Hemedti’s Latest Speech: A Bid to Restore Authority Amid Political and Military Fragmentation

By Amjad Farid Al-Tayeb

On June 2, 2025, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia in Sudan, delivered a video speech broadcast via the militia’s Telegram channels. Amid the ongoing armed conflict with the Sudanese army since April 2023, this address was far from a routine appearance—it was an intensified attempt to restore stature and stabilize his forces’ morale amidst mounting political and military challenges.

Context and Shifting Field Dynamics

Hemedti’s speech comes amid critical military and political developments indicating a weakening RSF position and significant advances by the Sudanese army. Since early 2025, the army has steadily regained control over Gezira State and the capital Khartoum, in addition to large areas in White Nile, Sennar, and North Kordofan states. The army has also neared breaking the siege on the strategic city of El-Obeid through the “Al-Sayyad” military operation.

Meanwhile, the legendary resilience of El-Fasher, besieged by RSF since April 2024, remains the defining battle in North Darfur. Despite the RSF’s assault on the Zamzam IDP camp—supported by the “Tasis” alliance, which includes forces loyal to Abdelaziz al-Hilu, Tahir Hajar, and Al-Hadi Idris—the army and its allied forces have consolidated their positions in the state. On May 18, 2025, the army captured the strategic area of Al-‘Atroun in North Darfur. In October 2024, it had already taken Bir Mazza base (28 km north of Kutum), cutting RSF supply lines from Libya and Chad and threatening to lift the siege on El-Fasher. This military pressure helps explain Hemedti’s escalatory rhetoric, likely intended to ease pressure on RSF in Darfur by opening new fronts—such as threats to attack El-Obeid and Northern State.

Crisis of Legitimacy and Defensive Rhetoric

Hemedti appeared in the June 2, 2025 speech as a leader grappling with a deep crisis of political and military legitimacy, trying to regain initiative amidst battlefield losses and growing international isolation. His tone and content revealed the fragility of his position. While he attempted to rally his militia with motivational slogans, he also exposed internal contradictions and a lack of strategic coherence.

His political anxiety was evident in the adoption of a victimhood narrative, aiming to deflect attention from military setbacks and mounting human rights accusations. In doing so, he seemingly followed, intentionally or otherwise, Machiavelli’s advice in The Prince—to use accusations to distract from one’s weaknesses.

Hemedti accused the Sudanese army of using chemical weapons against civilians and targeting ethnic groups in Darfur and Kordofan, offering no credible evidence. Notably, this was the first time he made such claims following U.S. sanctions against the Sudanese army, announced weeks earlier, alleging chemical weapons use in 2024. Those U.S. sanctions lacked public documentation and were not submitted to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), nor was a formal investigation requested. The timing and nature of Hemedti’s claims suggest political opportunism, especially in the wake of the UN’s July 2024 report labeling RSF actions in West Darfur as acts of genocide against the Masalit tribe and imposing personal sanctions on Hemedti. His sudden claim of possessing evidence now, a year after the alleged events, seems aimed at exploiting political leverage.

Ethnic Rhetoric and Tribal Polarization

Hemedti’s speech leaned heavily on ethnic and tribal rhetoric, a persistent trait of RSF propaganda. This was also evident in his October 2024 remarks about his “blood ties” to General Ibrahim Jaber, whom he criticized for siding with the Sudanese government. Such appeals to tribal and ethnic identity highlight not only Hemedti’s personal worldview but also a structural flaw in the RSF project, which has failed to transcend tribal loyalties in favor of a unified national legitimacy.

Instead of advancing a new social contract to unite Sudanese society under a cohesive political authority, this rhetoric perpetuates the very divisions that have historically contributed to the state’s collapse. In a volatile context like Darfur and Kordofan—marked by ethnic tensions and local conflicts—Hemedti’s approach heightens the risk of civil war and undermines efforts to build a national consensus.

Strategic Contradictions and Limited Options: Ignoring “Tasis” and Pressuring “Somod”

A striking feature of the speech was Hemedti’s complete omission of the “Tasis” alliance, formed in March 2025 to provide political cover for the RSF. This silence reflects a deeper strategic crisis, as “Tasis” has failed to form a parallel government due to internal disputes over positions. Rising secessionist rhetoric among RSF supporters, particularly in western Sudan, signals political despair over achieving national victory or a political solution—limiting the alliance’s ability to forge broader coalitions.

