On the Frontline: Dallang Pays the Price for Contradictory Alliances
Sudan Events – Agencies
Since the outbreak of the 2011 war—known locally in South Kordofan as the “Six Six War” in reference to its second day, June 6—fighting has raged between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), then allied with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The war has seen only brief lulls, as temporary ceasefires quickly collapse, giving way to renewed military operations.
In the April 15, 2023 war, the city of Dilling bore the cost of conflicting—both overt and covert—alliances among three parties: the SAF, the SPLM-N under Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and the RSF.
Prior to the April war between the SAF and RSF, the SPLM-N controlled all areas west of Dilling in South Kordofan. When the recent war broke out, the SPLM-N did not side with either party but instead launched attacks against both. In February 2025, it signed a political charter with the RSF, followed by military coordination.
Since June 2023, the SPLM-N began targeting SAF-held zones. On June 21, as a three-day truce between the SAF and RSF ended, Dilling awoke to the sound of explosions as SPLM-N forces attacked the 54th Brigade garrison—though it remained unclear whether these were al-Hilu’s forces. That day, the city’s market was closed and residents sheltered in their homes.
The same scenario repeated on July 14, when the SPLM-N shelled southwest Dilling, prompting retaliatory shelling by the SAF. The next day, SPLM-N forces captured the SAF camp in Karkal, located along the road between Dilling and Kadugli, effectively cutting the national road between the two cities. Four days later, an SAF spokesperson announced the repulsion of another SPLM-N attack on Karkal.
These military clashes escalated communal tensions, culminating on October 27, 2023, in violent clashes between armed members of the Nuba and Hawazma tribes in Abu Zeid neighborhood. Civilians were killed, many homes were burned, and the SAF managed to contain the violence. Nevertheless, clashes persisted, prompting thousands of Hawazma to flee Dilling for Dubeibat. Around this time, RSF commander in South Kordofan, Sheriya, mobilized Hawazma youth for an attack on Dilling, using Al-Ruweikeiba as a gathering point. On December 4, 2023, he met with tribal leaders at the Awlad Badr farm near Tayba Bridge, between Dubeibat and Dilling. The meeting included Emir Al-Hadi Mohamed Hamad Asousa of the Hawazma Emirate, and chiefs Bukhari, Malik Dras, and Mohammedi Habila.
By late 2023, Dilling was completely cut off from the rest of the country. The SPLM-N had taken control of Karkal and Hajar Jawad, severing the road to Kadugli. It also held the northwest region of Kudur and the eastern areas of Karkaraya and Taqma. Meanwhile, RSF forces had early on seized Dubeibat, severing the road to El-Obeid.
At year’s end, an RSF convoy led by Sheriya moved from Dubeibat with 12 military vehicles to Naila, where another RSF force under Makan al-Sadiq, with 13 vehicles, was stationed. Together, they advanced to Habila, 50 km east of Dilling. On January 4, 2024, the RSF posted videos claiming to have seized the government buildings and main market in Habila. The attack reportedly occurred on December 31, 2023, but poor internet access delayed news of the event.
RSF and SPLM-N clashes began on December 5, 2023, when RSF forces attacked Taqma, 7 km east of Dilling, only to be repelled. They repeated the attack the next day, causing mass displacement to Karkaraya and Dilling.
In January 2024, SPLM-N units entered Dilling, taking control of all entrances and neighborhoods like Tumat, while the SAF remained inside its garrison. SPLM-N leaders held talks with local community leaders, proposing to avoid confrontation by allowing the SAF’s 54th Brigade to withdraw to Kadugli or integrate under SPLM-N command.
On January 8, 2024, RSF forces attacked Dilling with 60 vehicles, but the SAF’s 54th Brigade, SPLM-N, and local Nuba resistance repelled the assault. Though no official alliance was declared, their coordination suggested a de facto military partnership. The RSF retreated to Dubeibat, and Dilling fell under joint SPLM-N and SAF control. The fighting caused health services and markets to shut down, displacing many and turning Dilling into a ghost town. Security forces warned civilians against evacuating homes to avoid looting. Several homes in Al-Qoz, the airport, and Abu Zeid—mainly inhabited by Hawazma—were burned. The official government platform later stated that the SAF and SPLM-N had jointly repelled the RSF and launched attacks on its positions. The SPLM-N did not comment and later denied any coordination.
In September 2023, after a meeting in Eritrea, Sovereign Council President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan asked al-Hilu to join the SAF in exchange for political concessions on secularism.
Following this battle, SPLM-N did not withdraw to its usual positions west and east of Dilling but remained in the city. In late February, they temporarily withdrew to allow the 54th Brigade to decide whether to withdraw or remain. The garrison refused.
