Sudan’s Dayton: A Roadmap to an Imposed Peace? (2/2)

As I See

Adil El-Baz

1.
At the end of the first part of this article, I said: “They are now trying to impose a modified ‘Dayton model,’ with various scenarios being drafted that resemble Dayton.”
But what is the Dayton model, and why is it being chosen?

The Dayton Agreement (1995) was imposed by the United States following decisive military and diplomatic intervention. It brought the leaders of Bosnia’s warring factions to a U.S. military base and forced an agreement under immense pressure—an imposed, not negotiated, settlement. It ended the war by dividing power, deploying a peacekeeping force, and freezing the conflict based on realities of force.

So why choose the Dayton model now?

While the context of Yugoslavia differs, Sudan faces similar threats:
State disintegration, multiple armed factions, failure of various mediation efforts, and the transformation of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) into a dangerous and internationally-condemned militia committing genocide and ethnic cleansing—much like the Serb militias in the 1990s. Recently, the RSF has also become a regional threat. The crisis deepened after their June 11, 2025 seizure of the border triangle between Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, which Egypt saw as a direct national security threat. Then came the Central African Republic incident where the UN accused RSF of killing a Zambian peacekeeper (June 27), preceded by the drone attack on Port Sudan on May 4.

All of this is happening at a moment when the Red Sea has gained major geopolitical importance, with Washington and its allies striving to curb Iranian and Russian influence in the region.

2.
The critical variable in this trajectory is the Trump-style intervention: “Deals, not negotiations.”
Trump dislikes long negotiations, preferring to impose final agreements swiftly and decisively—just as he did with the Abraham Accords, the Taliban deal in Doha, and more recently in Congo and Rwanda.

Thus, a likely approach by the Trump administration is a “Quick Dayton”: Bring the parties together, impose an agreement, and wield the carrot and stick through diplomatic coercion, monopolizing the negotiation process under U.S. leadership—threatening sanctions or even military force—while pushing through an agreement without concern for its long-term consequences.

3.
There’s now a ready-made proposal for resolving Sudan’s conflict: merge the Jeddah and “Quad” tracks (U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE)—now expanded to include the UK and Qatar.

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has already proposed such a vision:
Integrate the Jeddah and Quad tracks, form an executive secretariat in Jeddah to oversee the agreement, declare a UN-AU-monitored ceasefire, and convert the Jeddah Declaration into a binding political agreement under a UN Security Council resolution, with participation from civil society and minorities.

4.
To implement this plan, the six-party coalition must agree to a binding settlement under strict international supervision to enforce a ceasefire, backed by comprehensive sanctions (financial, military, political) and even threats of international trials—again echoing the Bosnia model.

Those who refuse would face the stick, while the carrot would be a reconstruction program with international guarantees, similar to the $5 billion Oslo pledge for Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and promises of debt relief and strategic partnerships with the West and Gulf states.

But here’s the problem: the Saudi/Egyptian/Qatari stance doesn’t fully align with the Emirati/British/American position.
Thus, phase one must involve the U.S. brokering a unified plan among its allies—based on the institute’s proposal or otherwise—which hasn’t happened yet. This lack of consensus delayed the Quad/Six-party meeting from July 20 to July 29, 2025.

Once agreement is reached, a draft deal will be presented, accompanied by public pressure, aiming to impose a non-negotiable reality in true Trumpian fashion: an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, followed by talks based on the Jeddah framework, possibly incorporating the Manama conspiracy document, all under exclusive U.S. oversight—Dayton style.

5.
But this scenario faces major hurdles—chief among them: the basis of the ceasefire.

Imposing a ceasefire based on current battlefield realities effectively saves the militia from defeat and grants it a legitimate negotiating position—a step toward partitioning the country.

How can the perpetrators of genocide be reintegrated at the top of the state after so much bloodshed and sacrifice?
This is a delusion that neither the army nor the Dignity Alliance, currently fighting alongside it, will accept.

Such a deal is impossible.
No leader would dare sign an agreement that legitimizes the militia or its symbols. The Dignity Alliance would flatly reject any such plan.

6.
The government’s stance is clear and has been publicly shared—including at the UN and with all foreign visitors arriving in Port Sudan. This same position was declared in February 2025:

No ceasefire unless the siege of El Fasher is lifted.

A ceasefire must be followed by the RSF’s immediate withdrawal from Khartoum, West Kordofan, and Darfur.

RSF fighters must be gathered in designated camps outside cities, pending decisions on their future.

The government might accept an initial ceasefire based on international guarantees—but who will ensure the militia doesn’t stall on lifting the El Fasher siege or withdrawing from Darfur and Kordofan?
Could they regroup and resume fighting?

The RSF is fractured by regional and tribal lines, lacking field control over its forces—so how can it possibly honor a ceasefire or stop its plundering, killing, and village attacks across Darfur and Kordofan?

No one can guarantee that.
Not even thousands of peacekeepers could restrain such a criminal, lawless militia.

Remember the notorious UNAMID experience—billions spent, 22,000 troops deployed, yet the war continued and security worsened.

So the war won’t end with a ceasefire.
It will only stop if RSF’s regional sponsor is pressured to halt support and explicitly orders:

All Janjaweed fighters out of cities and into camps.

An end to RSF’s future military and political role.

A complete severance of ties.

Otherwise, this “Trumpian Dayton” is nothing more than plowing saltwater—a delusion.

7.
Another challenge facing this new Dayton is trust.
Sudan has zero trust in the six-party coalition after decades of international deceit:
From Naivasha (2003), Oslo (2005), Paris (2021), Geneva (2024) to London (2025)—all empty promises.

International pressure is always swift and forceful, but their promises?
Pure fiction.

This time, Sudan must demand a real international reconstruction fund, with money deposited upfront before any comprehensive political deal—one that excludes RSF completely.

An agreement among Sudanese political actors only.
And before any pen is put to paper, the fund must be in place to rebuild what the UAE and RSF destroyed.

Without this, we’ll again be chasing wind.
If the world wants to help, it should start with tangible action, not guardianship.

The alternative?
Let the world leave us alone.
We’ll handle our own affairs—reach our own solutions—or not. That’s our business.

If the world truly sees this war as a threat to global security, then help us end it with real support for reconstruction and development, not hollow promises.