Hemedti and Egypt: When the State Becomes the Enemy

Dr. Abdelnasser Salem Hamed

When the conflict erupted in Sudan between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, attention turned to Cairo—not simply because it is a neighbor, but because it is the sole regional player that cannot be excluded from Sudan’s stability equation, whether as a geopolitical extension or as a vital national security interest.

From the outset, Egypt adopted an approach known in international relations theory as “crisis management through containment of collapse,” meaning preventing the disintegration of the state regardless of internal power balances. This is not an emotional stance but a strategic choice driven by a deep understanding of Sudan’s state nature, its position within regional power dynamics, and its direct border with Egypt stretching over 1,200 kilometers.

Despite the complex military situation in Sudan, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), leader of the RSF, escalated his rhetoric and began directly accusing Egypt of supporting the Sudanese army. These accusations were picked up by some media platforms hostile to Egypt’s role and presented as “on-the-ground facts,” despite the absence of any material evidence, intelligence documentation, or neutral international position to back them.

The question here is not whether Egypt supports the army but why these accusations have appeared—and why now?

To understand this angle, one must first consider the nature of Cairo’s role. Egypt is not a military party to the conflict but is invested in the survival of the state, not the victory of any side. Its declared support has always been for official state institutions, chiefly the army, as the last remnant of Sudan’s state structure. Conversely, Hemedti does not represent an institution but rather a parallel armed force established on the margins of central authority, with clear external support and a socially charged complex local composition.

Politically, the anti-Egyptian rhetoric serves two goals for Dagalo: first, to shift the conflict from an internal power struggle to a confrontation with “biased regional forces,” giving him a chance to recast himself as a victim on the international stage; second, to obscure the emerging human rights narrative against him, following reports from international organizations alleging systematic violations by the RSF in Darfur and Khartoum.

The reliance on an “external enemy” is not new in African crises, but in this case, it does not withstand scrutiny. There have been no recorded direct arms transfers from Egypt to any conflict party, and Cairo has not adopted hostile rhetoric against the RSF. Instead, it has continued hosting talks and supporting mediation efforts, including the Sudan neighbors’ summit. Egypt’s stance has also received implicit backing from international actors like the United Nations, which have raised no objections to its moves, unlike other regional actors accused of overt military support.

The paradox grows when comparing Egypt’s approach with that of other regional powers. While Cairo exercised restraint and avoided escalation, other parties engaged in direct military support via drones or smuggling routes, documented by multiple international reports, including the UN expert panel. This stark contradiction highlights that Hemedti’s accusations aim to tarnish Egypt’s role to compensate for his political losses.

Historically, the relationship between Cairo and the Sudanese army has not been circumstantial but based on long-standing institutional foundations. Cairo has consistently supported maintaining Sudan’s unity without intervening in leadership disputes. Its backing of the army stems from viewing it as the most coherent institution aligned with the state concept, not as a tool of power. In contrast, the RSF was established as a non-state armed force outside the state system, making its continued parallel existence to the army a direct threat to sovereign decision-making unity.

Regionally, Egypt’s position aligns with major interests: the ongoing conflict in Sudan threatens not only Red Sea security but also opens a geopolitical vacuum that non-Arab powers might exploit. This explains Egypt’s cautious moves rather than emotional reactions. Cairo understands that any bias would cost it its mediation leverage and weaken its regional position, which it seeks to keep inclusive rather than divisive.

Domestically, Egypt faces economic and social pressures making direct military involvement a risk it cannot afford. Thus, the logic of interests prevents it from entering a seemingly endless conflict, especially when maintaining a diplomatic role with negotiation capacity is the alternative.

Post-conflict considerations also factor into Egypt’s calculations. A unified and stable Sudan is crucial to its water and border security. From this perspective, Egypt recognizes that any role it plays today must pave the way for a larger role tomorrow in reconstruction, chaos containment, and creating future economic partnerships deep within Africa. This is not just a border battle—it is a long-term influence struggle.

In this context, a useful comparison arises with Egypt’s approach to Libya, where it adopted a “red line” policy to protect its interests while simultaneously investing in political solutions such as the Berlin Conference and the Joint Military Committee (5+5). The same pattern repeats in Sudan: a firm principled stance without getting entangled on a complicated battlefield.

Notably, despite Hemedti’s loud rhetoric, it has not produced any significant diplomatic breakthrough. Neither the African Union, the Arab League, nor Western countries mediating the conflict have adopted his narrative. This indicates the accusations were not aimed externally as much as attempting to manufacture an internal moment—one that might garner him some sympathy but does not change political realities.

Even Hemedti’s accusations against Egypt do not occur in a political vacuum. They are not merely hostile expressions but calculated political tools. Targeting Egypt serves four intersecting purposes: first, undermining the Sudanese army’s legitimacy by attacking its regional backers; second, manufacturing an “external enemy” to mobilize his base and promote a sovereignty discourse; third, provoking Cairo to respond directly, which would justify internationalizing the conflict and expanding the negotiation arena; and fourth, sending a covert message to the West and Gulf states that he can disrupt their plans by complicating Egypt’s role.

In this sense, Egypt is not the enemy to Hemedti as a state but as the “heavy symbol” of the national state camp in Sudan. Each accusation against it is an attempt to strike his real adversary—not Cairo but the idea of the state itself.

Ultimately, Cairo deals with the Sudanese crisis not based on whom it supports but on preventing the complete collapse. The accusations directed at it from any side will not alter the core of its strategy: preserving Sudan as a state, not as competing factions.

Within this framework, Egypt’s moves are built not on emotion but on a mix of geography and political rationality.

Those who believe accusing Egypt will stir the international scene may misunderstand the equation: countries are judged by what they do, not by what is said about them.