They Keep Looking Back…!
By Al-Tahir Satti
A man once came to Imam Ibn al-Jawzi confessing: “I have committed adultery, and the woman became pregnant.” The Imam rebuked him: “Why did you not use withdrawal when you committed the sin?” The man replied humbly: “I was told that withdrawal is disliked (makruh).” The Imam shouted in anger: “Leave my sight, man! You were told that withdrawal is disliked, yet you weren’t told that adultery is forbidden?”
What is astonishing today is that some people judge the contact between Khalid Omar Yousif, a leader in the “Sumood Alliance,” and Abu Aqla Keikel, commander of the “Batahna Shield,” as a sinful act — yet they do not see Keikel’s armed seizure of Al-Jazira as sinful, or even morally questionable. May God forgive this people, Keikel, Khalid — and that man who sinned long ago.
Phobia and Denial
Amid their pointless squabbles, I came across two striking claims: “Keikel is a miniature model of Islamist criminality.”
“He is a pawn on a chessboard run by the National Congress Party.”
Khalid Omar, it seems, is not defending himself; he is suffering from a deep phobia of the Islamist movement and the former ruling party.
In his subconscious, Batahna Shield — with all its soldiers and supporters from Al-Jazira and across Sudan — exists only as an extension of the National Congress Party. In this mindset, not only the Batahna Shield but also the Joint Forces and all popular supporters of the army are merely branches of the old regime. Such is the thinking of today’s activists.
And of course, to them, the Sudanese Army itself is “the Islamists’ army.” Anyone who fights the Dagalo militia must either be an Islamist or be incited by one. Every supporter of the army is, by their logic, managed by Islamists. In their narrow imagination, Sudan has no people left outside two camps: Abu Dhabi’s “Sumood Alliance” and Ali Karti’s “Islamists.”
An Obsession Turned Doctrine
Khalid Omar is not alone in need of psychological therapy. Consider this statement by Mohamed al-Faki: “The alliance between the army, the Rapid Support Forces, and the revolutionary forces must be restored to confront the Islamists.”
Al-Faki, too, is afflicted with the same Islamist phobia. His entire hope for political alliance revolves not around rebuilding the country, but around fighting Islamists.
This comes as no surprise. During his time in power, Al-Faki spent all his energy setting traps for Ali Karti—and failed in three separate attempts. Having achieved nothing tangible, he reduced his political mission to hunting one man. He never planted a single tree in his village, for his idea of achievement was limited to “a successful ambush.”
Similarly, look at Babiker Faisal. From the moment he learned to write until tomorrow’s column, he has had no issue other than the National Congress Party. His own political coalition, the Democratic Gathering, has splintered into five or more factions, yet he remains singularly obsessed with “Islamism,” or “the Islamic Movement,” as he calls it when readers tire of his repetition.
The Phobia of the National Congress
Driven by his obsession, Babiker Faisal recently accused the National Congress Party of rejecting a Turkish mediation initiative and sabotaging negotiations with the UAE—though Turkey never offered a formal initiative at all. It merely suggested that it might present one. The government agreed, and the UAE simply did not respond, because it seeks to pose as a neutral mediator while concealing the fact that it is, in truth, a hostile party.
And so it goes: all their discourse circles endlessly around the National Congress Party. Their entire intellectual horizon is limited to it. Anyone who disagrees with them—on politics, economics, or even on whether Real Madrid played better than Barcelona—is immediately branded a “National Congress loyalist.” They have inflated the party to mythical proportions unmatched by any propaganda in the world.
This collective phobia has stripped their parties of confidence in their own ideas, programs, and supporters. And that is how they are so easily devoured by their rivals. It is the law of nature: a gazelle can run over 90 kilometers per hour, while a tiger barely reaches 60. Yet the gazelle is often caught—not because the tiger is faster, but because the gazelle keeps looking back, over and over, to measure the distance between itself and the predator. In doing so, it slows down just enough for the tiger to catch it — and devour it whole.
