Ambitions Cloaked in “Support” in Sudan
Sudan Events – Agencies
Since the outbreak of the December 2018 revolution and the subsequent political transformations, Sudan has remained an open arena for foreign interventions—where regional and international interests intersect in the pursuit of influence, resources, and strategic positions.
These interventions—ranging from political, military, and economic support to various sides of the conflict—have not subsided; rather, they have evolved into more complex schemes that exploit the fragility of Sudan’s internal situation and the deep divisions among its national forces.
Instead of contributing to the country’s stability, these agendas have prolonged the conflict, reshaped the balance of power, and advanced external interests at the expense of Sudanese sovereignty, territorial unity, and national security.
Ambitions Under the Cloak of “Support”
Foreign interference in Sudanese affairs is not new. It is the product of accumulated historical, geopolitical, economic, and security factors. Since the fall of the Bashir government in April 2019, Sudan entered an uncertain transition that quickly became a playground for multifaceted foreign meddling—from neighboring and global powers alike, whether overt or covert, political or military, economic or intelligence-driven.
Despite the varied forms and justifications presented, the core objective of these interventions has been to weaken the nation-state, divide spheres of influence, and plunder resources—each actor according to its own agenda, or sometimes through coordinated roles and shared spoils.
1. Geopolitics: A Blessing and a Curse
Sudan occupies a critical location at the crossroads of North and East Africa, and between the Arab world and the Horn of Africa. With more than 800 kilometers of coastline along the Red Sea and wide borders with seven often-unstable neighbors, the country has inevitably drawn the attention of regional and global powers, each eager to secure a foothold.
But geography alone does not explain the intensity of foreign interest; internal fragilities have paved the way for interference.
2. Internal Fragility, External Exploitation
Sharp political divisions after the revolution, the absence of consensus between civilian and military actors, and the expanded political role of the armed forces created fertile ground for foreign meddling. Parallel armed groups—most notably the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—have further fragmented the security landscape in the absence of meaningful state reforms.
This instability whetted the appetite of external actors, who intervened through political funding, arms supplies, and even security-tinged economic projects—often under the pretext of supporting stability, countering terrorism, or humanitarian aid.
3. Interventions Serve Foreign Interests—Not Sudan’s
Contrary to official rhetoric, external powers intervening in Sudan are not genuinely seeking to foster democracy, end the war, or rescue the economy. In practice:
Some states are vying to control Sudan’s strategic ports and redraw the map of Red Sea influence.
Others back specific factions in the armed conflict to safeguard undeclared economic privileges.
Still others treat Sudan as a bargaining chip in unrelated global arenas—from Ukraine to the Iranian nuclear file to the conflict in Gaza.
4. Other People’s Wars on Sudanese Soil
Sudan’s deterioration is not solely the result of an internal war; it is also the product of a proxy struggle, fought by competing regional powers vying for influence beyond our borders.
Some countries bankroll factions, others arm them, and still others push to internationalize rather than resolve the crisis—ensuring their continued leverage. The outcome: Sudanese groups are lured, knowingly or not, into external alliances that undermine the national project, turning Sudan into a battlefield for disputes that are not its own.
5. Sovereignty: More Than a Slogan
Defending against these interventions does not mean isolationism or hostility toward the outside world. It means reclaiming national decision-making and structuring relations with the region and the world in line with Sudan’s interests—not those of others. This requires:
Rebuilding internal unity on the basis of inclusive consensus, not exclusion.
Launching a broad national project for state reconstruction, grounded in a constitution.
Regulating foreign relations according to sovereignty and balanced interests.
Strengthening the professional national army as the sole legitimate bearer of arms and representative of all Sudanese.
Abandoning the illusion that foreign actors will build our nation for us—they will only consume what remains of it.
Conclusion
Foreign interventions are not destiny. They are the product of Sudan’s own internal void and its failure to close off the channels of interference. Internal divisions, fragile alliances, and misplaced trust in outsiders have left the nation exposed to the storm.
The recent fiery statements by the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief—lamenting the situation in El Fasher and western Sudan more broadly, decrying the continued flow of arms to the rebellion, and expressing frustration at the international community’s stance—are but reflections of these ongoing intrusions.
The crucial question today is not: Who is intervening, and why? Rather, it is: When will we stop inviting outsiders to arbitrate our domestic affairs? When will we summon the courage to say: this is our country, and we will reclaim its decisions with our own hands?
And when will we confront the illusory alliances, born of power-sharing bargains and insurgent platforms, which ultimately reveal their subservience to foreign agendas—exposed by the contradictions in their words and deeds amid this fragile, high-risk context of contested wealth and power?
