Is the African Union Opening a New Chapter with Sudan?
On the sidelines of the Arab League Summit in Baghdad, striking remarks by African Union Commission Chairperson Mahmoud Ali Youssouf sparked debate over a potential shift in the continental body’s stance on the parties to Sudan’s ongoing conflict.
These statements came at a critical moment in the Sudanese war, following significant field advances by the Sudanese Armed Forces in several strategic areas and amid the failure of various initiatives aimed at reaching a peaceful settlement.
A Strained Relationship
Relations between the African Union (AU) and Sudan have been tense since the October 2021 coup, after which the AU suspended Sudan’s membership, describing the power seizure as an “unconstitutional change of government.”
This decision aligned with the AU’s strict policy against military coups across the continent, emphasizing the necessity of returning to a civilian transitional path as a prerequisite for any official engagement with Sudanese authorities.
Following the outbreak of war in Sudan in April 2022, African initiatives to curb the conflict increased. In May 2023, the AU announced a “roadmap” to resolve the crisis, consisting of six main pillars, including a comprehensive ceasefire, facilitating humanitarian aid, initiating inclusive political dialogue, and restoring constitutional order.
In January 2024, the AU established a high-level committee on Sudan, composed of three prominent African figures and headed by the AU High Representative for Silencing the Guns, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas.
However, a major feature of AU-Sudan relations has been the sharp disagreement between Sudan and former AU Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, whose handling of the Sudan conflict was described as “chaotic” in a report by the International Crisis Group.
The Sudanese army accused Faki and the AU of bias toward certain parties, particularly after controversial meetings between AU officials and advisors to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This exacerbated tensions and sparked a “war of statements” between Sudan’s foreign ministry and the AU.
Analysts believe these accusations undermined the AU’s credibility with the Sudanese government, diminished cooperation with its initiatives, and weakened the effectiveness of the high-level committee, which failed to make meaningful progress toward halting the war.
Changing Context
The mistrust and tension that defined AU-Sudan relations from late 2021 until early 2025 made Mahmoud Ali Youssouf’s May 19 comments all the more surprising. Speaking after a meeting with Sudanese Sovereignty Council member Ibrahim Jaber in Baghdad, Youssouf said Sudan is “the beating heart of Africa” and expressed optimism over the Sudanese army’s recent territorial gains. He hoped Sudan would soon regain its natural place in the regional and international arenas.
His words echoed similar remarks made during his October 2024 visit to Port Sudan, where he stated that the war had been “imposed on Sudan by the rebellion” and that signs of “victory by the Sudanese Armed Forces are now clear.”
These recent statements reflect a notable shift in AU-Sudan relations, attributed to leadership changes at the top of the AU Commission. In February 2025, Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Ali Youssouf assumed the Commission’s chairmanship, with Algerian Salma Malika El Haddadi as deputy.
Youssouf’s comments during his Port Sudan visit—then in his capacity as Djibouti’s foreign minister—marked a shift in Djibouti’s stance. Similarly, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, during a January 2025 meeting with Sudan’s de facto leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, expressed support for Sudan in overcoming its crisis and confronting “evil forces,” which many observers interpreted as a reference to the RSF and its foreign backers.
Sudan welcomed the leadership change. Former Foreign Minister Ali Youssef El-Sharif described Youssouf’s election as “beneficial to Sudan,” and Sovereignty Council Deputy Chair Malik Agar expressed confidence in the new AU leadership during a March visit to Djibouti, stating it could “correct the AU’s course” and help resolve African crises.
This Sudanese openness to the AU’s new leadership reflects a broader effort, as noted by The Standard’s regional affairs correspondent Mwangi Maina, to rebuild ties with IGAD and the AU after years of absence.
A New Approach
Observers suggest that the AU’s February 2025 elections did more than bring in new leaders—they introduced a new approach to handling African crises, including the Sudan war.
This new outlook is part of a broader debate on the effectiveness of traditional AU responses to coups—such as suspending membership or imposing sanctions. While these measures were once effective in the early 2000s, the International Crisis Group notes they are now far less impactful.
In Sudan’s case, the AU’s evolving strategy is part of a broader regional movement. Notably, the AU Peace and Security Council called for the reopening of the AU liaison office in Port Sudan in October 2024, despite Sudan’s suspended membership and the AU’s refusal to recognize the coup-led government.
Seeking more realistic and effective tools, Youssouf has also publicly rejected foreign interference in Sudan, calling for African-led solutions. This indicates a desire for a greater AU role in the Sudanese crisis.
This vision aligns with comments Youssouf made to Mail & Guardian during his campaign, where he criticized the AU’s previous handling of Sudan and identified it as a top priority if elected.
His position reflects significant developments: the Sudanese army’s military gains, as Youssouf acknowledged, and, as noted by Dr. Muna Abdel-Fattah, Sudan’s critical geopolitical position in North and East Africa and the Nile Basin.
The AU’s fears of Sudan’s war spiraling into deeper chaos were evident in the Peace and Security Council’s March 2025 rejection of a “parallel government” declaration, which Sudan’s foreign ministry welcomed as support for the Sudanese people and their national institutions.
In this context, Youssouf announced the start of a dialogue with Sudan’s Sovereignty Council on the political crisis and steps toward reinstating Sudan’s AU membership—a condition General al-Burhan has set for participating in AU-led solutions.
A “Legitimate” Authority
Despite fierce disputes over who legitimately represents Sudan in regional and international institutions, Youssouf’s remarks in Baghdad carry significant political weight. Implicitly, they suggest the AU recognizes a legitimate authority in Sudan and rejects narratives portraying the country as failed or open to foreign intervention.
This view is reinforced by AU envoy Mohamed Ibn Chambas, who told Al Jazeera Mubasher that the AU “works with the Sovereignty Council,” calling on Sudanese citizens to build a more legitimate authority through an inclusive transitional process.
Indicating further changes in the AU’s approach, Sudan Tribune reported on May 21 that the AU and IGAD—along with UN officials—are working to establish a new mechanism for addressing the Sudan crisis, led by IGAD.
Reactions and Implications
Youssouf’s statements stirred controversy in Sudan, with some viewing them as support for the Sudanese army and a boost to its legitimacy against its military and political rivals.
Conversely, the RSF explicitly rejected the remarks, calling them “blatant bias” and a breach of the neutrality and objectivity the AU must uphold. The group accused Youssouf of steering the AU in favor of the army and warned of continued bias, which it said contradicts the AU’s role as a neutral mediator.
Observers warn that these developments may entrench both sides in their positions, further complicating AU mediation efforts.
While Youssouf’s remarks point to a new AU approach to the Sudanese crisis, the final decision on restoring Sudan’s AU membership lies solely with the Peace and Security Council, which conditions such a move on a democratic civilian transition. The AU Commission Chair does not have the authority to unilaterally reverse the suspension.
Source: Al Jazeera Net
