What Cameron Hudson Said About the Quartet Statement and U.S. Treasury Sanctions

American analyst Cameron Hudson, a specialist in African affairs and particularly Sudan, published a series of posts on X about two recent statements: one issued by the so-called Quartet — the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia — and another announcing sanctions by the U.S. State and Treasury Departments.

Hudson’s commentary, though broken into short posts due to platform limitations, reads like a tightly argued article. His main points were sharply critical of both statements, contending that the Quartet was pontificating on matters it barely understood while following the lead of the UAE. He argued that unless the four states explicitly name the UAE as the main driver of Sudan’s prolonged conflict — supplying weapons and ammunition to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) — their statements amount to little more than fruitless diplomatic exercises.

A second theme in Hudson’s analysis was that, while he does not believe Sudan’s former Islamist regime under Omar al-Bashir can return to power, the blanket labeling of Islamists and the sanctions policy more broadly appear to be products of Emirati influence. He cited the case of Sudanese Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, noting that allegations linking him to Iran were questionable at best.

On the Quartet Statement

Hudson wrote that the Quartet’s “Statement of Principles” on Sudan was the most serious articulation in over a year of what influential states expect for the country’s political future. But, he added, it must be read alongside U.S. sanctions.

“This is not a roadmap,” he argued, “despite some media descriptions. It is not a process, and it contains no consequences or enforcement mechanisms.” Instead, it was simply a set of principles that four powerful states agreed upon, seemingly without any meaningful consultation with Sudanese civil society or political actors.

The statement reaffirmed familiar points — respect for Sudanese sovereignty, unhindered humanitarian access, and rejection of a military solution. Hudson acknowledged the importance of repeating these, but stressed that “they are not new.”

The novelty lay in sections four and five: declaring that neither of the armed parties should have a long-term role in governing Sudan, and proposing a very short nine-month transition to a broadly legitimate civilian-led government. The statement also explicitly excluded the former regime, identified as the Muslim Brotherhood, from future political participation.

Hudson described these provisions as “at best, ambitious.” Artificial timelines often serve diplomatic purposes, he noted, but without real political will to enforce them, they risk collapsing. The demand requires a great deal of good faith from warring parties — who are under no obligation to act in good faith — and from the Quartet states, who have yet to demonstrate consistent commitment to Sudan.

He also pointed out that the unnamed civilian groups who would supposedly inherit power are either politically aligned with key signatories like the UAE and Egypt, or too weak and fragmented to govern effectively. For Hudson, the most tangible value of the statement might be the call for a three-month humanitarian ceasefire — but only if the UAE and Egypt could pressure their respective clients in the conflict to respect it.

The “Big Lie” of Military Support

Hudson was particularly scathing about the fifth principle: ending external military support. He noted that everyone knows such support is prolonging the war — and that the UAE is the main supplier.

He wrote that unless Abu Dhabi openly admits its role in funneling weapons to the RSF — through Chad, Libya, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Puntland — the entire document lacks legitimacy. “If the central lie of this war remains unacknowledged,” he warned, “then this whole exercise is nothing more than a diplomatic charade.”

On U.S. Sanctions

Turning to U.S. sanctions, Hudson argued that they must be read in conjunction with the Quartet statement. Washington recently targeted Sudan’s Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim and the “al-Baraoun” militia.

Hudson questioned the rationale for labeling Jibril an Islamist hardliner. “From my knowledge of him and those around him, he is not,” he wrote, suggesting three possible explanations:

1. The U.S. possesses intelligence suggesting otherwise (which he doubted).

2. Washington’s understanding of Sudanese Islamism is so poor that it mistook Jibril for an easy target (which he saw as most likely).

3. The move was made under pressure from the UAE, seeking to portray Sudan’s army-backed government as dominated by Islamists.

Hudson emphasized that while almost everyone agrees Sudan’s former regime should not return to power, these sanctions look more like a diplomatic win for the UAE — which has long used the “Islamist threat” narrative to justify its covert support for the RSF.

Final Assessment

Ultimately, Hudson concluded that both the Quartet statement and the U.S. sanctions reflect Washington’s attempt to mediate among rival regional powers competing for influence on the Red Sea, rather than a genuine strategy to end Sudan’s war.

He noted that such efforts are not inherently bad — provided they create a process and commit the U.S. and others to sustained engagement. With the UN General Assembly only days away, Hudson wrote, “Let’s see whether this statement creates any momentum, and whether the parties live up to these commitments.”