Islamists in Sudan: A Comeback?
By Khalid Mohamed Ahmed
I was surprised by the civilians’ attempts to portray the statement made by National Congress Party leader Ahmed Haroun—regarding the Islamists’ readiness to return to power through the ballot box—as some kind of shocking revelation or breaking news that warranted all this sensationalism.
In reality, what Haroun said—though it came in the context of polishing the image—amounts, in principle, to a commitment to a democratic path. Yet the exaggerated reactions have exposed the flaws in the civilian discourse, which still relies on scare tactics rather than offering a genuine alternative.
The cleverness of Haroun’s statement lies not only in its content but also in its timing. The Islamists understand that a potential intervention by the Trump administration may upset the political balance in Sudan. Thus, they were quick to distance themselves from any intent to return via the military, in order to reassure the Americans and the West in case a foreign-brokered settlement emerges under the pretext of preventing extremists from taking the stage. From this angle, their talk of a return through elections seems like a preemptive move to secure a position on the upcoming political map. At the same time, this message is directed both internally and externally. It presents the Islamists as a disciplined force, confident in its popular support and respectful of democratic rules—while implicitly exposing what they see as their civilian rivals’ fear of electoral competition.
The civilian forces will not improve their standing or correct their course until they abandon their flawed strategy, which revolves around obsessively demonizing their Islamist rivals and constantly raising their specter, instead of focusing on offering a better model of governance or a more effective program to address the complexities of the current situation. Relying solely on fear-mongering about the return of the “remnants” or “Islamists” no longer convinces those who are suffering the consequences of this war. People no longer care who rules them as much as they care about who can bring them home safely, provide them security, health, and daily sustenance. These forces must realize that the emotional disconnect between them and the public is growing every day, because the “we are the elite, and you are the herd” rhetoric is no longer tolerable in a reality where even the most basic necessities are lacking. Anyone who speaks of rebuilding the state must first rebuild the relationship with the citizen, rather than seeking to return to power through shady alliances. They also need to understand that power cannot be seized by appealing to foreign actors or by raising empty revolutionary slogans. Rather, it comes by engaging with the people, understanding their needs, and delivering on their priorities.
The Islamists, on the other hand, should not be deceived by the momentum of the moment or assume that their contribution to military victories in this war will erase the legacy for which the people once rose up against them. Nor should they think that these victories will automatically translate into political gains after the transitional period. They must not delude themselves into believing that the road is open for a return that mirrors their 30 years of rule. That era is over, and the Sudan that rose against them in a popular revolution is not the same Sudan that might elect them back unless they change. They must recognize that the age of monopolizing power is gone, and that anyone wishing to play a meaningful role in Sudan’s future must view the moment with fresh eyes and seek to build understandings with civilian forces instead of antagonizing them. They should work toward a national settlement that ends the cycle of mutual exclusion, rather than reproducing it under a new guise. They also need to realize that the civilian forces’ utter failure during the transitional period—their exclusionary behavior, arrogant discourse, and above all their alliance with a militia that devastated the country—has handed the Islamists a free gift and breathed life into their ranks. But these factors do not grant them a blank check. They merely make them, for now, the “lesser evil” in a deeply troubled political landscape.
In the end, no one holds the deed to the future—neither the Islamists nor their opponents. Both are required today to engage in self-reflection rather than repeating old rhetoric. Anyone who believes the ballot box will reward them for their past without accountability, or for slogans without action, is delusional. The return of the Islamists is not a foregone conclusion, but it is a real possibility given the failure, confusion, and arrogance of the alternative, and the suspicions surrounding its alliances. Conversely, there is no salvation in a “civilian” front with no project and no popular base.
