Collapsed Borders: The Sudanese War as a Platform for the Disintegration of the Regional System in Africa
By: Abdel Nasser Salim Hamid
The war in Sudan is no longer a mere internal crisis or a rebellion against central authority. What began as an armed conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has swiftly escalated into an open war with dangerous regional ramifications—crossing geographic and sovereign boundaries and threatening to dismantle Africa’s fragile security and political architecture. Sudan has become a hotspot where the interests of multiple powers intersect and a launchpad for exporting chaos across the continent at a time when Africa faces an unprecedented weakness in collective deterrence mechanisms.
Since June 2025, the RSF’s military expansion into the border triangle between Libya, Egypt, and Sudan has become a grave indicator. The joint incursion with units loyal to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar into the Jebel Uweinat area was not just a logistical maneuver—it marked a qualitative shift in the dynamics of the war. This region is not only a geographic gateway but also a strategic nexus that controls gold routes, smuggling paths, and supply lines between the Sahara and the Sahel. Egypt’s indirect involvement in the line of fire opens the door to new interventions and further complicates the regional balance, which is already suffering from a strategic vacuum after U.S. retreat and global preoccupation with other issues.
Sudan’s political borders have effectively lost sovereignty in more than five directions. Field reports indicate that the RSF relies on over 12,000 foreign fighters, including elements from Chadian opposition groups and mercenaries from Niger, the Central African Republic, Mali, and Nigeria. Estimates suggest that 40% of the fighters in western Darfur are non-Sudanese. This composition makes the RSF a transnational irregular army, recycling fighters from other African conflict zones and posing a dual threat to neighboring states: inside Sudan through military operations, and within their own home countries upon return—with high-level combat experience and unregulated weapons.
South Sudan represents another potential flashpoint. In March, Ugandan forces entered Upper Nile states under the pretext of supporting the Juba government, prompting a swift Ethiopian response in the form of military mobilization along the border and issuing stern warnings. What appears to be an ethnic power struggle actually conceals a geopolitical showdown between two projects: Ethiopia’s bid to prevent encirclement from the west, and a Ugandan–Eritrean axis seeking expansion toward the Red Sea, and possibly to influence vital trade corridors.
In the southeastern interior, the conflict is taking on even more complex forms. In May 2025, the Sudanese government accused regional actors of using bases in Somaliland to launch drone strikes targeting critical infrastructure in Port Sudan. While the government did not name names, regional indicators suggest a settling of scores among actors testing their capabilities in a space devoid of international oversight. Sudanese territory is turning into a testing ground for drones and cyberattacks, with the state lacking both the means to respond and the capacity for self-defense.
Chad and the Central African Republic are not immune to these repercussions. The Chadian opposition, which fought inside Sudan, has begun returning to its territory bolstered with combat experience and weapons. Reports point to the formation of new camps near the border, hinting at intentions to reopen the front against the regime in N’Djamena. In the Central African Republic, armed groups have been observed infiltrating from southern Darfur into northeastern provinces, amid near-total security breakdowns—threatening to spark a new chain of uncontrollable conflicts.
Meanwhile, the continent faces a strategic vacuum. In May, the United States, through AFRICOM, announced it would halt direct military support and restrict its role to intelligence sharing. The African Union, mired in institutional crises, remains incapable of formulating a unified position. As major players retreat, regional powers race to fill the void—some through covert military support, others by forging on-the-ground alliances that reshape the balance of power in the region.
What we are witnessing is not merely the disintegration of the regional system, but a fracture in the traditional understanding of sovereignty, borders, deterrence, and legitimacy. Sudan has become a living example of what happens when the central equation in fragile states collapses and the international community fails to respond early. The war that began as an internal conflict has turned into a platform for proxy wars, entangling networks of mercenaries, smuggling, transcontinental financing, and geopolitical bargaining.
Amid this bleak landscape, the most pressing question remains: Who has the capacity to contain this explosion? Without urgent and coordinated efforts, the Sudanese war could become the spark for a large-scale regional inferno—reminiscent of the Congo and Rwanda wars, but on a broader scale, lasting longer, and with consequences that may reach as far as the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.
