Who Turned the Rapid Support Forces into a Western Secular Project?
By Dr. Hassan Mohammed Saleh
In an oversimplified and misleading narrative aimed at the Sudanese intellect and national consciousness, the former advisor to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Youssef Ezzat, claims that the Islamic Movement transformed the war into a tribal conflict in western Sudan. He alleges this was done by infiltrating RSF ranks with its cadres, directing the war against the Rizeigat and Misseriya tribes, which supposedly provoked a reaction from within the RSF itself.
Youssef Ezzat and others portray the Islamic Movement as all-powerful—able to do whatever it wants with Sudan and its people, driven solely by its political, social, and even economic whims.
However, it’s crucial to understand that the most influential project affecting the RSF and leading it to its current ruin was the leftist project spearheaded by Youssef Ezzat on behalf of others. He convinced the RSF leader to adopt this leftist secular agenda, leveraging General Hemeti’s immense influence as the RSF commander. This project had external support, most notably from the United Arab Emirates.
The UAE’s central project and war aim in Sudan has been the elimination of Islamists, exploiting historical and geopolitical factors—chief among them the official Egyptian stance on the Muslim Brotherhood and the positions of Israel and the United States. This stance disregards many of the political and ecological transformations that Islamists have brought about over their long history of dealing with both allies and enemies across the globe.
The UAE’s anti-Islamist agenda in Sudan is backed by international alliances, ideologies, and organizations. Yet, these actors view the Sudanese situation more broadly than merely targeting Islamists—whose government had already fallen at their hands. Despite this, Islamists remain the greatest perceived challenge to those aiming to control Sudan. The issue is no longer just about the Islamists or “the Kizan”; it has become about the Sudanese people themselves—who once criticized the Islamic Movement for its shortcomings in properly implementing Islam and Sharia law. This critique now spans Salafist, Sufi, traditional, and modern Sudanese movements.
The project led by Youssef Ezzat—which is now beginning to collapse—undermined another initiative led by Jumaa Dagalo with support from Abdel Rahim Dagalo. This latter project was political in nature, seeking to appeal to the public’s desire for development and basic services, and to offer roles for aspiring figures. However, Ezzat’s group and its allies quickly destroyed this alternative vision. Jumaa Dagalo, a former National Congress Party leader and member of the National Assembly, had been actively working to rebuild tribal and social networks through meetings and gatherings that were frequently attended by the RSF’s deputy commander in various homes and farms in Khartoum in the years before the war.
Ezzat’s group—which includes his sister—also involved some youth and female activists from the revolutionary movement and the Forces of Freedom and Change. The UAE and its ambassador, Hamad Al Junaibi, played a central role in this effort. The UAE managed to alienate Hemeti and the RSF from the Islamists and national forces, driving a wedge between them. Hemeti even publicly declared war on both nationalist and Islamist elements, famously rejecting Sheikh Al-Tayeb Al-Jed’s initiative after it had been finalized. He then courted the Darfuri armed movements through the Juba Peace Agreement. This was part of a broader movement that eventually caused a split within the Forces of Freedom and Change between the Central Council and the Democratic Bloc—leading up to the military commander’s measures on October 25, 2021.
What distinguished the secular and leftist forces and their foreign allies was their persistence in exploiting Hemeti’s wavering positions—until he fully joined their camp in a coalition of bloodshed, war, and the April 15, 2023 coup aimed at seizing power.
Looking back, it becomes clear to observers that the RSF was originally a military-security project of the former regime (the Ingaz government). But after the April 2019 revolution, it evolved into a political project—a tool for controlling Sudan. It was eventually stripped of all its original institutional affiliations, whether with the security apparatus, the military, or the Islamic Movement. A clear sign of this was the dissolution of the Security and Intelligence Service’s Operations Authority by a decision from the Sovereignty Council chairman and RSF commander, Hemeti.
This breakdown in discipline and loss of organizational allegiance pushed the RSF into the marketplace of international and political speculation—ranging from the European Union and the UAE to global intelligence agencies and the game of interests that harms others, even if it doesn’t directly benefit the players involved.
Source: Asdaa Sudania
