of regional powers.
This position aligns with Sudanโs formal submission to the International Court of Justice and its prior efforts to address Abu Dhabiโs involvement through multilateral diplomatic channels.
If the world is serious about sovereignty, it must begin by acknowledging not just the weapons used against Sudan but the frameworks of legitimacy being manipulated to dismantle it.
๐ฆ๐ผ๐๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ฒ๐ถ๐ด๐ป๐๐ ๐๐ ๐ก๐ผ๐ ๐ฃ๐ฒ๐ฟ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ๐บ๐ฒ๐ฑ โ ๐๐ ๐๐ ๐ฃ๐ฟ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐๐ถ๐ฐ๐ฒ๐ฑ
๐ฒ๐๐ฝ๐บ๐ ๐ฝ๐๐ฝ ๐๐๐ ๐๐พ๐๐๐พ๐บ๐. ๐จ๐ ๐๐๐๐๐ฝ ๐ฟ๐๐๐โ๐ ๐พ๐๐บ๐ ๐ ๐, ๐๐๐๐บ๐ ๐ ๐, and diplomatically. It severed ties with an aggressor, upheld international law, and protected its citizens, even on hostile soil. It did so without granting political legitimacy or recognition to the Abu Dhabi regime.
The regime, in contrast, deployed disinformation, recycled dismissed envoys, and relied on media theatrics. It sought to craft an illusion in place of law.
But Sudan did not blink. It chose discipline over reaction, law over optics, and responsibility over political theatre. That is what true sovereignty looks like.