Opinion

๐—ก๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฌ๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐˜€ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—š๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜: ๐—ฆ๐˜‚๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐—ปโ€™๐˜€ ๐—ฆ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ป๐˜๐˜† ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฃ๐—ผ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—ฏ๐˜‚ ๐——๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ถ ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฒ

๐—•๐˜† ๐—ฆ๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ฎ๐—ต ๐—”๐—น-๐— ๐—ฎ๐—ธ๐—ธ๐—ถ

๐˜ˆ๐˜ง๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ ๐˜š๐˜ถ๐˜ฅ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ ๐˜ด๐˜ฆ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ญ๐˜ข๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ๐˜ด ๐˜ธ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ฉ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ˆ๐˜ฃ๐˜ถ ๐˜‹๐˜ฉ๐˜ข๐˜ฃ๐˜ช ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜จ๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ, ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ด ๐˜ณ๐˜ถ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ๐˜ด ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ต๐˜ข๐˜ญ๐˜ช๐˜ข๐˜ต๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ฃ๐˜บ ๐˜ฅ๐˜ฆ๐˜ค๐˜ญ๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜จ ๐˜š๐˜ถ๐˜ฅ๐˜ข๐˜ฏโ€™๐˜ด ๐˜จ๐˜ฐ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ณ๐˜ฏ๐˜ฎ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฏ๐˜ต ๐˜ช๐˜ญ๐˜ญ๐˜ฆ๐˜จ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฎ๐˜ข๐˜ต๐˜ฆ, ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ท๐˜ฆ๐˜ข๐˜ญ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜จ ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฆ ๐˜ข๐˜ถ๐˜ต๐˜ฉ๐˜ฐ๐˜ณ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ข๐˜ณ๐˜ช๐˜ข๐˜ฏ ๐˜ญ๐˜ฐ๐˜จ๐˜ช๐˜ค ๐˜ฃ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฉ๐˜ช๐˜ฏ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ฎ๐˜ข๐˜ฏ๐˜ถ๐˜ง๐˜ข๐˜ค๐˜ต๐˜ถ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ฅ ๐˜ณ๐˜ฆ๐˜ค๐˜ฐ๐˜จ๐˜ฏ๐˜ช๐˜ต๐˜ช๐˜ฐ๐˜ฏ.

 

๐–ฎ๐—‡ ๐–ฌ๐–บ๐—’ ๐Ÿจ, ๐Ÿค๐Ÿข๐Ÿค๐Ÿง, ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐–ฑ๐–พ๐—‰๐—Ž๐–ป๐—…๐—‚๐–ผ ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡ ๐—Œ๐–พ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐—‰๐—…๐—ˆ๐—†๐–บ๐—๐—‚๐–ผ ๐—๐—‚๐–พ๐—Œ ๐—๐—‚๐—๐— ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐– ๐–ป๐—Ž ๐–ฃ๐—๐–บ๐–ป๐—‚ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—€๐—‚๐—†๐–พ, ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ผ๐—…๐–บ๐—‹๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐—‚๐— ๐–บ ๐—๐—ˆ๐—Œ๐—๐—‚๐—…๐–พ ๐–บ๐–ผ๐—๐—ˆ๐—‹. ๐–ณ๐—๐–พ ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ผ๐—‚๐—Œ๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡ ๐–ฟ๐—ˆ๐—…๐—…๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐—‰๐—Ž๐–ป๐—…๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡ ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐–พ๐—‘๐—๐–พ๐—‡๐—Œ๐—‚๐—๐–พ ๐–พ๐—๐—‚๐–ฝ๐–พ๐—‡๐–ผ๐–พ ๐—…๐—‚๐—‡๐—„๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐– ๐–ป๐—Ž ๐–ฃ๐—๐–บ๐–ป๐—‚ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐—‰๐—‹๐—ˆ๐—๐—‚๐—Œ๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡ ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐–ฝ๐—‹๐—ˆ๐—‡๐–พ๐—Œ, ๐—๐–พ๐–บ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‡๐—Œ, ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ ๐—…๐—ˆ๐—€๐—‚๐—Œ๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—… ๐—Œ๐—Ž๐—‰๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‹๐— ๐—๐—ˆ ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐–ฑ๐–บ๐—‰๐—‚๐–ฝ ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐—‰๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‹๐— ๐–ฅ๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–ผ๐–พ๐—Œ (๐–ฑ๐–ฒ๐–ฅ) ๐—†๐—‚๐—…๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐–บ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—Œ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‡๐—Œ๐—‚๐–ป๐—…๐–พ ๐–ฟ๐—ˆ๐—‹ ๐—†๐–บ๐—Œ๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—๐—‹๐—ˆ๐–ผ๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐–พ๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ ๐–บ๐–ผ๐—๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—†๐—ˆ๐—Ž๐—‡๐—๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐—๐–บ๐—‹ ๐–ผ๐—‹๐—‚๐—†๐–พ๐—Œ.

