At Least an Agreement, But Without Sudanese Participation: Khartoum Rejects U.S.-Arab Peace Roadmap

Sudan Events – Agencies

After a string of failed attempts to chart a path out of Sudan’s devastating civil war, a statement issued on 12 September 2025 by the Quartet—comprising Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States—on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York, appeared to mark a potential breakthrough. The plan calls for a ceasefire and a political transition led by civilian forces, excluding the warring factions from power.

On the same day, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on two Islamist factions allied with Sudan’s Armed Forces under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Khartoum. Washington’s move reflects its strategy to revive the peace process as part of a broader effort to counter Islamist movements and Iranian influence in Sudan and the wider region. Without firm action, U.S. officials fear Islamist influence could grow amid Sudan’s internal collapse.

Whether the Quartet’s plan translates into reality depends on the four states’ willingness to enforce it and punish spoilers. Some observers worry U.S. officials may lose interest or be distracted by other crises. Yet two political shifts could open the door to serious talks involving both warring sides—Burhan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”—alongside civilian forces pushing for a postwar transition.

The first shift is Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s departure from his previous position that Sudan’s Armed Forces were the sole legitimate authority and that generals should lead the postwar transition. The second is the UAE’s signature on the Quartet statement, despite its military and political backing for Hemedti and the RSF. The statement urges all external actors to halt support for either side.

Despite accusations of bias against the army due to sanctions, Washington does not support Sudan’s partition nor recognize the RSF-led “Founding Alliance” government in Darfur, which Hemedti created to secure a veneer of legitimacy.

The Quartet statement rules out a military solution, calls for unimpeded humanitarian access across Sudan as mandated by international law, and urges a three-month ceasefire leading to a permanent truce. It envisions civilian-led negotiations on Sudan’s political future followed by a nine-month civilian transition.

Crucially, the statement says the warring parties must not lead the transition, and Islamist groups—including Sudan’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood—must be excluded. U.S. officials say this explains sanctions against Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement, and the al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion, the largest Islamist militia aligned with the army.

However, the statement is softer on external military support, merely noting it must stop without naming the foreign suppliers. This likely reflects the fact that three major suppliers—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE—are themselves signatories, all closely tied to Washington’s security agenda. Western officials remain reluctant to censure or sanction the war’s sponsors, including Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

The plan is riddled with gaps. It offers few details on how the transition would unfold, and no Sudanese civil or political forces were invited to discussions—underscoring the Quartet’s apparent disregard for their weight. Coordinating a meeting between the Quartet and Sudan’s civilians remains fraught. A reference was made to talks held in Cairo a year ago, which were meant to continue this month, but Sudanese civilian groups have since grown more fragmented. Meanwhile, competing initiatives from Egypt, the African Union, and UN envoy Ramtane Lamamra add further confusion.

Before Khartoum’s army-led government formally rejected the Quartet plan on 18 September, skeptics already doubted its viability, citing restrictions on Islamist groups. Burhan insists today he is not an Islamist, but his career rose with the 1989 coup by the National Islamic Front, which entrenched Islamist dominance over Sudan’s security state.

At this stage of the war, Burhan seems unable—or unwilling—to distance himself from Islamist-aligned factions that prop up the army on the frontlines: the Justice and Equality Movement in El Fasher, and the al-Baraa bin Malik Battalion in Kordofan. Many of the army’s supporters see the Quartet plan as undermining both Burhan and the military just as they regain ground in North Kordofan and reinforce positions in El Obeid, while holding El Fasher.

Another flaw lies in the Quartet’s weak commitments: no deadlines or pledges from signatories to stop their own military support. This omission could leave the UAE the biggest beneficiary, given its reported arms, financing, and political backing for Hemedti, as well as its influence on Sudan’s neighbors Chad, Libya, South Sudan, and Uganda. Should the Quartet talks stall, international scrutiny will likely shift back onto Abu Dhabi.

U.S. presidential envoy Massad Boulos, after meeting Burhan in Zurich on 11 August, has not met RSF leaders, but soon after held talks with UAE Deputy PM and National Security Adviser Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a key Hemedti ally. The RSF and its allies maintain discreet contacts with the U.S. and UK, but human rights abuses by RSF forces make such engagement sensitive. Delivery of humanitarian aid remains hampered by both sides’ lack of control—or willingness—to implement their leaders’ commitments.

Given Abu Dhabi’s close ties to the RSF, the ruling family risks accountability if aid fails to reach civilians. Likewise, army-allied militias resist aid delivery unless it serves their interests.

Egypt’s support for the Quartet surprised many. Cairo has consistently backed Sudan’s Armed Forces as the legitimate national institution fighting what it calls an “armed rebellion.” Analysts suggest Egypt is recalibrating its regional security stance after Israel’s airstrike on Doha and Washington’s lack of response.

President Sisi refuses to host Gaza’s displaced on Egyptian soil, vowing not to travel to Washington to meet President Trump as long as U.S. resettlement plans remain on the table. Cairo views Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza as a forced displacement campaign, with no guarantees of return. Many fleeing Gazans—including Hamas cadres tied to the Muslim Brotherhood—would head toward Egypt, a scenario Sisi deems an existential threat.

Nile water politics further complicate matters. Sisi remains deeply unsettled by Washington’s ambiguity on Ethiopia’s Grand Renaissance Dam, backed by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the UAE. For Cairo, the dam represents a greater threat than Sudan’s war.

Gulf Calculations and Washington’s Balancing Act

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has remained publicly silent on Sudan despite deep concern over its impact on regional balance. Riyadh’s Sudan policy rests on two pillars: keeping foreign powers like Iran, Russia, and the UAE off its Red Sea shores, and opposing any left-leaning democratic politics or Islamist-aligned movements.

Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s ill-fated recent trip to Riyadh reflects this stance. Though he met Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan, he never secured an audience with MBS, despite Saudi attempts to arrange one. The Quartet statement pointed back to the failed 2023 Jeddah Agreement as evidence of Saudi engagement.

In the region, Washington’s sanctions are seen as one-sided, disproportionately targeting army allies while overstating Iran’s role. Critics argue U.S. policy downplays RSF backers’ responsibility. The New York Times recently revealed lavish Emirati payments to Trump and his envoy, real estate developer Steve Witkoff. Others note Washington’s interest in Libya’s oil sector and bargaining with Turkey on unrelated files.

By framing Sudan’s war through the lenses of “regional security” and “counterterrorism,” Washington is pressing the African Union and IGAD to align with the Quartet. Both have signed a joint statement backing its principles, signaling that dissenters will be branded spoilers.

Yet Eritrea and South Sudan may prove obstacles: their fragility makes them less susceptible to U.S. pressure, while China courts both.

For now, the Quartet roadmap looks ill-equipped to address Sudan’s fractured politics or the regional power plays shaping the conflict. It seems detached from realities on the ground and from Sudan’s civil forces, who demand humanitarian access, accountability, and a clear transition path.

No evidence suggests the Quartet has learned from Sudan’s failed 2019 transition, when grassroots resistance forced Omar al-Bashir out only to see the army derail reform. Unless the Quartet’s upcoming late-September meeting delivers timelines and concrete steps, the plan risks withering before it takes root.