Sudan: Power-Sharing Disputes Loom on the Horizon

Sudan Events – Agencies

A sharp political crisis has erupted within the pro-army Sudanese coalition following media leaks that exposed a “silent conflict” between the armed movements allied with the army—collectively known as the “Joint Forces”—and the military leadership. The dispute centers around the intentions of army-backed Prime Minister Kamil Idris to revisit the power-sharing arrangements in the soon-to-be-formed government.

The crisis had long been simmering within the components of the pro-army coalition in Port Sudan but came to light after the head of the Sovereign Council and army commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, appointed former UN official Kamil Idris as Prime Minister without consulting his allies. Idris quickly dissolved the existing government upon taking the constitutional oath, assigning ministry undersecretaries and secretaries-general to manage affairs. This decision affected ministers appointed under the “Juba Peace Agreement” of October 2020, provoking quiet anger within the “Joint Forces.”

The crisis exploded after Idris announced plans to form a “non-partisan technocratic government,” which would necessitate revising the existing power-sharing quotas within the ruling coalition—a move the “Joint Forces” rejected.

The Juba Agreement

According to Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the Juba Peace Agreement, the signatory parties were to be represented by three members in the Sovereign Council, five ministries (25% of the cabinet), and 75 seats in the Transitional Legislative Council—also 25% of the total. Based on this, then-Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok appointed Jibril Ibrahim, leader of the Justice and Equality Movement, as Finance Minister, and Minni Arko Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement, as Governor of Darfur, among others.

In October 2021, al-Burhan dismissed the “Forces of Freedom and Change” ministers, including Hamdok, but retained those appointed under the peace agreement. When war broke out between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, the armed movements that signed the peace agreement initially remained neutral. Later, the “Joint Forces” formed and declared their support for the army over six months into the conflict, tipping the military balance in its favor. Since then, the Joint Forces have fought alongside the army while retaining their ministerial and constitutional positions. Tensions escalated particularly after the army expelled the RSF from central regions, including Khartoum.

New players who had helped defeat the RSF, such as the “Northern Shield” militia led by defected RSF commander Abu Aqla Kikel and Islamist forces like the “Al-Bara ibn Malik Brigades,” began to quietly demand their share of power—something only possible by reducing the old quotas.

Threats of Rebellion

Political propaganda machines turned against the “Joint Forces,” trying to shape public opinion toward sidelining them. Some army-aligned figures—military, political, and Islamist—went as far as calling for their relocation to Darfur, though such talk remained limited to social media skirmishes.

The matter then became public through leaked reports claiming the Joint Forces opposed the government’s dissolution without prior consultation and were insisting on retaining their ministries. They were also accused of withdrawing from battlefields without justification, allegedly to prioritize resolving political disputes over field operations.

Supporters of the Port Sudan-based government accuse the Joint Forces of “blackmail” to preserve their gains and claim their military participation was driven not by patriotism but by self-interest in maintaining power.

For their part, the Joint Forces make no secret of their desire to hold on to the positions they gained under the Juba Agreement. A military leader told Asharq Al-Awsat that they consider their positions a “legitimate right” and would not relinquish them for any reason—even if it meant rebellion or allying with the RSF.

Mutasim Ahmed Saleh, political secretary of the Justice and Equality Movement, wrote on X (formerly Twitter) that there is a coordinated campaign against the Juba Peace Agreement. He argued that calling the peace agreement an ethnic quota is misleading and ignores its foundation in a long struggle for justice and equality. Saleh rejected portrayals of their insistence on retaining ministries as “political extortion,” calling that a biased misreading designed to undermine their movement and centralize power, thereby excluding marginalized groups from decision-making. He described this as an attempt to annul the peace agreement and a “threat of war,” warning that such actions would destroy what remains of stability and only perpetuate the crisis.

“Driving a Wedge”

Sudan Liberation Movement spokesperson Al-Sadiq Al-Nour described the developments as the work of a “dark circle” within state institutions attempting to drive a wedge between factions united against the RSF. He called on the government to enforce the law regarding the leaks.

Behind the scenes, consultations are reportedly underway to defuse the crisis. Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim hinted in a TV interview that the Prime Minister could begin by confirming the peace ministers, along with the ministers of defense and interior—whose appointments are constitutionally under the army’s authority. According to Sudan Tribune, Minnawi revealed that intensive meetings with army commander al-Burhan had discussed the “future of the political partnership,” saying that power-sharing is “meaningless without partnership.”

Analysts predict that al-Burhan may make concessions, such as agreeing to keep the finance and mining ministries under the Juba partners in the upcoming government—potentially derailing the Prime Minister’s plans for a purely technocratic cabinet.