The Juba Agreement in the Line of Fire: Sabotaging Peace and Sowing Discord
By Dr. Abdel Nasser Salim Hamid
The first step in the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) strategy for success in their war was not capturing cities or seizing equipment, but rather a systematic attempt to fracture the unified front of the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied forces. Undermining the national coalition from within is the most dangerous weapon the rebellion’s leadership is betting on, as they cannot face the army in the field as long as it maintains its political and military cohesion.
At a critical national moment, Sudan is enduring a fierce war that threatens to tear apart its political and geographical fabric. Amid this existential battle, dangerous calls are mounting against the Juba Peace Agreement—either to undermine it or to accuse its signatories of collusion and self-interest. These campaigns are far from innocent and cannot be separated from the military and political context that adversaries of the state—both internal and external—are seeking to exploit to dismantle the last vestiges of a unified national front.
Since the outbreak of the war in April 2023, the armed movements that signed the Juba Agreement have taken clear national stances, with some of their units joining the joint forces supporting the army, particularly in areas such as Khartoum and El Fasher. These were not merely symbolic alignments but real commitments to defend the state against an armed rebellion led by the RSF, supported externally, and facilitated by sleeper cells, regional interests, and chaotic agendas. In contrast, there has been no recorded instance of Juba forces fighting alongside the RSF, which—at the very least—demonstrates their national neutrality, if not full alignment with legitimacy.
Despite these positions, these forces have not been spared accusations of treason. Indeed, it appears that some are deliberately working to erode public and military trust in the movements, through systematic smear campaigns portraying them as power-hungry conspirators working in the shadows. This narrative reflects a political and psychological disorder in understanding the complexities of the current phase and reveals that some political actors remain imprisoned by exclusionary, zero-sum mindsets.
What is more concerning is that these campaigns coincide with a decisive military escalation in Darfur and Kordofan, where the RSF is attempting to consolidate control, expand its reach through mercenary recruitment, looting cities, and sowing chaos. In this context, casting doubt on the movements fighting alongside the army is a free service to the enemy project—whether those launching these campaigns realize it or not. Inciting division within the national ranks, especially between the armed forces and the armed movements, weakens the internal front and opens the door to battlefield collapses that may be difficult to recover from.
The Juba Agreement was never a final solution, but it marked a qualitative shift in the trajectory of the Sudanese conflict. For the first time in years, armed movements were formally integrated into state structures, and fighters were given a path into the military institution rather than endless war. These gains—albeit limited—helped calm conflict in large areas and offered hope for building a new, inclusive Sudan. However, incomplete implementation of the agreement, subsequent turmoil, and the RSF’s seizure of power have all hindered the agreement and charged the atmosphere against it.
While objective criticism of the agreement is legitimate, the timing of the current assault on it is not innocent. The war is ongoing, the battle is unresolved, and any division at this moment will be reflected on the battlefield, not in political halls. Worse still, some parties—domestic and foreign—are actively seeking to blow up the agreement for goals that go beyond Sudan itself, within the framework of regional competition over influence, corridors, and resources.
Attacking the joint forces—forces affiliated with the state under the terms of the agreement—is not just a blow to the armed movements; it is a direct threat to the unity of the military institution amid the most dangerous war the country has ever faced. To accuse the leaders of these forces of mere opportunism disrespects the nature of the battle, the blood of the martyrs who died in these forces’ ranks, and ignores the fact that the alternative is not better—it may well be chaos and fragmentation.
It must not be forgotten that the RSF—through both its rhetoric and actions—is working to dismantle the army from within, divide its allies, and win over any party that strays from the national alignment. Therefore, demonizing the armed movements at this time directly serves the enemy’s interest and achieves what it could not accomplish through force.
As for the calls to restructure the agreement now, this is either political naivety or dangerous distraction. This is not the time for revising agreements or settling scores with partners. It is a time to protect what remains of a united national front. The state has yet to rise from the rubble, the fronts are ablaze, and the bleeding continues. Engaging in political mudslinging at this point is not only a waste of time—it poses an existential threat to the state’s survival.
Imagine a scenario where the Juba Agreement collapses or the signatory movements are removed from the national equation. This would simply mean dismantling the last armed front fighting alongside the army and leaving the armed forces to face a militia alone—one with foreign support, advanced weaponry, and extensive regional and media backing. The agreement was not just a political document; it has become a military reality embodied by thousands of soldiers deployed on battlefronts.
Over the past few weeks, I have been in direct contact with several leaders of the joint forces from the armed movements. Without exception, all of them affirmed that their battle against the RSF continues, and that this fight is not tied to the agreement or political gains, but rather a moral and national commitment to Sudan. One of them told me: “We will not leave the battlefield until this sedition is completely defeated, even if we are left with no position or single line in the agreement.”
This position reflects that the forces who signed the Juba Agreement are no longer bound by its text—they are actively engaged in the battle to preserve the state. They see continued support for the armed forces as a non-negotiable duty. Therefore, any attempt to sideline or politically attack them at this stage amounts to handing the front lines to the enemies of the nation and destabilizing the strategic balance that has held despite the intensity of the war.
It is also important to remember that the Juba Agreement was not the result of a purely domestic settlement. It came with regional and international sponsorship, within a track supported by IGAD and directly supervised by international partners such as the African Union and the United Nations. Therefore, dismantling it impacts not just the domestic scene—it undermines Sudan’s credibility in the eyes of the international community as a partner in peace and development. Furthermore, the Sudanese Armed Forces have not officially withdrawn recognition of the agreement to date, meaning the campaign against it even precedes any institutional stance and threatens an already fragile balance at a time when further disintegration cannot be afforded.
The rebellion’s leadership understood that the first step toward victory lies not just in battlefield strength, but in tearing apart the national front from within. Weakening the Armed Forces’ coalition with its allied fighting forces is the RSF’s primary goal. Anyone participating in this internal assault—knowingly or unknowingly—is doing the enemy a favor. What Sudan needs now is cohesion, not the exchange of accusations. Rebuilding the state begins by preserving what remains of its body.
