President Al-Burhan and the “Emptying the Circle” Theory (1/2)

As I See

Adel El-Baz

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During my second meeting with President Al-Burhan—as part of the media delegation visiting from Doha—I noticed that all the members of the delegation were focused on current events and the many questions circulating in the political sphere, many of which only the president himself could answer.

However, in that session, I felt compelled to draw the president’s attention to something else—what I called the “imperative of leadership unity under all circumstances.”

The reason behind this was that just a day before meeting the president, I had met with a prominent political figure—one of the pillars of the current ruling alliance—who spoke to me bitterly about what he believed to be numerous grave errors being committed by the state. He had reached the conclusion that reform was no longer possible.

I engaged him in a lengthy discussion, stressing the dangers of instability within the leadership structure and the necessity of maintaining its cohesion in a time when the country is fighting a war for its very existence.

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In that meeting, I told President Al-Burhan:
“I have no questions or comments about current events, but I would like to offer one piece of advice: it is essential to preserve leadership unity in these circumstances. Any signs of fragmentation or visible internal conflict would erode confidence in the leadership, weaken the ‘Dignity War Alliance,’ and lead to dangerous consequences on the battlefield—a fact you’re certainly aware of.
Therefore, any disagreement, no matter the issue, should be seen as secondary and must not threaten leadership unity. And by leadership, I mean everyone supporting the army—whether on the battlefield, or from their political positions and parties.”

That was the extent of what I told President Al-Burhan in that session.

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What prompts me to revisit that advice today is what has transpired in the political scene over the past week: power struggles over cabinet seats and ministries that nearly tore apart the unity of the forces fighting on the front lines.

A dangerous phenomenon is beginning to emerge: leaks from individuals close to decision-making circles. These leaks sow discord, deepen rifts between leaders, and threaten the mutual trust that is vital among those steering the ship during these critical times.

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Two developments brought my earlier words in Port Sudan back to memory:
First, the Joint Forces’ Statement; second, a column by Youssef Abdel Manaan.

The statement from the Joint Forces was issued on the afternoon of July 13, 2025, following the recapture of the Umm Sumeima area. In it, Joint Forces spokesperson Colonel Ahmed Hussein Mustafa called on all citizens to “unite, rally around national interests, and abandon personal disputes—aligning behind the Armed Forces, the Joint Forces, and the popular resistance.” He stressed that “the fate of the entire nation hangs in the balance, and the current phase requires true solidarity among all national forces.”

When a battlefield commander feels the need to urge others to put aside personal rivalries and unite, it is a clear sign that the struggle for power has reached a level significant enough to concern those who are sacrificing their lives for the country. We must listen to them.

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Two days later, Youssef Abdel Manaan—a journalist close to decision-making circles, and one of the most professional and insightful writers on the war’s developments—wrote: “Foreign intelligence succeeded in sowing discord among the ruling forces who have been fighting together since the war began. The allure of power has now taken center stage. Everyone is preoccupied with the Kamil Idris crisis—who becomes minister, who gets sidelined—while trust is eroding between Al-Burhan and his partners over a manufactured crisis. Even many Islamists have lost faith in Al-Burhan, and the Unionists are disillusioned, despite the sincere efforts of the industrious young advisor, Alaa al-Din.”

And this is not to mention the many rumors circulating within Port Sudan’s corridors of power—no longer a secret to anyone.

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In light of all this, fears have grown that the “Emptying the Circle” theory may now be in play, and that those behind it are following the same script used to topple President Bashir. Their aim today, however, is not just to bring down President Al-Burhan—but the entire state.

What is the “Emptying the Circle” theory?

It’s not an academic theory with established principles, but rather a practical tactic used to bring down a regime from within.

I first heard about it in Cairo, in October 2013. My friend Diaa Bilal and I were meeting with a Sudanese-American who had been my university colleague. He worked at one of the most influential U.S. organizations and played a significant role both before and after the 2019 regime change.

He told us: “We’ll bring down Bashir within five years, at most.”

We laughed. I said, “You’ve been saying that for thirty years. Sanctions failed, invasions failed, airstrikes failed—the regime is still standing.”

He replied: “True. But this time, we’re changing strategy and tactics.”

Puzzled, Diaa and I exchanged glances. He said with confidence: “We’ll start by emptying the circle.”

He continued: “If you drain the circle around the president of strong, experienced, and influential figures, he’ll fill the void with weaker ones lacking expertise. That’s when vulnerability sets in. And we’ve already begun.”

At the time, President Bashir had dismissed Salah Gosh in 2009, only to reappoint him in February 2018.

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In a regime like the Ingaz (Salvation) Government, the president was surrounded by a “hard circle”—a network of political loyalty, organizational expertise, and security backing.

This circle preserved balance, managed internal disputes, and protected the regime from collapse.

Once targeted for dismantling, this core became a fatal weak point—the essence of what we now call the “Emptying the Circle” theory.

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So, what happened?

Salah Gosh’s chapter closed on August 13, 2009, and the dominoes began to fall:

On December 8, 2013, Ali Osman and Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi were abruptly removed from office, despite having wielded significant power.

Ghazi Salahuddin was dismissed from his role as political advisor and expelled from the National Congress Party (NCP) that same month.

Thirty-one senior NCP leaders were ousted for signing a memo criticizing the suppression of protests and calling for reforms.

These individuals were the backbone of the “hard circle,” known for their political acumen and state influence.

Once gone, Bashir relied on security agencies, Hemetti’s Rapid Support Forces, and politically inexperienced civilian figures. The ruling party and the Islamic movement were completely marginalized and excluded from decision-making circles.

Institutional capacity dwindled, decision-making became erratic and personalized, and Bashir appeared increasingly isolated—surrounded by men who lacked both experience and loyalty.

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Emptying the circle weakens a leader not just politically—but psychologically:

His decision-making capacity deteriorates

He loses trust in those around him

His perception of reality becomes distorted

All of this was evident in Bashir’s final speeches—especially the one on February 22, 2019, when he dissolved the government and declared a state of emergency. The country then spiraled into rapid decline.

He repeatedly tried to appease the streets, but it was too late. His responses were disorganized, and the regime became the victim of a double emptying:

One externally orchestrated to weaken it from within

The other internally manufactured by regime insiders through limitless infighting—until they abandoned Bashir at the most critical hour and let him fall as though he were no longer their concern.

The circle had been emptied. The regime collapsed.
Once balance was lost, confusion reigned, and the regime was devoured by forces of evil—both internal and external.

At that point, Bashir was floating alone, trapped in a void.
The rest, as they say, is history—carved by fate.

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Now, the very same internal and external forces—yes, the same ones—with the same faces, methods, and conspiratorial skill, are trying to play the same game with President Al-Burhan.

How?

To be continued…