Economically… How Do We Respond to the UAE’s Aggression? (3)

As I See

Adel El-Baz

1
The media discourse regarding the UAE’s aggression is focused on halting gold exports to Dubai, as if this measure alone would cause significant harm to the UAE, deterring it and halting its aggression. In my view, this is a flawed perception and pure illusion, merely a way to vent anger.

Let me first clarify the error in this approach, because dealing with the issue of gold exports should be part of a broader strategy—not a standalone measure capable on its own of deterring the UAE or even reducing the severity of its aggression. This is for two reasons:

First:
The UAE’s economy will not be significantly affected by halting gold exports. The UAE’s GDP at constant prices is approximately $457.38 billion—about 11.9 times the size of Sudan’s GDP, which is estimated at about $38.4 billion at constant prices (2024). This means that Sudan’s entire GDP, even with its gold, represents only about 8.5% of the UAE’s economy in size.

Gold trade (refining, selling, exporting, and importing) contributes between 10% and 15% to the UAE’s GDP.

In contrast, Sudan’s GDP in 2017 was around $117 billion (oh, Bashir!), which dropped to $42.7 billion in 2018, then fell further to $30.9 billion. It rose again to $109.3 billion in 2023, before dropping back to $29.8 billion in 2024, according to World Bank reports (see the bank’s website for reference). Estimates suggest that the gold sector contributes up to 44% of Sudan’s GDP, making it the single largest contributing sector, with no other sector coming close. This means that the national budget depends heavily on gold exports, and any attempts to harm this contribution—especially under current conditions—through reckless policies or decisions would expose the country to unnecessary risks.

Second:
Regarding gold:
Between 2022 and 2024, six credible and important international reports were published on gold, the UAE, and the conflict in Sudan. These came from: International Crisis Group, The Sentry, Chatham House, Reuters, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, and Sudan Transparency Organization. These reports provided extensive information about global gold trade, the UAE’s role in it, and its exploitation of African gold tainted by violent conflicts. They also revealed and documented the relationship between gold and the war in Sudan and the UAE’s role in fueling it through arms, driven by its pursuit of gold control.

The information from those reports shows that in 2024, the global gold mining sector made a significant contribution to the world economy, with a total gold production value of approximately $382 billion—the highest annual value recorded to date.

In the same year, the UAE imported around $76 billion worth of raw and unprocessed gold (commodity group 7108), equivalent to 559 tons.

These reports confirm that the total value of the UAE’s gold trade (imports, exports, refining, re-export) exceeded $129 billion in 2023, making it the world’s second-largest hub after India, ahead of the UK.

Around 20% to 30% of global gold trade passes through Dubai annually.

In 2024, the UAE imported about 435 tons of African gold, valued at over $31 billion—93% of which left Africa without official permits, meaning it was smuggled.

According to data from Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange and global trade databases, the UAE’s total gold imports reached 559 tons in 2024.

3
Regarding Sudan:
Reports documented that, based on official documents from the Sudanese government, Sudan’s annual gold production reached about 64 tons (according to the Ministry of Minerals and mining organizations). Independent estimates suggest that between 30 to 50 tons are smuggled annually.

Thus, the total amount of Sudanese gold (official + smuggled) ranges from 94 to 114 tons annually.

This means Sudanese gold accounts for 17% to 20% of the UAE’s gold imports in 2024 (calculated as 94 to 114 tons ÷ 559 tons × 100).

The market value of Sudan’s officially exported gold (64 tons) based on 2024 prices ($60,000/kg) is about $3.84 billion.

The market value of smuggled gold (30–50 tons) is estimated between $1.8 to $3 billion.

Therefore, the total estimated market value of Sudanese gold (official + smuggled) ranges from $5.64 to $6.84 billion.

These figures mean that Sudanese gold traded in the UAE represents about $6.84 billion out of a total of $129 billion in the UAE’s gold trade—around 4.65% of the total.

The striking and important detail here is that out of this $6.84 billion worth of Sudanese gold, Sudan receives only about $1.57 billion in returns from officially exported gold (64 tons), which highlights the extent of loss and looting. Therefore, part of the strategy to respond to UAE aggression should include recovering looted funds via anti-smuggling efforts.

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Conclusion:
Sudan exports between 17% to 20% of the UAE’s total gold imports, amounting to about $6.84 billion, within a UAE gold trade market worth $129 billion—30% of the global gold trade. Sudan’s gold exports (official + smuggled) make up around 4.65% of the UAE’s total gold trade value.

Hence, halting gold exports alone will not deter the UAE. A comprehensive strategy is needed to expand the scope of the economic response to the UAE’s aggression. One must avoid hasty decisions driven by public anger that could harm the economy, particularly given current market conditions and the lack of viable alternative markets for Sudanese gold in its current (raw) form.

A more cautious approach could involve suspending only government gold exports to the UAE and implementing serious anti-smuggling policies, while allowing the private sector to continue normal trade until a gradual withdrawal from the Dubai market can be planned—once alternative flexible markets are found.

So, what are the elements of a comprehensive economic response to the UAE’s aggression? We will elaborate, God willing, in the next installment.