The Juba Agreement… The Obstacle Facing the Government of Hope

By Dr. Hassan Mohamed Salih
In a previous article, I pointed out to Prime Minister Dr. Kamal El-Tayeb Idris a number of facts that require him to approach matters with great political and organizational realism. Chief among these issues is the Juba Peace Agreement and the share of ministerial positions allotted to the parties that signed it—seven ministries in total.
In reality, many observers are aware that the Prime Minister understands the problems and complexities tied to the Juba Peace Agreement. However, he seemingly wants to impose the agreement (emphasis on “impose”) in line with the vision, ideas, and slogans he expressed in his recent address to the Sudanese people regarding the features of his government, which he affirmed will be a technocratic, non-partisan government. It would have been better had he clarified that the exception lies with ministers representing the signatory movements to the Juba Peace Agreement, as these are fully-fledged political forces.
These movements, as some argue, entered the scene under two guises. The first: they are armed movements that fought for seventeen years against the former National Salvation government, and now they have forces fighting alongside the Sudanese Armed Forces in the Dignity Battle (although not everyone participating in this battle seeks a share of power).
The second guise is that these armed movements are well-known political forces: the Justice and Equality Movement led by Dr. Jibril Ibrahim, the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arko Minnawi, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North led by Malik Agar. Some other movements have aligned themselves with the rebel militias led by Al-Hadi Idris and Al-Taher Hajar.
The signatory movements to the Juba Peace Agreement claim they have disbanded their military forces in accordance with the agreement, which stipulates peace, development, power and wealth sharing, and security arrangements. This disarmament places them in the category of political forces awaiting elections, and many are already forming political alliances in preparation for the democratic transition that the Juba Agreement promised.
The signatory armed movements have shown the ability to outmaneuver those who once tried to control them, particularly during their participation in Dr. Hamdok’s second government, formed on February 9, 2021, which contrasted with his first government—a purely technocratic one—based on the Constitutional Declaration signed on August 8, 2019.
The Constitutional Declaration was later amended following the Juba Agreement, removing the word “independent” and transforming the government into a government of “technocrats.” The result was that Hamdok headed a second government that was essentially a partisan power-sharing government. It included the National Umma Party, the Unified Federal Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, and the signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement. Ministers also came from international organizations and foreign-affiliated entities, such as Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari. This marked the first nail in the coffin of the transitional period, which diverged from the goals of the revolution like a camel parting from its rider.
The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) tried to co-opt the armed movements—by the way, it was the FFC that coined the term “armed struggle movements” for them, as they were previously known only as “rebel movements” or, at best, “armed movements.” The FFC attempted to place them in their pocket, but the movements proved more astute and instead entered into the FFC and allied with the Rapid Support Forces. The resulting split fractured the FFC into the Central Council (which eventually shrank to four, then three, main parties after the withdrawal of the Baath and Umma Parties). The Juba Agreement movements won the round during the “corrective measures” taken by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in response to the Palace Sit-in—measures the FFC and the Taqaddum coalition later labeled the October 25, 2021, coup. These corrective actions toppled the partisan civilian government.
Now, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan is reinstating a civilian government under the leadership of Dr. Kamal Idris, with broad international, regional, and domestic support—which is what truly matters.
In conclusion, Prime Minister Dr. Kamal Idris will not deny the Juba Peace signatories their rightful share of ministerial positions—seven ministries distributed among their political forces—without requiring that one of them be the Ministry of Finance or any other specific ministry. These parties and movements must align with the vision set forth by the Prime Minister and must not sabotage it or be the cause of failure for this new national experiment. Sudan and its people are striving to break free from sanctions and imposed guardianship under the banner of civilian rule and democratic transition.
Prime Minister Professor Kamal El-Tayeb Idris should be commended for announcing, from the outset, his support for the armed forces, their allied forces, and the popular resistance. He has prioritized security as the top concern of his upcoming government. He is also to be praised for not sending any message to the rebel leaders allied with militias under the name of peace—he sent no message to the rebel Abdelaziz al-Hilu nor to Abdelwahid Mohamed Nour, as others have. He is a man devoted to the people of Sudan, concerned with the displaced, the refugees, and the prisoners.
Published by Asda’ Sudaniyya