๐–ณ๐—๐—‚๐—Œ ๐—๐–บ๐—Œ ๐—‡๐—ˆ๐— ๐–บ ๐—‹๐—๐–พ๐—๐—ˆ๐—‹๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—… ๐—€๐–พ๐—Œ๐—๐—Ž๐—‹๐–พ, ๐—‡๐—ˆ๐—‹ ๐–บ ๐—Œ๐—’๐—†๐–ป๐—ˆ๐—…๐—‚๐–ผ ๐—‰๐—‹๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—Œ๐—. ๐–จ๐— ๐—๐–บ๐—Œ ๐–บ ๐—…๐–บ๐—๐–ฟ๐—Ž๐—… ๐–บ๐–ผ๐— ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐—‡๐–บ๐—๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡๐–บ๐—… ๐—Œ๐–พ๐—…๐–ฟ-๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ฟ๐–พ๐—‡๐—Œ๐–พ ๐—€๐—‹๐—ˆ๐—Ž๐—‡๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐—‚๐—‡ ๐– ๐—‹๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐—…๐–พ ๐Ÿง๐Ÿฃ ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐–ด๐–ญ ๐–ข๐—๐–บ๐—‹๐—๐–พ๐—‹. ๐–ด๐—‡๐–ฝ๐–พ๐—‹ ๐—๐—๐—‚๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—‹๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐—…๐–พ, ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡ ๐—๐–บ๐—Œ ๐—ƒ๐—Ž๐—Œ๐—๐—‚๐–ฟ๐—‚๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐—‚๐—‡ ๐—‚๐—๐—Œ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—Œ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‡๐—Œ๐–พ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐–บ ๐–ฟ๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–พ๐—‚๐—€๐—‡-๐—Œ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‡๐—Œ๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐–บ๐—‹๐—†๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐–ผ๐–บ๐—†๐—‰๐–บ๐—‚๐—€๐—‡ ๐—๐—๐–บ๐— ๐—๐–บ๐—Œ ๐—„๐—‚๐—…๐—…๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐—๐—๐—ˆ๐—Ž๐—Œ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ๐—Œ ๐—ˆ๐–ฟ ๐–ผ๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐—…๐—‚๐–บ๐—‡๐—Œ, ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐—Œ๐—‰๐—…๐–บ๐–ผ๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐—†๐—‚๐—…๐—…๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡๐—Œ, ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ ๐—๐–บ๐—‹๐—€๐–พ๐—๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡โ€™๐—Œ ๐–ผ๐—‹๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—… ๐—‚๐—‡๐–ฟ๐—‹๐–บ๐—Œ๐—๐—‹๐—Ž๐–ผ๐—๐—Ž๐—‹๐–พ.

