Why Are We Negotiating with the UAE? And What Is This Negotiation About? (1/2)
As I See
Adel El-Baz
1
Background of the Negotiations: From Militia to Sponsoring State
Talk of negotiating with the UAE—rather than with the militia—has become openly discussed in both public and private political circles. The days of dealing with the militia directly are over: its collapse is imminent now that the vanguard of our armed forces has advanced into Darfur.
In truth, the UAE’s efforts to engage with Sudan to secure an exit from its quandary have never ceased. We’ve already seen two public contacts: on 19 July 2024, Mohammed bin Zayed spoke by phone with General al-Burhan (mediated by Ethiopia, following the Ethiopian president’s visit to Port Sudan), and on 20 January 2024 the UAE participated in Sudan-Sudan talks that led to the so-called “Manama Agreement.”
Numerous reports also allude to unannounced meetings. The latest, from Africa Intelligence, claims that on 12 May 2025 the Sudanese army refused to attend a secret UAE-hosted summit because Abu Dhabi’s demands were excessive. Although that report did not specify the demands—and rumors circulated that the UAE had insisted on strikes against Islamists and on guaranteed investment packages in exchange for a ceasefire—none of this has been confirmed by official or reliably sourced channels.
The key questions remain: Why negotiate with the UAE? What are the grounds of these talks? And what exactly is on the table?
2
Tracing the Militia’s External Support
When an internal rebellion grows this large, amasses such heavy weaponry and logistical assistance, and endures for years despite fierce combat, the central question becomes: Where did all this support come from?
The substantial and incontrovertible backing that the Rapid Support Forces received from the UAE is now a proven fact—in U.N. reports, international investigations, war-crimes testimonies, and even in U.S. congressional hearings. It is no longer a matter of dispute. Thus, opening negotiations with the UAE is not a retreat from confronting our internal foe but rather a political acknowledgment that this militia was merely a military instrument of an external project—and that the key to resolution now lies in Abu Dhabi, not the battlefield.
3
Why Negotiate with the “Aggressor State”?
Because the calculus of this war has shifted. Those who truly decide whether it continues or ends are no longer the militia’s commanders but their foreign controllers. The militia has lost control of both territory and popular support; its military, political, and financial levers now reside in Abu Dhabi, which continues to fuel the conflict under various guises—humanitarian aid, political initiatives, and direct influence over Western decision-makers through its investments and financial clout.
Therefore, we negotiate with the party that funds, plans, and sustains this war.
4
Negotiation as a Complement to Military Victory
Negotiation is not an alternative to military victory but a complement to it. Just as triumph on the battlefield is achieved through attrition, encirclement, and advance, political victory must be secured and leveraged through negotiation from a position of strength.
If the UAE has invested in this war to reap strategic, economic, or geopolitical gains, negotiation offers a way to demonstrate that the costs of this gamble now outweigh any benefits—and that its project is doomed across all fronts, for Sudan will not be run by foreign powers or militias.
Negotiation, in this sense, sends a clear message: We know who you are, we know what you want, and we are managing this conflict at every level—military, economic, and diplomatic.
5
The One Non-Negotiable Precondition: Cease the Aggression
All of the above presupposes a single, decisive condition for any genuine negotiations: an immediate halt to aggression.
Abu Dhabi must first stop arming and otherwise supporting the militia. Only then can we sit down at the table in good faith.
If weapons are still pouring in and the UAE continues to fuel the conflict—whether through the militia or proxies like Haftar—any talks will be nothing but political theater and a waste of time.
6
Key Parameters of Negotiation
The problem lies not in the act of negotiation itself but in its terms and conditions. Talks should not be conducted as though two equal parties were meeting; rather, they must be framed as between a sovereign state and another state that has flagrantly violated diplomatic norms and our sovereignty.
1. Negotiations must be conducted through sovereign, transparent diplomatic channels and from a position of strength, not on a false basis of equality with a state that has disregarded those very principles.
2.
Sudan is neither subordinate nor submissive. We are at a pivotal moment in which we hold rare bargaining chips: without Sudan, there can be no stability in the Red Sea; without our transit routes, East Africa’s growth is constrained; and without our independent will, no regional projects—no matter how many ports—can succeed. These facts must all be on the table, not as threats but as proof of our rightful standing and reciprocity.
3.
Negotiations must not become a straightjacket on Sudan’s sovereignty nor impose a political roadmap crafted to suit an external actor. Concessions made today could trigger renewed upheaval if Sudanese feel sidelined for the sake of appeasing a foreign power—or if our resources are plundered under the guise of investment.
What must be achieved today is not only battlefield victory but also victory in preserving our national decision-making. Abu Dhabi’s requests may be presented, but any acceptance or rejection must come from within sovereign state institutions—and all talks should be conducted openly and transparently.
What, then, are we negotiating with the UAE over?
We will continue this discussion in the next installment.
