The “Parallel Government” Storm in Sudan
By: Othman Mirghani
Any group can declare the formation of a government—on paper or in the digital realm—but such a declaration does not confer legitimacy or actual existence. A government without control over sovereign territory, without broad popular support, and lacking international recognition is nothing more than a phantom body. In some cases, it is a mere bargaining chip or a political maneuver to challenge a recognized authority.
The “parallel government” announced by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies on the “Ta’sis” platform represents a blend of all the above. It is a desperate attempt to impose a new reality following the failure of their bid to fully seize the Sudanese state after the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023, and after sustaining losses that forced the RSF to retreat from areas it had once occupied. Now, its control is largely limited to parts of Kordofan and certain regions of Darfur. However, this attempt is not only doomed to fail—it may well backfire on the RSF and its partners.
The move has been widely condemned by numerous countries, regional organizations, and the United Nations, all of which agreed on the illegitimacy of this so-called “government.” They warned that it could threaten Sudan’s unity and misrepresent the will of the Sudanese people. Both the African Union and the Arab League called on member states to withhold recognition, reaffirming their support for Sudan’s sovereignty, unity, and security, and emphasizing their recognition of the existing, legitimate authorities.
Domestically, the announcement sparked internal discord and outrage within the RSF itself, which has been showing signs of fragmentation in recent months due to power struggles, tribal tensions, and complaints of discrimination and marginalization. Security has deteriorated in areas under their control, with frequent armed clashes. Following the government’s announcement, several RSF advisers publicly resigned in protest. Social media platforms were flooded with videos of disillusioned RSF fighters criticizing the new government lineup and the presidential council formed under “Ta’sis.” In the footage, disgruntled soldiers accused the leadership of sidelining them and their tribes, demanding a share in power on the grounds that they were the ones who fought and lost countless young men—only to see political posts handed to civilians in suits who never joined the fight.
Protesters also lashed out at Abdelaziz al-Hilu, leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, who was appointed Deputy Head of the Presidential Council and was granted 30% of the government positions. Activists from his base in the Nuba Mountains mocked his acceptance of a subordinate role to Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), questioning whether the SPLM fought for power rather than for justice and against marginalization.
In truth, the RSF and the “Ta’sis” group’s declaration of a government is less a sign of strength than of despair, a reflection of their inability to turn the military tide in their favor—and a move that may further fracture their ranks. The government they announced is unlikely to exist on the ground, especially as the Sudanese army continues its offensives in Darfur and Kordofan. The conflict has shifted westward, with indications that the army is preparing for coordinated large-scale operations similar to those in Al-Jazira and Khartoum. Despite media claims that the government was announced from Nyala, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry stated that the meetings and the formation of the presidential council actually took place in Kenya.
While the RSF currently controls parts of Darfur and Kordofan, it does not represent the majority of the population there, nor does it enjoy support from many local communities—especially in light of widespread atrocities and acts of genocide attributed to its forces. Even within its own tribal base, the RSF faces fierce opposition from influential figures like Sheikh Musa Hilal, head of the Revolutionary Awakening Council, who harshly criticized the parallel government, lambasted Hemedti and his brother Abdelrahim, and ridiculed the notion that they could rule Sudan.
Ironically, alongside the announcement of the new government, the RSF also appointed governors for Sudan’s central, northern, eastern, Blue Nile, and Khartoum regions—areas whose residents had recently celebrated the army’s victories and the expulsion of RSF forces. These appointments underscore the absurdity of the situation for two key reasons: first, the appointed “governors” have no realistic prospect of assuming actual control; and second, even when the RSF had temporary control over these areas in the past, their civil administrations were nothing more than nominal entities with no real authority or accomplishments.
In the end, despite the media buzz surrounding its launch, this parallel government stands no chance of shifting the balance of power, which is increasingly tilting against the RSF. It certainly has no prospect of becoming a legitimate or viable alternative to govern all of Sudan.