๐–ณ๐—๐–พ ๐–ฟ๐—ˆ๐—…๐—…๐—ˆ๐—๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—’, ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐– ๐–ป๐—Ž ๐–ฃ๐—๐–บ๐–ป๐—‚ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—€๐—‚๐—†๐–พ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—Œ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—‡๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ฝ ๐–ป๐—’ ๐—Œ๐—๐–บ๐—๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐—๐—๐–บ๐— ๐—‚๐— ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐–ฝ ๐—‡๐—ˆ๐— ๐—‹๐–พ๐–ผ๐—ˆ๐—€๐—‡๐—‚๐—“๐–พ ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡โ€™๐—Œ ๐—€๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐—‡๐—†๐–พ๐—‡๐— ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ, ๐—๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐–พ๐–ฟ๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–พ, ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐–ฝ ๐—‡๐—ˆ๐— ๐–บ๐–ผ๐–ผ๐–พ๐—‰๐— ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐–ผ๐—‚๐—Œ๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐—Œ๐–พ๐—๐–พ๐—‹ ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐—‰๐—…๐—ˆ๐—†๐–บ๐—๐—‚๐–ผ ๐—๐—‚๐–พ๐—Œ. ๐–ณ๐—๐—‚๐—Œ ๐—๐–บ๐—Œ ๐—†๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–พ ๐—๐—๐–บ๐—‡ ๐–บ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—ƒ๐–พ๐–ผ๐—๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡โ€”๐–บ๐—‡ ๐–บ๐—๐—๐–พ๐—†๐—‰๐— ๐—๐—ˆ ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐—…๐–พ๐—€๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐—†๐—‚๐—“๐–พ ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡โ€™๐—Œ ๐—Œ๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐–พ๐—‚๐—€๐—‡ ๐–บ๐–ผ๐— ๐–ป๐—’ ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐—‡๐—’๐—‚๐—‡๐—€ ๐—๐—๐–พ ๐—€๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐—‡๐—†๐–พ๐—‡๐—โ€™๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—Ž๐—๐—๐—ˆ๐—‹๐—‚๐—๐—’ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐—†๐–บ๐—„๐–พ ๐—‚๐—. ๐–ณ๐—๐–พ ๐—†๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ ๐—Œ๐–บ๐—‚๐–ฝ ๐—…๐–พ๐—Œ๐—Œ ๐–บ๐–ป๐—ˆ๐—Ž๐— ๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡โ€™๐—Œ ๐—‚๐—‡๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐—‡๐–บ๐—… ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—…๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—… ๐—‹๐–พ๐–บ๐—…๐—‚๐—๐—’ ๐—๐—๐–บ๐—‡ ๐– ๐–ป๐—Ž ๐–ฃ๐—๐–บ๐–ป๐—‚โ€™๐—Œ ๐–บ๐—†๐–ป๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡ ๐—๐—ˆ ๐–บ๐—Œ๐—Œ๐–พ๐—‹๐— ๐–ฝ๐—ˆ๐—†๐—‚๐—‡๐–บ๐—‡๐–ผ๐–พ ๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—‹ ๐—‹๐–พ๐—€๐—‚๐—ˆ๐—‡๐–บ๐—… ๐—Œ๐—ˆ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐–พ๐—‚๐—€๐—‡๐—๐—’ ๐—๐—๐—‹๐—ˆ๐—Ž๐—€๐— ๐–ฟ๐—‚๐—‡๐–บ๐—‡๐–ผ๐—‚๐–บ๐—… ๐—…๐–พ๐—๐–พ๐—‹๐–บ๐—€๐–พ ๐–บ๐—‡๐–ฝ ๐—‰๐—ˆ๐—…๐—‚๐—๐—‚๐–ผ๐–บ๐—… ๐–ฝ๐–พ๐—‡๐—‚๐–บ๐—….

๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—ด๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป ๐—ฎ๐˜€ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ท๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป: ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฃ๐—ผ๐—น๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐——๐—ฒ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ด๐—ถ๐˜๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ถ๐˜‡๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป

In international relations, recognition is a function of legal status, not a discretionary token extended by regimes that have never practiced democratic governance. The Abu Dhabi regime, ruled through dynastic fiat, lacks elections, independent parties, and public accountability. Its claim to assess another stateโ€™s legitimacy is not rooted in international norms but in geopolitical self-interest.

Despite the immense strain, Sudanโ€™s transitional government has emerged from within, shaped by resistance, internal consensus, and national sacrifice. Its authority derives not from foreign endorsement but from the resilience and determination of the Sudanese people, a testament to the power of collective action in the face of adversity.

The Abu Dhabi regimeโ€™s dismissal of such a government is not diplomatic dissent. It is an act of narrative control masquerading as diplomacy.

๐—•๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐—ธ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—•๐—ฒ๐—น๐—น๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜: ๐—”๐—ฏ๐˜‚ ๐——๐—ต๐—ฎ๐—ฏ๐—ถโ€™๐˜€ ๐——๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—ฏ๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—š๐—ฎ๐—บ๐—ฒ ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—ฆ๐˜‚๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐—ป

The Abu Dhabi regime has perfected a dual-track strategy: funding armed factions while presenting as a neutral interlocutor. Nowhere is this strategy more evident than in Sudan. While branding itself as a stabilizing force, it has armed and supplied the RSF militia, an entity officially designated by Sudanโ€™s authorities as a terrorist organization.

Investigationsโ€”including a five-part exposรฉ by France 24 Observers and UN expert reportsโ€”have traced weapons and drone systems from Abu Dhabi to RSF militia operations via Chad. Despite such documentation, the regime continues positioning itself at the center of diplomatic tracks it sabotages.

What may seem like a contradiction in the Abu Dhabi regimeโ€™s actions is, in fact, a carefully orchestrated deception. It is not a contradiction, but a choreographed performance designed to deceive.

๐—–๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ถ๐—น๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ฅ๐˜‚๐—น๐—ฒ ๐—ช๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜ ๐—ฎ ๐—•๐—ฎ๐—น๐—น๐—ผ๐˜: ๐—” ๐— ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜‚๐—ณ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐˜‚๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐—ก๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ

The Abu Dhabi regimeโ€™s rhetoric about โ€œcivilian ruleโ€ in Sudan reveals a profound contradiction. It champions electoral transition in a country it seeks to influence, while having never held elections. Its political model does not allow multi-party competition, legislative debate, or public scrutiny.