As the three-way conflict continued, civilian suffering worsened. On February 20, the SAF bombed a school in Al-Hadra village, killing 11 schoolgirls and teachers. Meanwhile, SPLM-N maintained its siege on Dilling.
By mid-May 2024, living conditions deteriorated sharply. Food prices quadrupled—especially sorghum, a dietary staple—reaching SDG 300,000 per sack due to failed crops. Most residents rely on farming for survival. The key agricultural region of Habila suffered severe insecurity. Food shortages and cash scarcity ensued as supply routes from markets like Souq al-Na’am (South Sudan) and Um Jamina (West Kordofan) were cut off.
In July 2024, the Humanitarian Aid Commission in Dilling reported 41,132 displaced people had arrived since April 15, 2023, in addition to older displacements dating to 2011. A nutrition survey registered 6,126 cases of child malnutrition across 12 health centers, with Tumat center recording the highest rate.
Meanwhile, talks between the Sudanese government and SPLM-N on allowing humanitarian aid into South Kordofan were ongoing. On May 13, 2024, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir met Sovereign Council member Shams al-Din Kabbashi, who had earlier met with al-Hilu. A deal for immediate aid delivery within a week was expected but collapsed.
On July 30, following failed talks, the SPLM-N launched an attack on Dilling that was repelled by the SAF, which also attempted to break the siege by attacking SPLM-N areas in Karkaraya.
On October 10, 2024, a tripartite agreement—brokered internationally—allowed humanitarian aid to pass freely across South Kordofan. Aid trucks reached six areas: Dilling and Kadugli (SAF-held), Hajar Jawad and Karkal (SPLM-N-held), and Hammadi and Dubeibat (RSF-held).
In December, Dilling witnessed student protests due to exam delays. The SPLM-N stated the exams had reached Kadugli from Juba, but the government rejected its proposal to have the NGO Smarten Pearce deliver the papers via SPLM-N territory, citing national security risks. The governor insisted on armed escort.
On December 30, 2024, the SPLM-N accused the SAF of violating aid agreements by airdropping military supplies in Kadugli on December 29. The SPLM-N claimed the agreed aid corridor was via Kadugli Airport and Jalad drop zone, and that the SAF used the cover of aid to move military equipment.
The new year opened with fresh accusations and escalation. On January 14, 2025, the SPLM-N accused the SAF of attacking Karkaraya and Hajar Jawad. A month later, the SPLM-N shelled Kadugli, killing 44 civilians and wounding 28. On February 13, the 54th Brigade garrison in Dilling was shelled during a military parade. The SAF responded, regaining control of Karkaraya and Hajar Jawad, which host oil infrastructure.
On February 19, SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu appeared at the Nairobi Conference alongside RSF figures and other armed group leaders to sign a charter establishing a parallel government—ending hopes of alliance with the SAF.
On February 24, the SAF reopened the Dilling-Kadugli road after the 54th Brigade linked up with the 14th Division in the Samasim area, breaking the SPLM-N’s siege.
Speaking to Beam Reports, SPLM-N spokesperson Gatigu Amouja Dalman said the Nairobi signatories aim to transform the charter into a military-security agreement for a unified professional national army. He noted that SPLM-N will shift to offensive operations in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
Though first framed as political, the Nairobi pact quickly yielded battlefield results. On March 26, SPLM-N and RSF forces seized Lagawa. On April 3, they captured Khor al-Dalib, previously retaken by the SAF when it reopened the Dilling-Kadugli road. On April 12, RSF and its new allies attacked Um Adara, cutting the route between Dilling, Kadugli, and Souq al-Na’am—critical for supplies—triggering new food shortages. On May 30, RSF deputy commander Abdelrahim Dagalo declared that “Tasis Forces” are now fighting alongside the RSF.
On Saturday morning, June 20, Dilling was shelled by SPLM-N forces stationed in Hajirat west of the city, and in Kudur to the northwest. They exchanged fire with the SAF on the outskirts while clashes raged in Dushul, the Intersection, and Kika since June 17.
By Sunday morning, June 21, markets reopened, and Starlink internet resumed. However, tension remains high amid ongoing insecurity and general instability.
Despite the siege, goods are still reaching the city via alternative routes—through El-Obeid while avoiding RSF-held Dubeibat, and from Al-Khowei via Hamar tribe traders using tuk-tuks on three-day journeys.
On June 28, the SAF captured Dushul in fierce battles with the SPLM-N. A day later, Sudanese exam papers finally arrived in Dallang.
Source: Atar Magazine
