Opinion

An Intellectual Forum on a Vision for Ending the War and the Features of a New Social Contract

By: Al-Wathiq Kameir

Comments on the Agenda
I extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to my two friends, Shams Al-Din Daw Al-Bayt (Democratic Thought Project) and Mahboub Abdel-Salam (Solidarity Movement for Democracy and Social Justice), for inviting me to participate and contribute to this intellectual gathering on the vision for ending the war and the features of a new social contract.

As I read the forum’s title — “A Vision for Ending the War and the Features of a New Social Contract” — it immediately occurred to me to share with you some core questions. Without addressing these, I believe it will be difficult, if not impossible, to reach a consensus on a vision to stop the war and to lay the foundations for a post-war Sudan.

However, after going through the forum’s agenda and objectives several times, I found myself immersed in important observations that may elicit a response from the organizers and participants. These observations could enrich their ongoing efforts and help achieve better results. (These points do not necessarily fall outside the forum’s current discussion scope.) In this contribution, I will present these remarks, followed by questions that require answers concerning the cessation and end of the war.

I.

My first observation is that the invitation to dialogue focuses only on the overall goal — “restoring the role of the intellectual” — without defining specific objectives whose anticipated outcomes would lead to achieving that ultimate goal. This makes it difficult to assess the actual impact of current and future dialogues.

II.

I was particularly struck by the phrase stating that this dialogue aims to “restore the role of the intellectual, the sage, and the scholar, along with their spiritual and societal authority, and to resume their noble mission that laid the foundations for the Sudanese peoples and communities toward a shared homeland.”

III.

Leaving aside the debate on who qualifies as an intellectual, what was the role of these intellectuals in laying the country’s foundations in the first place? And what are the criteria for evaluating or measuring that role?

Indeed, we need a thorough study of the contributions of Sudanese intellectuals to shaping political discourse, raising awareness, proposing new visions and ideas, and driving social change. This would go back to the Graduates’ Conference during the struggle against colonial rule and continue through the evolution of the “professional” demands movement — largely driven by intellectuals — given the conceptual confusion between “trade unions” and “political parties.”

Post-independence Sudanese political and social conflict was marked by tension and clashes between “traditional” and “modern” political forces (despite the controversy around these terms), and between the trade union movement and the state.

Ironically, while the trade union movement historically supported and defended democracy, it also notably backed the May 1969 coup, exemplified by the unprecedented mass rally organized by unions on June 2, 1969. Based on my unionist activity and observations, I assert that the prolonged conflict between trade unions and successive regimes significantly undermined the parliamentary system. This is evident, for example, during the 1985–1989 elected government, which saw strikes and protests that created fertile ground for the Islamic Front’s coup. This is one of the key contradictions within Sudan’s trade union movement, warranting serious and productive discussion.

Therefore, I believe it is important for “activist” intellectuals to initiate a comprehensive critical review of their contributions — however modest — to the country’s current situation, especially as they continue to call on political parties and movements to conduct self-criticism.

IV.

In light of the efforts made by the “Democratic Thought Project,” it seems worthwhile to reconsider the approaches and methodologies used in tackling these topics — especially the need for genuine inclusion of community-based and youth groups. There is an urgent need to organize grassroots community dialogues that prominently feature youth participation.

V.

Social bases, in their various forms, are almost entirely excluded from dialogues organized by intellectual groups. These discussions remain largely monopolized by elites, political parties, and so-called “civil forces,” which limits their broader impact. It’s important to point out that “community representation” in the context of political struggle is often inadequate and confined to forces labeled as “civil society,” which in reality represent “urban civil” actors within a broader civil society that spans rural and urban areas across the country.

The term “civil forces” was coined during the December Revolution to refer to non-partisan societal groups (though not necessarily apolitical), as opposed to the term “modern forces” used during the March–April 1985 Uprising.

VI.

Although youth represent the vast majority of the population (61%) and led the December Revolution and called for change, they are still largely excluded from contributing meaningfully to research forums and think tanks. I learned from the forum organizers that only six young people (15% of total invitees) were invited to participate in this event. Nonetheless, I was pleased to hear that the organizers are aware of this shortcoming and are planning a second event with greater youth representation.

VII.

The four agenda items proposed for discussion, while seemingly related in addressing the political and social conflict in Sudan, appear disconnected in their objective approach and intellectual framing. The discussion points focus on totalitarian ideologies, regional and demographic marginalization, and the militarization of public life. But the question remains: Are these the root causes of Sudan’s wars, or mere symptoms and manifestations of deeper issues — or secondary byproducts? Or is the fundamental root of the crisis the absence of a national project or social contract, which this forum seeks to explore?

VIII.

The ongoing war has produced challenges that threaten the very existence of the Sudanese state. This calls for a paradigm shift in thinking, a break from outdated approaches, and the adoption of unconventional methods and new agendas — crafted with active participation from youth and grassroots (civil) groups.

For instance, and to my knowledge, the subject of totalitarian ideologies and equal citizenship rights was thoroughly addressed at the “Sudanese Forum on the Relationship between Religion and State,” held in Nairobi from February 23–25, 2017. I had expected this forum to reference that important event and its concluding statement, as well as the potential outcomes of revisiting its discussions.

Since the current war may mark a new chapter in Sudan’s history — a chapter that Sudanese people have interpreted differently politically and socially, and one that has threatened national unity, social cohesion, and destroyed infrastructure — there is a dire need for in-depth research to answer the central question:

Why have all attempts at change failed, and why were three revolutionary transitions and a peaceful political transition following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement squandered, ultimately leading to the outbreak of war in April 2023?

In comparison to various African experiences, several countries in East, West, and Southern Africa managed to end their conflicts and stop their wars through constitutional evolution — not through revolutions and popular uprisings — and have since become sustainable democracies.

Perhaps the lessons and consequences of this war will serve as a catalyst for political, civil, and societal forces to break from their old methods of handling post-revolution transitional periods, which have historically revolved around struggles for power and transition management.

Despite the abundance of fragmented writings and analyses on Sudan’s transitional experiences, we still need a re-evaluation of these experiences based on a sound methodology — not merely issuing calls for papers within various think tank forums, only to have the discussions dissipate.

I propose that participants in this forum entrust a dedicated research group (not necessarily drawn from among themselves) — composed of experts in political science, sociology, and economics, and capable of working beyond political and intellectual biases — to undertake this study. Its mission would be to answer the question:

Why have all our transitions failed to achieve the democratic transformation and change long sought by the Sudanese people and their vibrant youth forces?

The group would also be tasked with presenting the findings of their study in various gatherings that include meaningful participation from youth, grassroots groups, and local communities.

Related Articles

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Back to top button