The Vision of the “Wise Man” Is Not Binding on the Sudanese Army or People

By Othman Jalal

(1)
Did the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) manage military affairs based on visions and revelation, or through the judgments of a brilliant military commander? Politics in Islam—including warfare—is the management of political matters using tools of force when necessary, and its basis is permissibility, shaped by historical context and its challenges. The Prophet (PBUH) approached military matters with the behavior of a human military leader. Since the revelation of the verses permitting fighting and self-defense—“Permission [to fight] has been given to those who are being fought, because they were wronged…” and “Had Allah not repelled some people by means of others, the earth would have been corrupted…”—the Prophet regularly consulted his companions and those with military experience. Before the Battle of Badr, he sought to motivate the Muslim army prior to facing the Quraysh forces. Leaders of the Muhajirun (emigrants)—Abu Bakr, Umar, and Al-Miqdad ibn Amr—rose to inspire the troops with words of steel.

(2)
At the Second Pledge of Aqaba, the agreement with the Ansar (Helpers) stipulated their defense of the Prophet inside Medina. When a renewed pledge was needed due to a looming battle, the Prophet asked the Ansar for their counsel: “Advise me, O people.” The leaders of the Ansar—Sa’d ibn Mu’adh and Sa’d ibn Ubadah—rose to pledge their support in combat. Before the two armies clashed, the Prophet stationed his army near the wells of Badr. Then Al-Hubab ibn al-Mundhir, a military expert, asked, “O Messenger of Allah, is this a divinely revealed position, or is it opinion, warfare, and strategy?” The Prophet replied, “It is opinion, warfare, and strategy.” Al-Hubab then advised a different tactic: position the wells behind them so the Muslims could drink while denying the Quraysh access. Jibreel (Gabriel) descended and affirmed that Al-Hubab’s suggestion was correct—and so it was.

(3)
Before the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet saw in a vision that some of his companions would be killed, including members of his own household. Interpreting this vision, he suggested fighting inside Medina, from house to house and from rooftops. However, he yielded to the youth’s wish to fight outside the city, which ultimately led to the Muslim army’s defeat.
During the Battle of the Trench, the Prophet adopted the suggestion of Salman the Persian to dig a trench around Medina for defense. When the siege became severe, the Prophet proposed giving half of Medina’s crops to the Ghatafan tribe in exchange for them abandoning the Quraysh alliance. The Ansar rejected this, choosing instead to confront the confederate forces by sword.
At the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah, despite the harsh terms and opposition from senior companions, the Prophet signed the treaty with Quraysh in obedience to divine guidance. Although it seemed unfavorable at the time, the treaty paved the way for the eventual conquest of Mecca and the broader expansion of Islam into Arabia and the frontiers of Persia and Rome: “Indeed, We have granted you a clear conquest.”

(4)
These events and military campaigns confirm that the Prophet (PBUH) approached them as a strategic military commander—sometimes succeeding and occasionally erring, then adjusting based on consultation and collective decision-making. Rarely did he act unilaterally on political matters based solely on divine command. Crucially, he never implemented military action based on dream interpretation, even though visions are part of prophetic inspiration. Military decisions were made collaboratively with leaders and experts in response to tactical field challenges, while also considering political, religious, and social factors, all with long-term dignity and strategic interests in mind.

(5)
Therefore, the vision claimed by Muhammad Hashim Al-Hakim—where he alleges that the Prophet informed him of the end of the war in Sudan and called for negotiations between the army and Mohammed bin Zayed’s militia—might be a good omen if such negotiations lead to the militia surrendering and laying down arms.
However, if negotiations are intended to recycle and reintroduce this criminal militia into Sudan’s political scene, then this vision holds no authority over the will of the Sudanese people and army, who have resolved to confront the militia on the battlefield until surrender or decisive defeat is achieved. And the matter over which you seek guidance has been decided.