Conversely, Hemedti directed an implicit message to the rival “Somod” alliance, demanding they choose a side: “You’re either with us or against us.” Both “Somod” and “Tasis” emerged from the fragmentation of the “Taqaddum” alliance led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. While they share anti-Islamist stances and similar ties to regional and international actors, RSF’s worsening military position has deepened polarization, reducing the political spectrum to a binary “friend-or-foe” scenario.

Rejection of the Jeddah Platform and Regional Tensions

Hemedti’s rejection of a return to the Jeddah peace talks reveals a rigid stance rooted more in his fragile negotiating position than in any principled resistance. This contradicts previous statements about humanitarian commitments and pledges made by his delegations during the 2024 Switzerland talks. Such inconsistencies reflect a pattern within RSF leadership—making flexible political promises to appease international mediators, without clear intent to implement them.

Viewed through John Rawls’ theory of justice—which requires negotiators to make decisions behind a “veil of ignorance,” detached from personal interests—Hemedti’s rhetoric falls short. His emotionally charged, polarizing tone is not aimed at building consensus, but rather at buying time and bolstering his camp’s morale at the expense of peace prospects.

He also accused Egypt and Eritrea of supporting the Sudanese army, again without evidence—attempting to mobilize supporters and explain battlefield defeats. Meanwhile, UN reports since January 2024 have documented UAE arms shipments to RSF via Chad, making Hemedti’s claims appear as part of a broader propaganda effort to distract from his own foreign backing.

Sudanese Leadership’s Diplomatic Engagement

In contrast, Sudanese leadership has pursued an increasingly active regional diplomacy aimed at breaking the international isolation caused by the war. In May and June 2025, Port Sudan hosted high-level delegations from the Central African Republic and Ethiopia, carrying messages of political and security support. On May 28, CAR Foreign Minister Sylvie Baipo-Temon delivered a letter from President Faustin-Archange Touadéra to General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, head of Sudan’s Sovereign Council. In early June, a senior Ethiopian delegation—led by Intelligence Chief Redwan Hussein and PM Abiy Ahmed’s East Africa Advisor, Getachew Reda—visited Port Sudan, reaffirming Addis Ababa’s support for Sudanese unity. It was Ethiopia’s second such visit in six months.

These efforts go beyond bilateral ties, signaling improved relations with regional organizations. Both the African Union and IGAD welcomed the appointment of Dr. Kamal Idris as Prime Minister, viewing it as a step toward restoring civilian governance. Altogether, these developments suggest growing international political capital for Sudan’s government, strengthening its negotiating position and contrasting starkly with Hemedti’s isolation.

Linguistic Signals and Military Threats

Hemedti’s speech employed a blend of populism and escalation, using emotional terms like “blatant aggression” and “killing the people” to cast RSF as the people’s defenders against tyranny. This victimhood narrative is a common populist tool to rally support and assert legitimacy. His phrase, “no room for grey stances,” echoed a binary logic aimed at consolidating political control.

His omission of any mention of the “Tasis” alliance reflected an effort to conceal or downplay its political failures, while his focus on military threats emphasized “power” over politics.

Threats of War Expansion

Hemedti issued direct threats to attack El-Obeid and Northern State, referencing RSF encirclement of El-Obeid from three directions (Al-Khuwai, Hamrat Al-Sheikh, and Al-Hamadi), and the retaking of positions like Al-Khuwai and Dilling. His warning for civilians to remain in their homes signals a dangerous escalation, recalling RSF atrocities during the invasions of El-Geneina, Khartoum, and Gezira.

If acted upon, these threats suggest an RSF effort to regain military initiative after losses in Darfur and Kordofan. El-Obeid is a strategic hub for controlling North Kordofan, while Northern State serves as a rear base for the army. Such threats raise displacement risks—13 million people had been displaced by May 2025, per UN reports—and worsen an already dire humanitarian crisis marked by hunger and ethnic violence.

Hemedti’s latest speech portrays a leader in crisis, relying on populism and polarization to compensate for political, military, and ideological weakness. It was a performance aimed at reconstructing his image amid deepening fragility. Yet, it offered no inclusive national vision. The resilience of El-Fasher, the army’s advances, the appointment of a civilian prime minister, and Sudan’s diplomatic outreach have all strengthened the government’s hand. Hemedti’s threats and divisive rhetoric only deepen the conflict. The lingering question remains: how long can a leader maintain power through a rhetoric of crisis and escalation, in the face of battlefield losses and an absence of legitimacy?