Attack on the Army and the Risks Facing Sudan

By Othman Mirghani

At a time when Sudan is facing a fierce internal war—one with clear external dimensions and interventions, the latest being the events in the triangle bordering Sudan, Libya, and adjacent to Egypt—some parties continue their campaign to weaken the Sudanese army. Some wish for its defeat, others call for its dismantling, and some hide their agendas behind the vague slogan of “restructuring.”

A central tactic in this campaign is the repeated accusation that the army is merely a “Kizan army” (a term referring to supporters of the former Islamist regime), or that it is a partisan militia rather than a national military institution.

Even if there are “Kizan” within the army, there is a wide segment of Sudanese within its ranks who belong to other political movements or who have no political affiliations at all. A vast number of those currently fighting alongside the army—including joint forces and mobilized battalions—belong to this broader group. In fact, some of them are youth from the December Revolution and others who long opposed the previous regime. No one can rightly label them as “Kizan.”

Many international and regional actors—despite their differing positions—agree on the necessity of preserving Sudan’s state institutions, foremost among them the armed forces. The collapse of the army wouldn’t simply mean the defeat of one party in a military conflict, but the collapse of the state itself and its descent into chaos and fragmentation. This isn’t an emotional stance, but rather a pragmatic reading of real-world precedents.

Modern history offers tragic examples of states that became arenas of bloody conflict as soon as their national armies collapsed. Iraq, after the 2003 invasion, is a stark reminder. The decision by U.S. administrator Paul Bremer to dissolve the Iraqi army created a massive security vacuum quickly filled by armed groups—from al-Qaeda to ISIS. Iraqi cities turned into battlefields, state institutions collapsed, and the country was plunged into sectarian violence.

In Libya, the ouster of Gaddafi without a plan to build a unified army led to the rise of competing militias and a devastating war marked by multiple foreign interventions. Somalia disintegrated after the fall of Siad Barre’s regime, turning into fragmented zones ruled by warlords. This triggered a brutal civil war and the collapse of state institutions for nearly two decades, eventually giving rise to extremist groups like al-Shabaab.

These weren’t exceptions. In Africa, similar disasters have unfolded in various forms. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), the collapse of Mobutu Sese Seko’s army led to the First and Second Congo Wars, which involved the armies of nine African countries and cost millions of lives. In Liberia, the disintegration of the army triggered a civil war that killed around a quarter of a million people.

The shared lesson in all these examples is that the national army is the “central pillar” of the state. Once it collapses, the entire structure of the state crumbles. For Sudan, if the army collapses or is dismantled—whether due to internal conflict, external pressure, or misguided political decisions—the country will face catastrophic scenarios:

– Security and police services will cease, leading to widespread chaos and crime.
– The resulting power vacuum will enable militias to rise and battle over power and resources, leading to dangerous tribal and regional conflicts and renewed calls for secession—especially amid the exploitation of the marginalized regions issue.
– Cross-border conflicts could erupt as militias and armed groups seek safe havens or resources.
– Terrorist groups will exploit the security void, finding fertile ground for their activities, especially given their rising presence in the Sahel region—not far from Sudan’s borders.
– Instability will pose a threat to neighboring countries and regional security.
– All of this will trigger unprecedented humanitarian disasters, escalating hunger crises and waves of displacement.
– Sudan will be opened wide to foreign intervention.

In summary: The Sudanese army is the “last line of defense” against total collapse. Historical experience shows that dismantling national armies does not necessarily lead to democracy—but often leads to chaos, particularly in an unstable environment marked by rising regional and global conflicts.

Reforming the army is necessary—just like many other Sudanese state institutions that require reform. Army leaders themselves acknowledge the importance of reform, especially in light of the war and the need to integrate armed movements that signed the peace agreement and to end the phenomenon of multiple armed groups and parallel armies. The goal must be to ensure that weapons remain solely in the hands of the state. But reform should never mean dismantling the army or restructuring it in a way that weakens it.

Today, more than ever, Sudan needs a strong national army—one that defends it from conspiracies and external ambitions. A capable, apolitical army focused on its essential duty: protecting a homeland that is clearly under threat.

Source: Asharq Al-Awsat