Rapid Support Forces and the Appetite for Open Wars
By Al-Sadiq Al-Rizayqi
The war in Sudan is entering a new phase—not just in terms of combat within its territorial borders, but with the spillover of its repercussions and consequences into neighboring and regional countries.
This is exactly what Sudanese leaders warned of at the onset of the war, along with regional leaders and international organizations closely monitoring the armed conflict and its ramifications. Over the past months, these warnings have materialized, bringing the entire region to the brink of disaster.
There is little doubt now that a confrontation between Sudan and the forces of retired General Khalifa Haftar in Libya is inevitable. Haftar’s forces, operating in southeastern Libya, attacked a Sudanese border post at Jabal Al-Uwaynat and occupied the tri-border area shared by Sudan, Egypt, and Libya.
Furthermore, on June 10, 2025, forces from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia crossed into Egyptian territory, triggering strong reactions within Egypt. The situation has since become volatile, with the Sudanese Air Force launching air raids to reclaim the area.
Sudan shares borders with seven countries: Egypt, Libya, Chad, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The total length of these borders is about 7,500 kilometers, and Sudan also has a roughly 700-kilometer coastline along the Red Sea, across from Saudi Arabia—a maritime neighbor.
The affairs of these seven neighboring countries are interconnected with other nations affected by developments in Sudan—namely Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These countries, which shared direct borders with Sudan until the secession of South Sudan in 2011, lie within the sphere of Sudan’s war spillover effects.
Kenya is deeply implicated in the war, as it hosts RSF leaders, their political allies, and associated armed movements. Kenyan authorities have also reportedly facilitated the transport of military equipment via their airports and airspace to the RSF in Nyala, western Sudan.
Uganda has also faced accusations of supporting the Sudanese rebellion, while deploying its forces into South Sudan to fight opponents of President Salva Kiir’s government. It is estimated that Uganda has over 10,000 troops in South Sudan.
In the Sahel and across West and Central Africa, the ripple effects of Sudan’s war have reached several countries, including Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and Guinea-Conakry. These countries serve as sources and transit points for transnational mercenaries.
The situation in these countries is intertwined with domestic armed opposition movements and fluctuating international conflicts, foreshadowing a dangerously unstable future.
Following drone attacks on Port Sudan in early May, Sudan’s government accused regional parties of launching the drones from bases in Somaliland, adding yet another regional dimension involving the Horn of Africa.
Long-standing tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Kenya, and Eritrea and Ethiopia remain unresolved and could ignite at any moment. Regional alliances and interventions—some from beyond the Horn of Africa—are now becoming entangled with the Sudanese conflict due to overlapping interests and realignments.
Recent reports from Nairobi suggest that the commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) informed several regional defense ministers that the United States expects them to handle counterterrorism efforts on their own, with American support limited to intelligence sharing.
This development implies that, in the absence of U.S. oversight, these countries—already overwhelmed by internal insurgencies and armed groups—are likely to descend into chaos and disorder if internal unrest and regional disputes intensify.
In short, the Sudanese war is now clearly spilling into its surroundings, especially with Libya’s direct involvement through Haftar’s forces. A regional war appears to be in the making, which must be analyzed through two main lenses:
1. Contraction of the War and Its Concentration in Western Sudan
The Sudanese Armed Forces are advancing in these regions, while RSF and its allies face military and moral collapse. Their political project to form a parallel government and establish authority in western Sudan has failed, and tribal support for the RSF is waning.
This has led to the mass retreat of foreign mercenaries, prompting RSF backers to hastily open new battlefronts—especially along border points—to ensure supply lines, ignite surrounding regions, reduce pressure on current war zones, and attempt a quick and symbolic victory elsewhere.
2. Growing Concern Among Neighboring States
The RSF’s military setbacks and inability to manage the war have raised alarm in neighboring countries. In response, the Central African Republic and Ethiopia dispatched their intelligence chiefs to Sudan (CAR’s intelligence chief visited on May 29, and Ethiopia’s on June 2).
Chad has also signaled a willingness to re-engage diplomatically, which observers see as a tentative step toward normalizing relations. These developments mark a blow to the RSF, possibly pushing it toward further escalation and attempts to spread the conflict regionally, especially given its suspicious alliances with rebel movements opposing their own governments.
The Sudan war has revitalized numerous rebel groups across the region, many of which now aspire to replicate RSF’s model. Chad, the CAR, South Sudan, and Ethiopia are particularly vulnerable:
Chad: 9 major armed groups, with 34 signing the 2022 Doha Agreement.
CAR: 12 known armed movements.
South Sudan: 5 movements.
Ethiopia: 7 rebel groups from various regions.
Libya, meanwhile, teeters on the edge of war, facing instability in the south, east, and west amid delicate political and military tensions that could plunge the entire country into violence.
A full-blown regional war may erupt soon, with South Sudan as the most likely starting point due to historic competition between Ethiopia and Uganda for regional influence.
In March, Ethiopia rejected Uganda’s military presence in South Sudan’s Upper Nile state, near the Ethiopian border along the Sobat River. This was part of the ongoing conflict between the Juba government and Nuer factions—a tribe spanning both countries.
Ethiopia responded by reinforcing troops along the South Sudan border and indicated its readiness to intervene if Ugandan forces did not withdraw. In early June, it dispatched a high-level security delegation to Sudan and South Sudan to express its position and leave the door open for potential military action.
Ethiopia has also updated neighboring capitals about its deteriorating relations with Eritrea regarding the Tigray front. Addis Ababa claims that Tigrayan rebels, allegedly supported by Asmara, may restart hostilities, while Ethiopia is now hosting several Eritrean opposition groups.
Additionally, Kenya and Uganda’s competing interests in South Sudan could further complicate matters. Both countries have allies in Juba, and growing polarization may shape the course of future developments in this tense environment.
Simultaneously, there are ongoing communications among Chadian opposition figures in several Sahelian capitals, laying the groundwork for a new wave of armed conflict in Chad. Some Chadian armed opposition groups that fought alongside the RSF have gained access to weapons, vehicles, funds, and equipment, and are preparing to launch their own rebellion.
Sudan’s war has merely served as a staging ground for this. These groups are now establishing camps in western and southern CAR, and possibly within Darfur, while others are engaged in diplomatic and political moves across Africa and Europe.
Given current developments and the RSF’s massive losses—especially among foreign fighters from neighboring states and sub-Saharan Africa—the expansion of the war into these regions is no longer just a possibility. It is becoming a concrete reality, validating long-standing warnings about the regional dimensions and ripple effects of Sudan’s war, in a volatile environment ill-suited for dangerous gambles.
Source: Al Jazeera Net
