“Hostages, Not Support Bases”: Debunking the Myth

As I See 

By Adel El-Baz

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May God bless Dr. Osama Al-Eidaroos and benefit us with his knowledge. Since the beginning of the war, he has stood out for his realistic analysis and sharp insight into what is happening on the ground. At a time when people were lost between rumors and despair, Dr. Osama consistently repeated that this militia, despite its hollow claims of control, is nothing more than a “sandcastle” that will quickly collapse. And he was right.

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Indeed, from Mount Moya to the mountains of Kordofan, the illusions of field control have collapsed one after another. Recently, Dr. Osama appeared once again on Al Jazeera, refuting the criminal militia’s claims that it enjoys “social support bases.” He emphasized that those the militia claims as its base are, in fact, hostages—abducted citizens forcibly taken by the militias. He stated clearly: “It is our duty to liberate them from its claws.” And he was right again.

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Today, it can confidently be said that all tribes and social components once exploited as propaganda tools to depict societal support for the militias are now seeking a way out—and openly rebelling against the gang. The evidence is abundant:

Despite repeated recruitment calls by the militia, tribes have refused to send their sons into a doomed war. Promises of positions or money have failed to entice them. People are witnessing the burial of their sons by the dozens—if not hundreds—daily. Money no longer means anything.

Journalist Al-Sadiq Al-Razeegi reported that the city of Al-Daein alone has lost over 40,000 of its youth in this senseless war.

Moreover, Youssef Ezzat, former political advisor to militia leader Hemedti, tweeted a few days ago urging that tribes should not be dragged into the war. He affirmed that the war originated from a dispute within the military institution, and involving social components would only turn it into a prolonged civil war. This tweet reveals the deep divisions within the fragmented Rapid Support Forces (RSF).

The militia, which once boasted about its popular base, now implicitly admits its collapse through the threatening and coercive language of its leaders. Just days ago, Abdel Rahim Dagalo warned tribes against reluctance and threatened to hold their leaders accountable if they did not contribute to recruitment. He brazenly declared, “You’ve tasted the sweet of the RSF… now taste its bitterness.”
What kind of “support base” is threatened with punishment if it doesn’t hand over its sons to death?

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In another scene exposing the collapse of the “support base” myth, over 18 armed clashes have been recorded within three months between ethnic groups inside the militia itself. These stem from accusations of betrayal and disputes over loot, leading to violent conflicts and increasing fragmentation. This internal division reflects the deep crisis of social legitimacy the militia suffers from, stripping it of its last fig leaf.
Amnesty International documented in a mid-2024 report that the militia abducted civilians from villages and used them as human shields—clearly proving that the concept of “social support bases” cannot withstand field investigations.
Furthermore, the defection of senior figures from within the militia, such as Brigadier General Mohamed Sharaf El-Din, who explicitly stated that “the militia exploits tribal youth as cheap fuel,” reinforces what Dr. Al-Eidaroos and Youssef Ezzat have asserted.

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The notion of “social support bases” is not new in Sudanese conflicts. Historically, it has been used as a cover to justify the presence of armed militias in specific areas. Yet these “bases,” as history has shown, have always been fragile, built on temporary interests rather than genuine and lasting popular support.
The rhetoric around support bases has become a political tool to exploit tribal affiliations—dividing communities and legitimizing violence—rather than reflecting any cohesive popular backing. The tribes that were once claimed as militia supporters are, in reality, victims and captives who now refuse to continue supporting the war.
Many of these tribes have turned against the militias and are now aligning with the national army as a protector and liberator. This shift underscores the fragility of the so-called support bases that the militias and their propaganda machine trumpet, which do not reflect the reality on the ground.

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These facts dismantle the myth of the support bases and reveal that such claims are merely part of a deceptive propaganda campaign aimed at prolonging the conflict and fracturing Sudan’s social fabric.
Those who continue to speak of support bases are attempting to distort the nature of this war—from a rebellion against the state led by a treasonous family blinded by greed and used as a tool to strip the country of its sovereignty through an invasion involving more than nine countries with their weapons and mercenaries—into a civil war.
But talk of support bases is nothing more than a cover for systematic crimes.
Soon, when the army reaches what are now labeled as “support base” areas, people will realize that these criminals had no real popular support—and the illusions of support and civil war will collapse, just as the sandcastle did before.