The Liberation of Bara and the Battle for An-Nuhud: The Army’s Gateway to Ending the War in Kordofan and Darfur
By Abdel Nasser Salem Hamid
The battles in Kordofan are no longer peripheral skirmishes on Sudan’s margins. They have become the decisive knot that could determine the entire outcome of the war. Between Bara—whose liberation broke the siege of El-Obeid and reopened the road to Khartoum—and An-Nuhud, the strategic gateway to Darfur, lies the choice: either a strategic victory restoring state authority, or a prolonged war of attrition that exhausts both the army and society.
The liberation of Bara in September 2025 was not a local event of limited consequence, but a turning point in the war. Just 60 kilometers from El-Obeid, the town has always been a logistical hub controlling supply lines between Khartoum and the west. The militia had deployed thousands of fighters and foreign mercenaries from Chad, Niger, and even Colombia, relying on guerrilla tactics, ambushes, and hit-and-run raids with pickup trucks. The army countered with a coordinated offensive—ground troops and armor backed by heavy air support and precision drone strikes—that collapsed the enemy’s defenses and secured the town.
The immediate effect was logistical. Reopening the Khartoum–El-Obeid road restored a vital supply artery for ammunition, provisions, and medical evacuation. For months, El-Obeid had been semi-isolated. Breaking the siege revived the army’s operational mobility, though threats remain from Jabra Al-Sheikh, a potential route for enemy counter-maneuvers. The army has therefore moved to secure this axis within a broad defensive belt to safeguard the corridor.
El-Obeid, 360 kilometers from Khartoum, has regained its role as the operational center of gravity. As North Kordofan’s capital and a crossroads linking east, west, and south, its earlier encirclement nearly paralyzed central Sudan. Now restored, it serves as a strategic rear base and logistical depot. More than a liberated city, El-Obeid is the beating heart of the army and the launchpad for broader offensives.
An-Nuhud, however, remains the true test. Located 110 kilometers west of El-Obeid, the town is a strategic linchpin. Its capture would shift the war’s center of gravity directly into Darfur, a fact well understood by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). They have concentrated over 6,000 fighters there, bolstered by fresh mercenaries, and built layered defenses to block the army’s advance. For the RSF, holding An-Nuhud is existential: its fall would open the road to Al-Fashir, Nyala, and Zalingei—the heart of Darfur and the RSF’s social and military support base.
The army’s tactics blend aerial reconnaissance, precision strikes, and attacks on supply lines with simultaneous ground offensives from multiple axes. The aim is not merely to seize territory, but to dismantle the RSF’s cohesion and strip away the element of surprise that has long defined its warfare.
If An-Nuhud is the fulcrum of northern Kordofan, then Abu Zabad is the key to its west. Securing it would neutralize the entire state, denying the militia any fallback positions. Meanwhile, Dubeibat opens the road to Dilling and reconnects the south with the center, ensuring unified supply lines between Kadugli and El-Obeid. Together, these gains would allow the army to maneuver freely across multiple fronts.
Yet the battle is not only geographic—it is also psychological and social. Civilians in Bara and El-Obeid greeted the army with cheers, restoring state prestige and lifting soldiers’ morale. By contrast, the RSF lost its aura of invincibility, undermining recruitment and loyalty within its ranks. Images of popular celebrations became strategic messages, undercutting the RSF narrative and weakening its political legitimacy.
Regionally, the impact extends beyond Sudan. Libya and Chad watch nervously, aware that closing smuggling routes will alter cross-border trade dynamics. Egypt and Ethiopia monitor the situation due to its implications for Red Sea and Nile Basin stability. The UAE—accused of backing the militia—faces the prospect that losing Kordofan would erode its influence in Sudan. International powers, meanwhile, see control of Kordofan as a decisive card in any future political settlement.
History shows Kordofan has never been marginal. In the late 19th century, it was the springboard of the Mahdist revolution that toppled Khartoum. In the 1980s, battles in Rahad and Kadugli shaped the civil war’s trajectory. Today, history repeats itself: whoever controls Kordofan holds the key to both central and western Sudan.
The challenges ahead remain significant. The army must consolidate its gains by securing Jabra Al-Sheikh, dismantling RSF concentrations around An-Nuhud, and capturing Abu Zabad and Dubeibat to open the road to Dilling. The militia will continue to exploit geography—long exposed roads in the north, dense savannah in the south—for ambushes. Yet with expanded drone surveillance, precision strikes, and multi-axis deployments, the army has blunted much of the RSF’s ability to surprise, exposing it to mounting losses.
In sum, Sudan stands at a historic crossroads. But the trajectory on the ground suggests the army is advancing steadily with growing momentum. With Bara liberated and El-Obeid unencircled, the battles for An-Nuhud, Abu Zabad, and Dubeibat are edging closer to resolution. Each step forward shrinks RSF influence and weakens its staying power. As operational tempo accelerates and logistical and tactical superiority widens, the full liberation of Kordofan now appears a matter of time—paving the way for entry into Darfur from a position of strength, and the definitive end of the militia era.
The Sudanese army is not merely defending territory. With the blood of its soldiers, it is shaping the contours of a new Sudan—one freed from chaos and terror.
