What Do the Port Sudan Raids Mean for the Course of the War?
By: Othman Mirghani
The recent intense airstrikes on Port Sudan are significant mainly due to their timing. Despite being a temporary administrative capital since the early days of the war and a vital gateway for Sudan to the world—serving as a lifeline for trade—the city had largely remained safe and out of the line of fire until these latest attacks.
Some analysts interpreted the strikes as retaliatory, in response to the Sudanese army’s targeted raids on Nyala Airport, where it destroyed an aircraft carrying weapons for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), along with other key targets, killing a number of foreign “advisers” and mercenaries. The brief time gap between the Nyala attack and the Port Sudan strikes may indeed suggest a connection between the two, but that alone isn’t enough to fully grasp the scope of these attacks.
In my estimation, the broader objective of the Port Sudan raids was to disrupt army leadership and divert its attention, aiming to delay the army’s comprehensive offensive against RSF strongholds—whether the remaining pockets in Omdurman or their larger presence in the Kordofan and Darfur states.
This offensive marks the second major leap by the army and allied forces, following the first phase launched last September, which liberated areas from Jebel Moya and Sennar through Al Jazirah and culminated in the recapture of Khartoum. As with the previous operations, planning for this phase had been ongoing for months, adjusted according to changing conditions. Since the capital was reclaimed, the army has been preparing intensely for this next phase, which, as multiple army officials have declared in recent months, aims to liberate all of Kordofan and Darfur—up to the final border points—potentially making this the decisive final stage of the war.
In response, the RSF has resorted to drone warfare and the targeting of civilian infrastructure—especially the power sector. Dams have been bombed, and power stations destroyed, leading to blackouts in various regions. Every time the authorities managed to repair the generators and restore services, the drones would return to strike again—acts that clearly constitute war crimes under international law.
Since drones alone cannot win a war, the apparent goal was to disrupt the army’s plans and movements, and to increase public suffering in hopes of prompting citizens to pressure the government into negotiating a ceasefire. During this phase, there was a notable increase in drone deployment, including advanced long-range strategic drones—clear evidence of growing involvement from foreign experts, advisers, and mercenaries. The RSF lacks the capability, expertise, and resources to operate such sophisticated weaponry, some of which is not even available for sale to militias or armed groups.
It was in this context that the Port Sudan airstrikes occurred, utilizing more advanced military technology. The city lies roughly 1,100 kilometers from the nearest possible RSF launch point—far beyond the range of drones previously used.
Nevertheless, these airstrikes—which also targeted key civilian infrastructure such as the airport, port, and fuel depots—ultimately failed to disrupt daily life or halt military operations. Life in the city continued, just as it has in other areas hit by drone attacks—a testament to the resilience and patience of the Sudanese people, who have shown remarkable endurance over the course of the two-year war.
Moreover, even before the fires at the Port Sudan fuel depots were extinguished, the army launched its full-scale offensive across remaining RSF-held fronts, achieving significant victories in Omdurman, Kordofan, and even near El Fasher, the capital of Greater Darfur. Based on the outcomes of the first offensive—which did not stop until its goals from Sennar to Khartoum were accomplished—it is expected that this second push will continue and accelerate in Kordofan and Darfur. This means the war is now entering its decisive phase, one that will likely shape its conclusion.
Source: Asharq Al-Awsat
What Do the Port Sudan Raids Mean for the Course of the War?
By: Othman Mirghani
The recent intense airstrikes on Port Sudan are significant mainly due to their timing. Despite being a temporary administrative capital since the early days of the war and a vital gateway for Sudan to the world—serving as a lifeline for trade—the city had largely remained safe and out of the line of fire until these latest attacks.
Some analysts interpreted the strikes as retaliatory, in response to the Sudanese army’s targeted raids on Nyala Airport, where it destroyed an aircraft carrying weapons for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), along with other key targets, killing a number of foreign “advisers” and mercenaries. The brief time gap between the Nyala attack and the Port Sudan strikes may indeed suggest a connection between the two, but that alone isn’t enough to fully grasp the scope of these attacks.
In my estimation, the broader objective of the Port Sudan raids was to disrupt army leadership and divert its attention, aiming to delay the army’s comprehensive offensive against RSF strongholds—whether the remaining pockets in Omdurman or their larger presence in the Kordofan and Darfur states.
This offensive marks the second major leap by the army and allied forces, following the first phase launched last September, which liberated areas from Jebel Moya and Sennar through Al Jazirah and culminated in the recapture of Khartoum. As with the previous operations, planning for this phase had been ongoing for months, adjusted according to changing conditions. Since the capital was reclaimed, the army has been preparing intensely for this next phase, which, as multiple army officials have declared in recent months, aims to liberate all of Kordofan and Darfur—up to the final border points—potentially making this the decisive final stage of the war.
In response, the RSF has resorted to drone warfare and the targeting of civilian infrastructure—especially the power sector. Dams have been bombed, and power stations destroyed, leading to blackouts in various regions. Every time the authorities managed to repair the generators and restore services, the drones would return to strike again—acts that clearly constitute war crimes under international law.
Since drones alone cannot win a war, the apparent goal was to disrupt the army’s plans and movements, and to increase public suffering in hopes of prompting citizens to pressure the government into negotiating a ceasefire. During this phase, there was a notable increase in drone deployment, including advanced long-range strategic drones—clear evidence of growing involvement from foreign experts, advisers, and mercenaries. The RSF lacks the capability, expertise, and resources to operate such sophisticated weaponry, some of which is not even available for sale to militias or armed groups.
It was in this context that the Port Sudan airstrikes occurred, utilizing more advanced military technology. The city lies roughly 1,100 kilometers from the nearest possible RSF launch point—far beyond the range of drones previously used.
Nevertheless, these airstrikes—which also targeted key civilian infrastructure such as the airport, port, and fuel depots—ultimately failed to disrupt daily life or halt military operations. Life in the city continued, just as it has in other areas hit by drone attacks—a testament to the resilience and patience of the Sudanese people, who have shown remarkable endurance over the course of the two-year war.
Moreover, even before the fires at the Port Sudan fuel depots were extinguished, the army launched its full-scale offensive across remaining RSF-held fronts, achieving significant victories in Omdurman, Kordofan, and even near El Fasher, the capital of Greater Darfur. Based on the outcomes of the first offensive—which did not stop until its goals from Sennar to Khartoum were accomplished—it is expected that this second push will continue and accelerate in Kordofan and Darfur. This means the war is now entering its decisive phase, one that will likely shape its conclusion.
Source: Asharq Al-Awsat
