Why, How, and When Will Israel Intervene in the War in Sudan? (3/3)
As I See
Adel El-Baz
1
In the first two parts of this series, we addressed the question of why Israel would intervene in the war in Sudan and under what pretexts. In the first installment, we examined the myths and narratives being constructed to justify such intervention. We reviewed summaries of reports published by research centers, media outlets, and think tanks that aim to create a favorable climate for Israeli involvement in Sudan’s war—ultimately serving the interests of the regional sponsor of the Janjaweed forces. We exposed the fabricated claims designed to give this sponsor a plausible reason to draw Israel in, suggesting that both parties have a shared interest in intervening in—and eventually dominating—Sudan.
2
In the second part, we explained how these claims were disseminated and how this symphony of deception operates. Lies are manufactured and promoted through a process that begins with fabricated news, which is then built upon in detailed reports. Researchers—often funded or influenced by the same actors—treat these falsehoods as fact-based sources, publishing them as “professional” and “academic” studies. These are then amplified by global media and social platforms as credible information originating from trustworthy institutions. That is why we called for the establishment of a Sovereign Observatory for Media and Information Security, to monitor fabrications and issue timely responses exposing to both local and global audiences the falsity of these orchestrated narratives—composed by the sponsor, played by corrupt journalists and researchers, and funded at a global scale.
3
In this third and final part, we explore how Israel might intervene in Sudan’s war. To confirm Israel’s readiness for such an intervention, let us first consider the statement made by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Reuters on June 14, 2025, in which he affirmed that Israeli strikes on Iran would continue and that Israel would stop at nothing:
“Israel’s surprise attack on Iran was clearly aimed at severely disrupting Tehran’s nuclear program… The strikes appear designed to undermine Iran’s internal credibility and its standing among regional allies — destabilizing factors for Iranian leadership.”
The Jerusalem Post considered Sudan to have joined—or been pushed into—the camp of Iran’s allies, despite its signing of the Abraham Accords under Justice Minister Nasredeen Abdulbari.
Thus, Israeli and Janjaweed-aligned regional threats toward Sudan have become overt, growing in intensity and visibility daily. The only question that remains is: how will a strike on Sudan be executed?
It would likely begin with advanced intelligence gathering—airborne and electronic surveillance by Israeli spy planes and naval vessels in the Red Sea, in coordination with the intelligence services of the Janjaweed’s sponsor.
4
Based on the claims within its constructed narrative about Iran’s presence in Sudan, Israel could strike military or civilian sites under the pretext that they are Iranian in nature. There are ongoing rumors about secret Iranian tunnels under Sudanese mountains used for manufacturing drones, weapons, and military equipment.
A potential scenario involves a swift airstrike on a specific facility in eastern Sudan—perhaps near Port Sudan or within the port itself—targeting warehouses or trucks during loading near the coast. The strike could be executed from the sea, with plausible deniability to avoid escalation.
In essence, a repeat of the recent Port Sudan attack—this time openly conducted by Israel, under the pretense of targeting Iranian interests. In such a scenario, the Janjaweed’s sponsor—blamed previously—would be exonerated, while Israel would bear full responsibility, without consequences.
Another possible tactic could be cyberattacks targeting command and control systems used in Iranian drones operating in Sudan.
Those who dismiss this scenario forget that Israel has already bombed Sudan—in 2009 and 2012, allegedly targeting Iranian arms shipments—and has frequently struck Iranian positions in Syria and Yemen, all without international accountability.
5
As of now, there is no final decision, but this remains a delayed aggression. So, when might Israel implement one or more of these scenarios?
Analysts agree: the primary obstacle preventing immediate execution is the ongoing Gaza war. Once that ends, Israel will likely refocus its efforts on other objectives—chief among them, as Netanyahu said, is “undermining Iran’s internal credibility and its regional alliances.”
6
This leaves us with two critical questions:
What is the regional position?
And how prepared are we?
How can Sudan diplomatically and militarily counter the potential Israel/UAE plan to attack?
While Sudan may lack air superiority, it can disrupt regional security equations if attacked. Asymmetric deterrence has become a vital survival tool when conventional power is unbalanced.
One strategic option for Sudan is to deepen alliances with regional powers (such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia) and major global players like Turkey, Iran, and Russia. This should go beyond conventional cooperation to include comprehensive security agreements—logistics, tactical coordination, and potentially the hosting of temporary bases or radar/surveillance platforms—sending a clear deterrent message to would-be aggressors. At the very least, this should be used as leverage at the negotiation table.
Any such alignment with Iran and Russia should be understood as a necessity, not an ideological shift—forced upon Sudan by those who drove it to this point.
7
Sudan can adopt the concept of Asymmetric Deterrence—a strategy weaker nations use to deter stronger adversaries by threatening to use unconventional tools (e.g., chaos, cyberwarfare, disruptive alliances), making the cost of aggression outweigh any gains. This is used by countries like North Korea and Iran.
Such a strategy does not entail surrendering national sovereignty or decision-making. Instead, it leverages global power dynamics to protect our nation.
Sudan could also alert regional and global stakeholders in Red Sea security—that any military escalation against Sudan will not remain contained but could ignite instability along the entire Red Sea corridor, from Bab el-Mandeb to the Eastern Mediterranean, jeopardizing one of the world’s most vital trade routes.
If Houthi missiles can reach Haifa and Ashdod from deep inside Yemen, the distance from Port Sudan to Israeli ports is only 1,400 km.
The best way to make these reckless actors think twice is by threatening chaos. Sudan has nothing to lose. These actors know that if chaos spreads in Sudan and it becomes a haven for terrorist groups, they will pay a heavy price.
8
Diplomatically, Sudan must immediately launch a campaign to expose the scope of this plot, supported by witnesses and evidence dating back to the Port Sudan attack and now escalating through open threats.
Concrete steps could include a formal letter or briefing to the UN Security Council or the African Union, clearly stating Sudan’s position.
Sudan’s diplomacy must rally African countries, or at least raise their awareness of the potential outcomes if the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa descend into chaos through Israeli and Emirati aggression. No one would be spared.
Efforts must also intensify in Red Sea-littoral states, as any threat to this body of water directly affects Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Eritrea, Yemen, and other coastal nations. They must take a stand against the planned attacks, which are fundamentally threats to Red Sea security—a passageway handling 12% of global trade, 25–30% of Saudi trade, and generating over $9 billion annually for Egypt (2023–2024).
9
We must not wait for disaster before reacting with outrage. We must act now.
We have exerted great effort to compile the information proving that a paid Israeli aggression, backed by the Janjaweed’s sponsor, is coming—unless we continue to expose this plot in the media and intensify our diplomatic efforts to thwart it before missiles land in our homes.
O Lord, have I conveyed the message?
