Could the Military Retreat of the Rapid Support Forces Lead to Their Disintegration?

After more than 25 months since the war broke out in Sudan, concerns have emerged that the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from Khartoum and central Sudan, and the shift of fighting to the west, could lead to the fragmentation of the RSF into rival tribal militias, the rise of warlords, threats to regional security, and the spread of chaos if peace is not achieved.

The RSF, formed in 2013, evolved from militias that have existed in Darfur since the 1980s. These were primarily tribal groups created to assist regular forces in dealing with challenges resembling guerrilla warfare, similar to the “Murahileen Forces” established during the late Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s era.

Originally part of the intelligence and security apparatus and led by an army officer, the RSF was later placed under the presidency. In 2017, legislation passed in parliament made it an independent force under army supervision, with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” appointed as its commander.

Tribal Nature

The RSF’s composition is predominantly tribal, with most fighters coming from the Rizeigat, Messiria, and Hawazma tribes, who share an ethnic bond known as “Al-Atawa,” in addition to other tribal groups.

Leadership roles within the RSF are largely held by the Dagalo family: Hemedti’s brother Abdel Rahim Dagalo serves as deputy commander, while financial and logistical responsibilities are handled by other family members.

The RSF began with about 6,000 fighters over 12 years ago and expanded significantly after former President Omar al-Bashir decided to involve the Sudanese Armed Forces in the Yemen War as part of the “Decisive Storm” coalition in 2015.

The RSF participated alongside the army in the Yemen war and trained tens of thousands of fighters, mostly from Darfur and Kordofan, also attracting recruits from other states, according to an army officer seconded to the RSF who spoke to Al Jazeera Net.

According to this officer, tribal leaders would ask RSF command to train and deploy their sons to fight in Yemen, as the resulting financial benefits significantly improved their families’ living conditions.

Decline in Support

Weeks after the war began, Arab tribes in South Darfur declared their support for the RSF in its fight against the Sudanese army. Their leaders issued a statement urging tribal members in the army to defect and support the RSF, followed by recruitment and training campaigns.

The statement was signed by chiefs from the Bani Halba, Turgum, Habania, Fellata, Messiria, Ta’aisha, and Rizeigat tribes in South Darfur.

A tribal leader in Darfur told Al Jazeera Net that RSF deputy commander Abdel Rahim Dagalo toured Darfur regions, meeting tribal leaders and requesting specific numbers of young men for training and combat, claiming the Sudanese army and remnants of the previous regime targeted them.

However, according to the same source, tribal mobilization has declined due to RSF’s mounting losses—especially in Khartoum—and its failure to fulfill financial promises to the families of dead fighters, care for the wounded, and support those who lost limbs.

Security analyst Ismail Omran explained to Al Jazeera Net that tribal mobilization and alliances initially provided a human resource base for the RSF, but the force’s tribal makeup makes it vulnerable to collapse if key group leaders are absent and financial incentives vanish—jeopardizing battlefield gains.

Omran added that tribal and geographic loyalties have weakened discipline and commitment within the RSF. Should the RSF lose the war, it could splinter into small, ethnically- and regionally-based factions and gangs led by warlords. He argued the best solution is to reach a peace agreement that includes security arrangements to integrate all factions and militias into official state forces.

UN expert reports indicated that the RSF hired mercenaries from neighboring African countries. Meanwhile, Colombian newspaper La Silla Vacía reported that two RSF units included over 300 retired Colombian soldiers who fought in Sudan for profit.

The joint Darfur force stated that some Colombian mercenaries were killed in the Darfur desert while traveling from Libya to El Fasher.

Foreign Fighters

Sovereignty Council member and army deputy commander Yasser Al-Atta previously disclosed that the RSF includes foreign mercenaries, mainly from South Sudan, along with fighters from Libya, Chad, Niger, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, remnants of the Russian Wagner Group, and even Syria.

Darfur affairs expert and writer Ali Mansour Hasbullah noted that the RSF absorbed former members of the border guard, tribal militias, and leaders of armed gangs labeled “repentant,” some of whom rose to senior positions within the RSF.

According to Hasbullah, the RSF also recruited fighters from opposition groups in their home countries, notably from the Seleka movement in the Central African Republic, the Azawad Liberation Movement in Mali, and FACT in Chad. Many senior figures from these groups died in battles in Khartoum and Darfur, including Chadian General Saleh Al-Zubaydi, who was killed recently in the Khoy battle in West Kordofan.

Hasbullah expects the RSF to fragment due to contradictions in its tribal makeup and escalating historical rivalries between its constituent social groups. This may drive factions to return to their homelands to protect their communities, while foreign fighters could return to their countries with weapons—spreading violence and chaos.

The RSF denies accusations of employing foreign mercenaries, calling them “black propaganda.” An RSF media official told Al Jazeera Net that Hemedti affirms the RSF is a national force comprising members from 102 social groups across Sudan.

Impunity

Meanwhile, an international human rights report released Wednesday urged justice for victims of crimes committed against Sudanese civilians, calling for “victim-centered accountability approaches at all levels of responsibility.”

The report, prepared by a coalition of African and international human rights organizations, said the absence of civilian rule and lack of political will are key barriers to accountability amid Sudan’s crisis.

It emphasized the need for political commitment and legal reform to end impunity in Sudan, calling on authorities to restore judicial independence, repeal immunity provisions, and ratify key international treaties.

The report also highlighted the importance of recognizing Sudan’s traditional justice mechanisms—valued for accessibility and legitimacy—and recommended reforming them as complementary accountability tools aligned with modern justice standards.

It stressed that the African Union must play a stronger role in integrating justice into peace processes, and advocated strengthening international mechanisms including the International Criminal Court and UN fact-finding missions.

The report concluded that the justice needed in Sudan should be comprehensive, victim-focused, and applied at all levels to promote long-term peace and uphold the rule of law.