U.S. Congress Moves Closer to Designating Sudan’s (RSF) as a Terrorist Organization
Sudan Events – Agencies
The U.S. Congress is edging toward an unprecedented step in its handling of the Sudanese crisis. As lawmakers debate the 2026 defense budget this week, an additional provision requires the State Department to conduct a formal assessment of whether Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) meet the criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).
The amendment, introduced by Republican Senator Jim Risch, compels the Secretary of State—working in consultation with the Treasury Secretary and the Attorney General—to submit a classified report to the relevant congressional committees within 90 days of the bill’s enactment.
This move comes amid growing pressure on the Biden administration from lawmakers and human rights groups, following mounting international reports accusing the RSF of committing massacres and atrocities that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, particularly in Darfur and across northern and western Sudan.
U.S. Designation Criteria
The United States bases FTO designations on Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA – 8 U.S.C. §1189), which sets out three conditions:
1. The entity must be a foreign organization.
2. It must engage in terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to carry it out.
3. Its activities must threaten U.S. national security, including defense, foreign relations, and economic interests.
Applied to the RSF, the fit appears clear:
Criterion One: The RSF is a Sudanese paramilitary force with a defined hierarchy under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”).
Criterion Two: Organizations including the UN, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International have documented massacres in Geneina, Zamzam, and El Fasher, as well as systematic rape, sieges of displaced persons camps, and looting of humanitarian aid.
Criterion Three: The RSF’s involvement in gold smuggling networks through Dubai, its collaboration with Russia’s Wagner Group, and its destabilizing role across Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic all directly touch U.S. and allied interests.
Consequences of Designation
Should the State Department move forward with the designation, the RSF would face immediate repercussions:
Legal: Any material or logistical support from U.S. persons or entities would be criminalized.
Financial: Assets within U.S. jurisdiction would be frozen, with secondary sanctions threatening foreign banks and companies that maintain ties.
Political: The RSF would shift from being treated as a domestic conflict actor to an internationally isolated terrorist organization, placing major pressure on backers—particularly the UAE.
On the Ground: Reduced access to financing and arms could weaken its battlefield capacity, but might also push the group toward more desperate acts of retaliation.
Comparisons with Past Cases
Hezbollah (Lebanon): Designated in 1997; implicated in bombings, assassinations, and global financing networks.
Houthis (Yemen): Designated in 2021 (with later adjustments); responsible for attacks on civilians and maritime shipping.
RSF (Sudan): Currently under review; meets all three statutory criteria.
International and Regional Reactions
Globally: The designation is likely to win support from the EU and Canada, where calls have been mounting for tougher sanctions on the RSF and its leadership after recent massacres in Darfur.
Regionally: Chad and South Sudan may come under pressure to block RSF supply routes. The UAE, however, would face the sharpest dilemma—balancing ties with Washington against its interests in Sudan and Libya.
Domestically in Sudan: The army could gain political legitimacy as the “lawful” counterpart against a terrorist-designated foe. Yet, analysts warn the move may radicalize the RSF, worsening the civilian toll.
Expected Outcome
Based on precedent, the RSF appears fully eligible for designation. If enacted, the measure would:
1. Cut off its international financing networks, especially gold exports.
2. Force regional allies—particularly the UAE—to reconsider their involvement.
3. Strengthen the Sudanese Armed Forces’ standing as a potential U.S. counterterrorism partner.
4. Reframe Sudan’s war from a domestic civil conflict to a matter of global counterterrorism policy.
Still, experts caution that such a move could complicate mediation efforts and prolong the war if the RSF chooses escalation over compliance.
Conclusion
Congress’s upcoming vote on the 2026 defense budget is not merely a domestic legislative matter. If the RSF is designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization, it would face unprecedented isolation, and its regional backers would be forced to reassess their strategies. The Sudanese army, meanwhile, would seek to leverage the decision to its advantage.
Ultimately, the outcome goes beyond Sudan: it touches on regional balance in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and signals Washington’s broader approach to managing armed violence worldwide.
