How Should We Respond to the UAE’s Aggression? (2)

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1
In the first part of this article, I explained that what prompted me to write was how some writers were being misled by online rabble-rousers who are often driven by blind anger when reacting to the UAE’s aggression. I noted that there are two types of people: one group doesn’t know how to respond and proposes outlandish ideas; the other doesn’t know what to do at all — hence, they’re hopeless. Unfortunately, some of the country’s leaders fall into the latter category.
In the previous article, we discussed political and diplomatic responses. Today, we continue with suggestions concerning legal, economic, and media-related responses.

2
On the legal front, I don’t want to dwell much on the farce led by the Minister of Justice, which played out before the entire world. I remain baffled by such debacles, especially considering Sudan has access to seasoned international legal expertise. Yet, this minister subjected us to this legal scandal! Unbelievable. This same minister formed a legal advisory committee in late December—just two months before the deliberations began at the International Court of Justice. After completing everything, he hastily invited senior legal experts (via WhatsApp, I swear!) to review the case file—too late. They declined, realizing the invitation wasn’t for genuine consultation, but a ridiculous formality.
To make matters worse, this baffling minister enlisted a corrupt judge—Al-Khasawneh—only to find out early on that the man was indeed corrupt and unserious. This was confirmed by a leaked call where Al-Khasawneh declined to appear publicly on behalf of Sudan because he is a sitting judge at the ICJ and receives a salary from it—thus, he cannot legally represent Sudan before the court!
Is there a more blatant example of corruption and absurdity? Even more bewildering: this corrupt judge received $1.7 million from the Sudanese public treasury! We lost the case. The UAE gained more than it lost, and the ignorant minister simply returned home as if nothing had happened—and he remains in office as of this writing. Oh my country, how many tragedies must we endure!
If you asked the Minister of Justice: What’s the next step in this legal matter? Or have we closed the legal file on the UAE’s aggression? — you’d get no answer. And by the time the minister is “inspired” with another bad plan and squanders more funds, the war might be over, and our rights lost.

I propose the following legal steps:

Establish an independent Sudanese legal group abroad made up of Sudanese and foreign lawyers specialized in international humanitarian law. This team would be exclusively responsible for pursuing the UAE’s aggression in international courts and institutions.

File lawsuits in European courts against arms suppliers that violate arms embargoes or illegally supply weapons to militias.

Compile a legal dossier of war crimes backed by documented evidence (photos, testimonies, human rights reports) for use at the International Criminal Court or the United Nations.

Petition UN Special Rapporteurs (e.g., on arms, human rights, mercenaries) to open public cases against the UAE.

I know many such efforts already exist, but they are fragmented, uncoordinated, and underfunded—hence ineffective. Through a clear, centralized mechanism, we could at least achieve modest yet meaningful results.
There are also legal initiatives suggested by activists in the UK that the minister could support and build on—at least to keep Sudan’s case against the UAE visible in the global media and courtrooms.
On May 5, 2025, The Guardian published a report revealing that a legal complaint documenting war crimes by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had been submitted to the War Crimes Unit at London’s Metropolitan Police (Scotland Yard). This is part of the devastating civil war between the RSF and the Sudanese Army, now in its third year.

3
Domestically, legal complaints can be filed against the militias, their supporters, and collaborators—criminal charges, not political ones. Much can be done legally, whether or not these efforts succeed. At the very least, they create pressure and keep the issue of aggression and reparations alive—even if it takes decades.
All of this is possible. But what is the Ministry of Justice doing now? What about the Attorney General? Where are the patriotic legal experts and lawyers? Are they all just sitting in the stands watching the match—waiting for a win, loss, or draw? If they won’t act now, when will they?

4
The best thing to emerge from this war is what happened on the media front. Despite everything, the Sudanese people mobilized and transformed into a grassroots media machine defending their nation. For the first time, public opinion was formed from the bottom up, with citizens themselves responding to rumors and the vile propaganda of mercenary media.
This national media surge—without any involvement or funding from the state—discredited all the narratives of the enemy. The army triumphed in cyberspace and online platforms. The militia’s propaganda agents were exposed to the extent that they now fear walking the streets.
Despite the massive media machine prepared to support the rebellion, the voice of the people was stronger—because their cause is just. Everyone became a part of a spontaneous media army, while the state and private media were completely destroyed. Sudan had no voice.
Now, with Mr. Khalid Al-Ayasir in charge of the Ministry of Information, Sudan has a voice again. A government finally speaks to its people. Still, the official media needs a vision, strategy, plan, qualified personnel—and all of that requires time and resources.

5
Media efforts to respond to the UAE’s aggression require a practical plan based on several pillars:

1. A fundamental shift in the war narrative: from an internal RSF rebellion to foreign aggression led by the UAE, supported by certain African and European countries, and executed through Janjaweed militias.

2. Continued exposure of atrocities, massacres, and even acts of genocide committed by militias using Emirati weapons.

3. Monitoring and exposing the types of weapons the UAE provides, their origins, delivery routes, and the destruction they cause.

4. Ongoing exposure of UAE activities and revealing its agendas at regional and international forums.

5. Providing African media with documentation of crimes committed by UAE-funded militias against African tribes in Sudan.

6. Engaging international media directly by facilitating access for major news outlets to visit Sudan and report firsthand.

7. Launching a global campaign using a unified hashtag in both English and French, featuring visual content and short clips documenting the aggression—this must be a continuous effort.

8. Establishing a “Sudanese Media Observatory” to track coverage of the aggression, analyze disinformation, and respond promptly in multiple languages.

9. Producing short documentaries (5–10 minutes) for digital platforms, translated into various languages, documenting the civilian victims of Emirati weapons.

10. Building a database of sympathetic journalists, particularly in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, to keep them informed about the scale and nature of the UAE’s aggression.

11. Promoting publications and websites in English and French and building distribution networks in major world capitals and across Africa.

6
For all these efforts to be coherent and for the media discourse to be unified and well-coordinated, we need a central media center tasked with planning, follow-up, strategy, and countering hostile media—both inside and outside Sudan. This center should work in coordination with state institutions, the private sector, and international media.
In the next article, we will continue with proposals for an economic response.