That such a regime seeks to define what civilian governance should look like elsewhere does not demonstrate regional leadershipโ€”it is the outsourcing of political design. Under this model, civilian rule is less about ballots than branding.

The figures it promotes are often selected not for who they represent, but for whom they align. Their credibility is shaped by international appearances, not by national constituencies.
Civilian leadership in Sudan is crucial. However, it must not be assembled offshore by a regime unacquainted with voting booths. It must emerge from Sudanese political development, a process that demands our respect and support.

๐—”๐˜‚๐˜๐—ต๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—œ๐—ป๐—ณ๐—น๐˜‚๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—ฒ ๐—ช๐—ถ๐˜๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜‚๐˜ ๐—•๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€

The Abu Dhabi regime operates a model of statecraft that blends economic leverage, military outsourcing, and image management. It is not traditional authoritarianismโ€”it is transactional power disguised as stability.

Across fragile states, it deploys this model: invest in infrastructure, arm local actors, and mediate the crises it helped inflame. Its public diplomacy is polished, but its strategy remains clear: displace political agency through external dependency.
In Sudan, this model has fueled violence, obstructed institutional recovery, and stalled national coherence.

๐—ช๐—ต๐˜† ๐—œ๐˜ ๐— ๐—ฎ๐˜๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐˜€: ๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฅ๐—ถ๐˜€๐—ธ๐˜€ ๐—ผ๐—ณ ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฑ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐˜๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—”๐—ฟ๐˜€๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ถ๐˜€๐˜

Despite mounting evidence, some Western governments continue to treat the Abu Dhabi regime as a source of regional stability. This framing is increasingly out of step with on-the-ground realities. In Sudan, the regime has not mitigated conflictโ€”it has enabled it.
Rewarding such behavior undermines the principle of non-intervention and the credibility of international norms. It also signals that regimes can act as fire-starters and still be applauded as firemen.

Western tolerance of such dual-track behaviorโ€”arming conflict while preaching diplomacyโ€”undermines the credibility of the rules-based order these powers claim to defend.
Sudan is not merely facing a domestic crisis. It is resisting the normalization of externally orchestrated fragmentation.

๐—–๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฐ๐—น๐˜‚๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป: ๐—ฅ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐—น๐—ฎ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฆ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ป๐˜๐˜† ๐—ถ๐—ป ๐—ฎ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ผ๐˜…๐˜† ๐—”๐—ด๐—ฒ

No regime holds proprietary rights over recognition, not least those that reject representative governance themselves. Sovereignty is not something to be leased or conferred. It is exercised, defended, and, when necessary, reclaimed.

The Abu Dhabi regime may continue to present itself as a diplomatic actor. But Sudan has clarified its position: its sovereignty is not subject to foreign brokerage. Its political trajectory will not be scripted in the lobbies of regional powers.

This position aligns with Sudanโ€™s formal submission to the International Court of Justice and its prior efforts to address Abu Dhabiโ€™s involvement through multilateral diplomatic channels.
If the world is serious about sovereignty, it must begin by acknowledging not just the weapons used against Sudan but the frameworks of legitimacy being manipulated to dismantle it.

๐—ฆ๐—ผ๐˜ƒ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ฒ๐—ถ๐—ด๐—ป๐˜๐˜† ๐—œ๐˜€ ๐—ก๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฃ๐—ฒ๐—ฟ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐—บ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ โ€” ๐—œ๐˜ ๐—œ๐˜€ ๐—ฃ๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฐ๐—ฒ๐—ฑ

๐–ฒ๐—Ž๐–ฝ๐–บ๐—‡ ๐–ฝ๐—‚๐–ฝ ๐—‡๐—ˆ๐— ๐—‹๐–พ๐—๐—‹๐–พ๐–บ๐—. ๐–จ๐— ๐—Œ๐—๐—ˆ๐—ˆ๐–ฝ ๐–ฟ๐—‚๐—‹๐—†โ€”๐—…๐–พ๐—€๐–บ๐—…๐—…๐—’, ๐—†๐—ˆ๐—‹๐–บ๐—…๐—…๐—’, and diplomatically. It severed ties with an aggressor, upheld international law, and protected its citizens, even on hostile soil. It did so without granting political legitimacy or recognition to the Abu Dhabi regime.

The regime, in contrast, deployed disinformation, recycled dismissed envoys, and relied on media theatrics. It sought to craft an illusion in place of law.
But Sudan did not blink. It chose discipline over reaction, law over optics, and responsibility over political theatre. That is what true sovereignty looks like.

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