The Quadruple Farce: How Abu Dhabi Tailored the Statement to Its Whim

As I See

Adil Al-Baz

This article aims to dissect the so-called “Quad Statement,” a document mired in collusion, distortion, and brazen interference. From the moment I read it, I found myself circling back, astonished, bewildered—not merely because of its flimsy language and deceitful framing, but because it revealed the betrayal of supposed brothers in a manner that stirred nausea. Most striking was the extent of Emirati manipulation embedded within it; the statement could well have been drafted in the UAE’s foreign ministry, for it delivered on every one of Abu Dhabi’s agendas. Each paragraph was riddled with contradictions and confusion, as I will show.

What puzzled me further was the Quartet’s sheer ignorance of Sudan’s political climate—its willful blindness. It saw nothing on the ground, only the desires of the UAE, adopting its agenda without shame.

I will begin my reading of this “quadruple monstrosity” from the last line—backwards, as it deserves. But first, note the timeline:

July 2025: A draft collapses in Washington amid disagreements among Quartet members.

Late August: Quiet efforts revive the process, with cosmetic edits.

September 2025: The statement emerges, stamped with concessions that distinguish its “September version.”

The final line reads: “The ministers agreed to continue consultations on this matter during the Quartet ministerial meeting in September (2025).”

This reveals that the document released days ago is in fact the very draft discarded in Washington two months earlier. Its reference to “September consultations” betrays the recycling; had it been freshly prepared, it would have referred to “the current month.” No credible mediation could issue a statement on complex conflicts only to call for further consultations within ten days—without consulting the very “warring parties” it names.

The confusion stems from the sweeping concessions the U.S. and the UAE extracted from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which made them rush to publish the shelved July text without even correcting the dates. The urgency was no accident—it reflected the battlefield collapse of Emirati-backed militias before the advance of Sudan’s army in Kordofan and Darfur.

By inserting a token concession (which I will expose later), the UAE resuscitated the rejected July draft. This cosmetic tweak secured buy-in from its partners, who shamefully surrendered to Abu Dhabi’s line. The battlefield shifted, so the Quartet scrambled to cloak the military reality with vague humanitarian language—an effort to freeze momentum that no longer served those behind the statement.