Opinion

A Storm in Sudan Following al-Burhan’s Decision

By: Rukabi Hassan Yaqoub

On Monday, May 20, 2025, the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, issued a constitutional decree appointing Kamal El-Din Idris as Prime Minister.

Mr. Kamal Idris is a prominent diplomat and politician who served as Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) for over a decade. He also held the position of Secretary-General of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).

Idris is considered an independent political figure with no known prior affiliation to any political party or ideology. He ran as an independent candidate in the 2010 presidential elections against former President Omar al-Bashir.

His résumé is filled with various significant roles that helped build an extensive body of experience, making him a distinguished choice among several candidates to assume the role of Prime Minister during this critical period Sudan is going through.

The appointment of Kamal Idris, with full powers of the premiership, ended a more than three-year vacancy since the resignation of former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in January 2022. Since then, the Cabinet had been operating on an interim basis.

Idris’s appointment sparked widespread controversy both among the public and political elites—not only because it was unexpected, but also due to his absence from the political scene since the outbreak of the war, now in its third year. He had been withdrawn from public affairs, distancing himself from the fierce polarization between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their political wing led by Hamdok on one side, and the Sudanese government and its political supporters on the other.

Kamal Idris maintained a position of neutrality, refraining from aligning with either side—a stance that clearly reflects his independent character.

For this reason, his appointment generated sharp division between supporters and opponents.

The RSF and its political wing were among the first to reject his appointment, arguing that the current government lacks the legitimacy to take such action. They claim its legitimacy ended with al-Burhan’s measures on October 25, 2021, which removed Hamdok from office.

They maintain that Hamdok remains the legitimate prime minister. However, this is contradicted by the fact that Hamdok was reinstated less than a month after his removal, only to resign two months later, citing failure to build a necessary national political consensus “to deliver on promises of security, peace, justice, and bloodshed prevention.”

The RSF and its allies also accuse Kamal Idris of being a product of the Bashir regime and claim he is aligned with the Islamist current, citing contradictions in his history—as stated by RSF legal adviser Mohamed Mokhtar al-Nour.

Other voices within the opposition, including politicians, journalists, and youth activists (particularly on social media), also expressed reservations about Idris’s appointment. They argue that his neutral stance on the war raises doubts, as the severity of RSF’s war crimes and foreign-backed interventions leaves no moral ground for neutrality or silence instead of supporting the army and the government.

On the other hand, the supporters of Idris’s appointment include political forces that previously submitted a transitional roadmap to al-Burhan. These include the Democratic Bloc, the National Movement Coalition, Sudan Justice Coalition, and the Popular Congress Party led by Al-Amin Mahmoud.

These groups hailed the appointment as a step in the right direction, allowing the civilian sector to revive executive governance, focus on citizens’ daily livelihoods, restore normalcy, and provide essential services. They believe assigning full authority to a prime minister is key to implementing the Juba Peace Agreement and preparing for elections at the end of the transitional period.

Additional support came from outside the “roadmap coalition”—notably from the (mandated) National Congress Party, a major Islamist faction led by Ahmed Haroun. The party issued a statement praising the move as an important step toward “reorganizing the national house,” enabling the Sovereign Council and army leadership to fulfill their duties efficiently. Haroun described Idris as a “qualified and independent national figure.”

Notably, the opposition’s criticisms largely targeted the person of Kamal Idris rather than the principle of appointing a prime minister—despite it being a legal and political necessity of the transitional phase, as stipulated in the constitutional document. Thus, their position appears weakened by focusing on character attacks and unverifiable accusations.

Meanwhile, supporters of the appointment did not rely on Idris’s personal traits or neutral stance, but rather on the legitimacy and necessity of the decision to complete the transitional process, allow the army to focus on military duties, and advance the path toward victory and ending the rebellion.

That said, Kamal Idris’s task will not be easy. One of his main challenges is the economy. His upcoming government is expected to carry out short-term economic reforms and urgently improve living conditions—especially in areas like water, electricity, healthcare, education, and infrastructure. He must also address the critical issue of gold exports, which form the backbone of the state’s revenues.

Additionally, there’s the need to rehabilitate major agricultural projects, especially the Gezira Scheme, which was severely damaged by RSF forces.

Politically, Idris faces the daunting challenge of steering Sudan through a smooth four-year transition, as outlined in the roadmap—toward a politically healthy environment, national consensus on democratic governance, and free, fair elections under public scrutiny. This places his future government under intense and direct public pressure.

The task is not easy—but it’s not impossible, provided that Idris garners strong public support, selects his ministers based on merit and competence (not favoritism or quotas), and enforces accountability and anti-corruption measures.

The key question remains: Will the new government meet the expectations of its supporters and fulfill the trust placed in it by leading Sudan from war and instability to peace, stability, and democratic rule? Or will it falter and become yet another failed government?

For now, there’s no clear answer. The ink on the decree is still fresh, and the course of events amid war is too unpredictable.

Source: Al Jazeera Net

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