National Capitalism and the Production of Failure: Unraveling Sudan’s Economic Structure and Exposing the Hidden Truth

By Mohamed Al-Haj
Sudan possesses immense natural wealth: vast fertile lands, abundant water resources, and rich mineral deposits. Its strategic geographical position also qualifies it to be a regional and global economic hub. Yet, the economic reality tells a different story — one of dysfunction and missed opportunities. Instead of serving as a driver of progress, national capitalism has degenerated into a parasitic form driven by the logic of quick profit, fueled by nepotism and administrative corruption, and operating in the absence of strategic planning. The result has been the mere production of value extraction, not the building of an integrated economy.
Sudan’s productive sectors, foremost among them agriculture, suffer from chronic neglect despite being the backbone of the national economy. Weak infrastructure, lack of technology, and inconsistent government policies have rendered agriculture unstable. The industrial sector is virtually absent, lacking a strategic vision that could link it to local raw materials. Meanwhile, the national private sector—expected to be the engine of growth—faces bureaucratic obstacles and an investment-hostile environment, caused by a lack of incentives and eroded trust in state institutions.
Sudanese capitalism has not been built on production, but on speculation and consumption. It is a parasitic capitalism that feeds on imports and quick returns rather than long-term investment. This economic model produces no added value, creates no sustainable employment, and entrenches dependency, leaving the economy fragile in the face of crises. The unregulated gold mining boom stands as a striking example—destroying productive sectors like agriculture and livestock, while generating a fragile rent-based economy incapable of sustainable expansion.
The crisis extends beyond parasitic capitalism to encompass deep-rooted administrative corruption and nepotism within state institutions. Positions are awarded on the basis of loyalty rather than competence; projects are managed without transparency or oversight. This has led to resource waste, bloated unproductive spending, and a severe erosion of public trust. Such structural corruption has not only paralyzed development but also produced a class of entrenched elites who obstruct genuine reform and perpetuate cycles of failure.
Another decisive factor in this collapse is the absence of strategic planning. Budgets are managed reactively; projects are launched without feasibility studies; and economic policies are detached from the realities of production. There is no vision linking resources to sectors, nor institutions capable of coordinating between economic actors. The result is a fragmented economy, incapable of adaptation or growth.
The so-called National Project—which once carried the slogan “We eat what we grow and wear what we make”—was nothing more than a rhetorical façade. It was sabotaged from within by those who promoted it. It became a propaganda slogan, while the state continued to import food and clothing and ignored support for agriculture and industry. Ironically, those who championed the slogan were the first to abandon it in practice, revealing the stark contradiction between discourse and reality and further eroding public faith in any developmental initiative.
The outbreak of war on April 15 exposed the fragility of Sudan’s economic structure with unprecedented clarity. Supply chains collapsed, production halted, the currency plummeted, and state institutions disintegrated. No economic framework withstood the shock, nor was there any strategic reserve or adaptive capacity in place. The so-called “national” capitalist class quickly fled abroad in search of financial safety in foreign banks and real estate, leaving behind a vast economic vacuum. This mass exodus revealed the true nature of Sudanese capitalism—it is detached from production, thrives on import margins and speculation, and collapses at the first real test.
To achieve genuine transformation, Sudan must adopt a national economic project based on the following pillars:
Restructuring the agricultural sector and linking it to agro-industrial development.
Revitalizing the industrial sector through production zones and real investment incentives.
Regulating the mining sector and turning it into a sustainable, environmentally responsible industry.
Combating administrative corruption and nepotism by reforming state institutions and strengthening oversight mechanisms.
Establishing an effective economic planning framework grounded in data and realistic studies.
Building a genuine partnership between the public and private sectors based on trust and transparency.
Formulating a national development strategy that reflects Sudan’s unique context and defines clear investment priorities.
The failure of Sudanese capitalism is not merely an economic setback—it is the outcome of decades of corruption, poor planning, and the absence of political will. What is required today is not superficial reform but a complete reconstruction of the economic model—rooted in production, justice, and good governance. Only when the economy shifts from rent-seeking to production, and from patronage to competence, can Sudan embark on a true path toward stability and prosperity.



